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This dissertation focuses on the cultural productions of humor by South Asian Muslim 
men and the ways in which “Islam” is self-constructed and articulated through comedic 
performance in a contemporary U.S. context. I argue that humor is a mode of secular discourse, 
in which the ability to laugh at oneself has been disciplined into a prized personality trait of the 
ideal subject within secular social schemas. In such a humor regime, the gendered and racialized 
Muslim body becomes a signifier of communal belonging, exclusion, and religious difference. 
Through a critical analysis of films, television shows, and standup comedy routines by the 
comedians Aziz Ansari, Kumail Nanjiani, and Hasan Minhaj, I chart the discursive goalposts that 
demarcate when humor becomes explicitly marked and/or recognized as Muslim, and when these 
comedians themselves were named and name themselves as such.  
Under a progressive consensus of recognition, these men step into their Muslim identities 
through the language and hostile implications of racialization. They cultivate a Right Muslim self 
that upholds secular ideals like multiculturalism by taming bodily comportments that may 
otherwise affiliate with Islam outside the legible boundaries of racialized difference. The humor 
that these men stage subverts categorical assumptions about Muslim sedition and violence while 
also offering a performance of representative resistance to counter the hegemonic order that 
reads largely as white. This performance does not hold to account the disciplinary demands of 
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INTRODUCTION: FUNNY MUSLIMS  
 
We’re walking down the hallway, and I see all these photos of the old correspondents that 
came before me. Steve Carell, John Oliver, Sam Bee, Jason Jones, Ed Helms, Steven 
Colbert… and me? Keema roti me? Nah, come on, you know we don’t end up this far. You 
know the way it is for us. Middle management till we die. Cube life till we die. We’re not on 
that stage, ever. 
 
- Hasan Minhaj, Homecoming King1 
 
Why Comedy? 
Hasan Minhaj stares at his palms in wild disbelief in this scene, employing his signature 
harried pacing across the stage of the Mondavi Center at the University of California, Davis. He 
is back in that moment, bewildered that he is being physically ushered into a world of American 
comedy greats, where – in his telling – “we” have never been.2 His audience whoops and hollers, 
both in recognition of the illustrious roll call but also because they know how this story ends. 
Minhaj gets the job at The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, then America’s premier satire television 
program. He has, by all accounts, made it. The triumphant demeanor that closes out the special, 
accompanied by spinning spotlights and an orchestral score, signals that by extension so have 
“we.”3 
 
1 Hasan Minhaj and Christopher Storer, Homecoming King (Netflix, 2017). 
2 The contrast painted between Minhaj and this all-white list of correspondents is blunted by the fact that 
The Daily Show under Jon Stewart’s helm employed a number of non-white correspondents prior to 
Minhaj’s hire, including Larry Wilmore, Wyatt Cenac, Al Madrigal, Jessica Williams, and most notably 
Asif Mandvi (another South Asian Muslim man).  
3 Throughout this dissertation, I have opted to write in the present tense with respect to the performances I 
investigate as well as my analytical responses to them. 
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I recall sharing in that air of celebration when I first saw Homecoming King, flush with a 
sense of pride for this man who had the gait and facial hair of my brother. Furthermore, it was 
not just him: the currency of three South Asian Muslim men (Hasan Minhaj, Aziz Ansari and 
Kumail Nanjiani) had reached a zenith in 2017. By the end of that year, these men were 
everywhere on the pop culture scene: Minhaj hosted the White House Correspondent’s Dinner 
during Donald Trump’s first year in office, released Homecoming King, and left a stint on the 
Daily Show to headline his own political comedy program on Netflix titled Patriot Act. After 
several Comedy Central and Netflix comedy specials, as well as seven seasons as a series regular 
on the popular NBC sitcom Parks and Recreation, Aziz Ansari launched and starred in his own 
critically acclaimed show Master of None on Netflix. Kumai Nanjiani, a mainstay on HBO’s 
Silicon Valley, turned the story of his marriage into an Amazon-produced film, the Big Sick. He 
and his wife, Emily Gordon, were nominated for an Oscar the next year for their screenplay.  
It was thus a mix of curiosity and shared excitement over the sudden and no longer 
singular representation of South Asian Muslim men on the pop culture stage that drew me to this 
project. As a longtime backseat observer (and indeed, a consumer and fan!) of this phenomenon, 
I found a moment of convergence with my broader scholarly interest in the shifting forms of 
American Muslim representation. Why was it comedy and comedians, and ones who were South 
Asian men at that, who were getting these big breaks? And why was Islam being invoked as a 
way of identifying themselves and the dynamic in which their work was located? These men are 






Representation and Seeing Muslims 
Enduring in the study of Islam is a common refrain, picking up steam in the years since 
2001, that if people just learned about Islam or saw more positive representations of Muslims in 
media, then instances of anti-Muslim hostilities would inevitably diminish and end.4 This 
hostility exists, the argument goes, because of a lack of knowledge; it is a problem with a simple 
fix. An outpouring of positive representation would counter the otherwise overwhelming media 
associations of Muslims and Islam with terrorism, war, and immigration.5 Yet scholars like 
Evelyn Alsultany have deftly demonstrated the folly behind such stratagem, arguing that the 
production of such inverse imagery (in shows like 24, The Practice, and Law and Order) lifts up 
the claim of a “post-racial” society in which the constitutional rights of some Muslims can be 
legitimately jettisoned in order to maintain the security of a broader populace that includes 
innocent Muslims.6 Such simplified representations do not extricate “good” or “bad” Muslims 
from of the realm of U.S. national security threats, rather insisting upon the demonstration of 
“diversity patriotism” to ensure one lands in one column and not the other. That there is a list 
with two columns, however, is not a question. All the while, anti-Muslim hostility pervades 
 
4 I use anti-Muslim hostility in place of the more commonly recognized “Islamophobia,” drawing from 
Juliane Hammer’s reasoning that the etymology of this latter term individualizes discrimination by way of 
diminishing its broader social and systemic relations to war, racism, patriarchy, and homophobia. She 
translates the German word Islamfeindlichkeit for its applicability not just in intellectual discourses such 
as these, but to “empower activist strategies and political interventions.” See Juliane Hammer, Peaceful 
Families: American Muslim Efforts against Domestic Violence (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2019), 37-38. 
5 Saifuddin Ahmed and Jörg Matthes, “Media Representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A 
Meta-Analysis,” International Communication Gazette 79, no. 3 (2017): 219–44, 238. 
6 Evelyn Alsultany, Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation After 9/11, Critical 
Cultural Communication (New York: NYU Press, 2012), 45. 
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across the United States; indeed, rates of such hostility in the form of physical assault were 
demonstrably worse in 2017 than in the weeks after 9/11.7  
What and whom, if not just media, are to be held accountable for the production anti-
Muslim hostility? Singular focus on just one social institution neglects the highly interwoven 
nature of anti-Muslim hostility with the issues of popular discourse, state surveillance and 
entrapment, hate crimes, and war. It is in their conjunction, not individual operations, that anti-
Muslim hostility is reproduced. While the public, too, is an active agent in this (re)production, 
individual acts of physical violence are often referred to as the sole expression of anti-Muslim 
hostility. Once more, attention is drawn away from the multiplicity that enables such violence. 
Acts such as these must been reconceptualized as just one end of anti-Muslim hostility because 
the beginning is just as pernicious. Yet hostilities at the start are named otherwise: sometimes 
thought of as a logically-derived “distaste” for Muslim beliefs and practices or perhaps as 
“concern” over safety for oneself and their “own” community.  
The pressure for positive media representation as political antidote has not abated. In fact, 
these efforts have linked up with and become a part of the broader cultural media conversations 
on minority representation in front of and behind Hollywood cameras. All the while, Minhaj, 
Ansari, and Nanjiani have seen their stars continue to rise on stages from New York to LA, led 
by their standup routines and comedic productions that always find a way back to their 
experiences as South Asian Muslim men. In many ways, standup comedy would seem the 
obvious home for this type of resistance work; a natural pathway for engaging in cultural critique 
against broader hegemonic influences. After all, the medium’s distinctive history has been 
 
7 Katayoun Kishi, “Assaults against Muslims in U.S. Surpass 2001 Level,” Pew Research Center, 




catalogued as an artistic expression of political commentary, rebellion, and counterculture.8 
Comedians, presaged by the likes of Lenny Bruce and Richard Pryor in the mid-20th century, 
“took aim at political corruption and corporate greed, made fun of society’s hypocrisy and 
consumerist excess... their point of view - ironic, skeptical, media savvy, challenging authority, 
puncturing pretension, telling uncomfortable truths - is the lens through which we view 
everything from presidential politics and celebrity scandal to the little trials of our everyday 
lives.”9  
Standup comedy has also been a venue for the taboo, the edgy, offensive, and patently 
absurd. Steve Martin played to sold out 10,000-seat theaters throughout the 1970s wearing bunny 
ears and poorly twisting balloon animals on stage. In his comedy special, Fire in the Maternity 
Ward, Anthony Jeselnik cooly relates how easy it is to drop babies on their heads and scoop 
them back up so “no one is the wiser, especially not that baby.”10 The contemporary comedian 
occupies the position of a provocateur in a jester’s hat: inviting their audience to laugh with 
them, occasionally at them, but always at the incongruity of the situation presented. Says 





8 Richard Zoglin, Comedy at the Edge: How Stand-up in the 1970s Changed America (Bloomsbury, 
2008), 2-3. 
9 Zoglin, Comedy at the Edge, 3. 
10 Marcus Raboy, Fire in the Maternity Ward, Streaming, Comedy (Netflix, 2019). 
11 Jason Zinoman, “His Punch Lines Cross Moral Lines. Anthony Jeselnik Gets Away With It.,” The New 




The Limits of Funny 
This impulse for the provocation, when coupled with calls for responsible social critique, 
has been met with revulsion among several of the living bulwarks of American standup today. 
These individuals bemoan what they seen as a cultural tide of viewer “sensitivity” that seeks to 
place limits on their subjects of observation. One such elder statesman, Jerry Seinfeld, openly 
scoffs at the idea of attending to questions of minority representation:  
People think it’s the census or something. This has gotta represent the actual pie chart of 
America? Who cares? Funny is the world that I live in. You’re funny, I’m interested. 
You’re not funny, I’m not interested. I have no interest in gender or race or anything like 
that… To me, that’s anti-comedy. To me it’s PC nonsense and not “are you making us 
laugh or not?”12  
 
I am fascinated by this conception of the guild: one that positions itself as home to a risible and 
astute anthropologist wielding a microphone, unbridled by parameters and free to comment on or 
even embody the incongruity they’ve observed. Funny, as Seinfeld suggests, is an equalizer. It is 
also the job’s only obligation.  
Endemic to the terms set out by funny, however, is their own set of restrictions. What 
makes something funny, anyway? Who decides, and what has given them that command? Turn 
comedy’s self-articulation on its head: what happens if we think of humor not within the mythos 
of resistance and “punching up,” but as a site of secular discipline and limit – a place where 
regimes of humor determine what is funny and worthy of laughter within the framework of 
concomitant secular ideas like free speech and equality? A place where the subjects of that 
humor (especially when those subjects are Muslim) must prove their capacity to joke and take a 
 
12 BuzzFeedBrews, Jerry Seinfeld On Diversity In Comedy: “Who Cares? Are You Making Us Laugh Or 
Are You Not?” BuzzFeedBrews (BuzzFeed, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EsEr6xNN8Hw. 
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joke, especially at their own expense? What happens when the Muslim comedian is both a 
commentator on the peripheries but also its warden? What does Islam look like then and there? 
Zeroing in on the funny Muslim – one who rushes into a literal spotlight, takes up the 
mantle of humor, enduring caricature, but also refashioning it to elicit laughter – is what Carl 
Ernst might call a “striking example... cases that do not fit our common expectations, which 
therefore force us to revise conventional assumptions.” 13 At the same time, I also see this 
isolation as a conscientious engagement with the obvious. Of course these comedians are men. 
Of course they are South Asian, they are “Brown,” they are “Muslim.” Of course they are a point 
of interest because they are funny Muslims. How and why, I ask, did all of this come to be so 
obvious in the first place?  
 
A Note on Sources 
In this project, I specifically examine sources in which these men held creative control 
over output, narratives they themselves wrote and then enacted on stage and screen. These range 
from standup specials to television shows to film. Other roles, like Ansari’s character in the 
television show Parks and Recreation or Nanjiani in Silicon Valley, serve as secondary sources 
given that they were not written by these men and do not operate as an agential self-articulation, 
though I do consider these roles for their function in promoting their career trajectories. I couple 
these primary sources against theoretical insights from race and feminist scholars who have 
attended specifically to embodied realities and how they are forged by, against, and within 
historical forces and social institutions.  
 
13 Carl W Ernst, It’s Not Just Academic! Essays on Sufism and Islamic Studies (New Delhi, India: SAGE 
Publications, 2017), xiii. 
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My archive – by virtue of scrutinizing a contemporary phenomenon within popular U.S. 
culture – is therefore vast and varied. Given that this project is most interested in the self- and 
Islam-making of these men through an analysis of discourse and embodiment, I focus less on 
audience reactions and responses to these productions. When I do utilize them, it is for the 
purpose of illustrating broader theoretical points on sensation and affect which feeds back into 
questions of self-making and what “works” so to speak. I employ such first-person narratives 
from the place people vocalize them in the era I study: social media. This means taking tweets, 
blog posts, and YouTube comments seriously as interlocuters. Even when written with harried 
flippancy and non-standard syntax, I am resolute in my decision to include this as literature from 
which there are conclusions to draw and evaluate. This is particularly useful when thinking about 
the language of representation and what that has come to mean in parlance that evokes feeling as 
the primary indicator of value; affective pleasure and “feeling seen.” 
 
Drawing the Perimeter 
 As meaningful as this moment is, it is just as dynamic. I reaffirm that this is, therefore, a 
historical investigation of an instructive moment in American public life and popular culture. For 
the purposes of this dissertation, I cut off my analysis in mid-2019. We cannot, I believe, analyze 
every angle of the moment we are currently inhabit. Ansari, Minhaj, and Nanjiani’s careers are 
ongoing and, as I write, continue to reach new heights. In the year since, Hasan Minhaj has 
continued to release episodes of his Netflix show Patriot Act, many filmed in isolation due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, but still tackling issues like paying rent during times of hardship, the cost 
of a college education, and anti-Black racism within Asian American communities. Though Aziz 
Ansari’s sojourn post #MeToo has only been punctuated by one comedy special titled Right 
9 
 
Now, he has reappeared in episodes of David Chang’s culinary show Ugly Delicious. Ansari 
travels to India alongside Chang for an episode dedicated to the idea of curry, and also has 
invited Chang to share a meal with his parents and brother in New York.14 Nanjiani has perhaps 
gone through the starkest change: rumors abounded through early 2019 of his casting in a new 
set of superhero action flicks (alongside Angelina Jolie and Salma Hayek), and in December 
2019 he posted a shirtless, oiled photo of himself on Instagram to reveal a transformed physique 
in service to his role as an immortal god-like samurai in the latest Marvel/Disney film, The 
Eternals.15 The internet responded with the equivalent of bewildered but enthusiastic applause. In 
January 2020, he and his wife Emily Gordon produced a short anthology series for Apple TV+ 
titled Little America, made up of eight episodes depicting immigrant narratives ranging from the 
lives of a Ugandan cowboy to a gay Syrian to a young Indian boy whose parents get deported. 
Says Nanjiani, “If there is a political agenda in the show, it’s just that immigrant experiences are 
very varied, as are anybody else’s experiences. Just saying that immigrants are human beings 
feels like such a basic thing… Somehow a simple statement of fact has become a radical political 
stance.”16  
A fair and common question I field when discussing my study in academic settings and 
among those simply curious about the structure of my research is where are the women? Their 
absence as case studies here should not assume their irrelevance. It also does not preclude the 
 
14 Meghan O’Keefe, “Is Netflix’s ‘Ugly Delicious’ Setting Up an Aziz Ansari Comeback?,” Decider 
(blog), March 6, 2020, https://decider.com/2020/03/06/ugly-delicious-season-2-aziz-ansari-comeback/. 
15 Kumail Nanjiani, “I Never Thought I’d Be One of Those People...,” Instagram, December 16, 2019, 
https://www.instagram.com/p/B6I7b2bnuJz/. 
16 Brandon Yu, “Kumail Nanjiani on ‘Little America’ and Hopeful Immigrant Stories,” The New York 




centrality of gender and women to the ways that I understand American Muslim humor and its 
significance; far from it. Comics like Zahra Noorbakhsh, Maysoon Zayid, Negin Farsad, Aizzah 
Fatima, Mariam Sobh, and countless others draw audiences to their shows across the United 
States. The reality of pop-culture prominence remains, unfortunately, that these men are at the 
top and in the center.  
The specter of Muslim women and the gendered realities of Ansari, Minhaj, and Nanjiani 
are nevertheless a constant presence in my considerations, from the ways that these men 
construct their performances of  neocolonial masculinity to the content they choose to include in 
their joke-writing. In fact, the distinct dearth of fully-realized Muslim women in these particular 
stagings of Islam speak to what I later term a conceit of representative #resistance, which buys 
the participation of a broader public because the comedian is markedly minoritized in one way, 
and he is thus permissibly able to stand-in for all types of minoritizations. Studies of gender in 
Islamic Studies too often have reinforced the frenetic obsession with Muslim women that these 
studies themselves critique. A focus on masculine subjectivities, however, displaces that onus 
and instead explores gender from this under-analyzed perspective. 
 
Why It Matters 
In this dissertation, I demonstrate how and why these men have been endorsed, and 
indeed, fast-tracked, in their pop culture ascent by the very regimes of humor that insist on the 
industry’s native candor and openness to those that meet the single standard of funny. Minhaj, 
Ansari, and Nanjiani construct a specific self on stage that is intended to be and is read as 
universally funny by way of their adherence to several other cultural criteria. That self and the 
humor that it employs, especially as it pertains to their experiences and articulations of Islam, are 
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deeply consonant with broader operative cultural discourses in the U.S. Chief among these 
discourses, I argue, are those that read Islam as a racial category in the U.S., wherein Islam is 
something that is read off and onto one’s body. by extension, this “mark” of Islam does not 
influence one’s assumed allegiance to American liberal exceptionalism, its capitalist pursuits, 
and what I am calling a “progressive consensus” of recognition vis-à-vis racially-minded social 
justice. This staging of Islam similarly reifies a simultaneously hyper/deficiently masculine 
vision of Muslims, against which the comedians’ blithe and non-threatening masculinity 
constitutes an agreeable, soothing Muslim foil for their American patrons (audience and 
underwriters). While their humor can, and often does, subvert categorical assumptions about 
Muslim sedition and violence, it does not do so for the ontologies that naturalized those 
assumptions in the first place. The secular order that gives them rise simultaneously contains 
them, ensuring that the comedian has room to critique certain power structures while still very 
much remaining subject to them. 
 Thus, while these figures and this moment in the pop culture sun are captivating subjects 
in their own right, they are principally a conduit for what are the ultimate subjects of my 
research. At its heart, this project is about recognition and representation. It is about the 
discipline of American secularism. It is about racial formations and embodiment. It is about 
hegemonic masculinities that authorize anti-Muslim hostility across perceived political 
affiliations, and their historical interplay with the daily operations of empire. It is about the 
muddied waters that categories such as religion and race and gender swim in, and how Muslims 
affectively perform themselves into legibility out from within that murk. It is about how humor 
(and the pleasure it generates) creates new modes of meaning-making among Muslims outsides 
the normative confines of prescribed ritual. Foremost, it is an attempt to use this historical 
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moment, these men, and their significations to appreciate why religion matters and how Islam, 
categorically, is capacious in its scope. It is a testament to why religion must be a central node of 
study in how we interpret contemporary political, racial, and gender formations. What ties these 
nine chapters together is the idea that none of these concepts – humor, religion, race, Islam, 
gender, capitalism – can, in isolation, answer for the current predicament of the others. Rather, 




 It is necessary to situation each of these comedians through a longer introduction to their 
lives, positionalities, and careers. The biographical sketches below also highlight their most 
significant works and the contexts in which they were produced. Throughout the dissertation, I 
refer to these works and their contexts in order to illustrate my broader theoretical interventions. 
 
Aziz Ansari 
Aziz Ansari was born in 1983 to parents Shoukath and Fatima in Bennettsville, South 
Carolina. His father, a gastroenterologist, came to the United States from Tamil Nadu for a 
fellowship at the University of South Carolina.17 His mother works in the medical office 
alongside her spouse.18 Ansari has said there was not much opportunity for being Muslim during 
 
17 “Ansari Named Physician of the Year,” Richmond County Daily Journal, May 8, 2017, 
https://www.yourdailyjournal.com/news/73101/ansari-named-physician-of-the-year. 
18 Terry Gross, “Aziz Ansari On Master Of None; And How His Parents Feel About Acting,” Fresh Air, 




his childhood because “there was no mosque or anything like that. So I was never really 
religious.”19 He went on to pursue a degree in biology and business at New York University, 
graduating in 2004. Throughout those years in New York, Ansari tried his hand at standup, 
attending open mics and sketch comedy shows throughout the city.20  
He joined the Amy Poehler-founded Upright Citizens Brigade Theater, and with a few 
castmates began to host a comedy night at the theater titled “Human Giant.” MTV picked up the 
premise and filmed two seasons starring the troupe. Ansari and his costars declined a third 
season, after which he found himself cast in Judd Apatow’s 2009 film Funny People and as a 
series regular on Amy Poehler’s NBC comedy Parks and Recreation. On Parks, Ansari took on 
the character of Tom Haverford, a slick, luxury-indulging government employee that frequently 
embarked on entrepreneurial hijinks. Haverford always dresses in suits (“Brooks Brothers Boys, 
it’s like the cuts are slimmer, and it’s cheaper. Win win!”) and unsuccessfully pursues the 
women he works with (“Think about how much better our friendship would be if we added 
‘doing it’?”).21  
There was little delay between the end of Parks and his next venture. Ansari and comedy 
writer Alan Yang envisioned shooting their own television show, titled Master of None, in New 
York while still working on the Parks set. As Parks entered its penultimate season, Yang and 
Ansari pitched their idea with the backing of Parks producer Michael Schur to various networks 
and sold to Netflix, with whom Ansari had already filmed several standup comedy specials. “I 
 
19 Gross, “Aziz Ansari On Master Of None.” 
20 Sanneh Kelefa, “Funny Person,” The New Yorker, November 1, 2010, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/11/01/funny-person. 
21 Tristram Shapeero, “94 Meetings,” Parks and Recreation (NBC, April 29, 2010); Ken Kwapis, 
“Galentine’s Day” (NBC, February 11, 2010). 
14 
 
had done my stand-up specials with them,” he says. “When we went to them, they were just 
super enthusiastic. They told us we didn’t have to do a pilot or anything. We just went straight-
to-series - 10 episodes.”22 Ansari had wide creative control over Master of None’s script, 
character development, plot, and direction, unlike his role on Parks and Recreation. 
 Master of None premiered in 2015 to rave reviews. The New York Times called it “the 
year’s best comedy straight out of the gate,” and it wrapped a successful second season in 2017.23 
The show follows Dev Shah, a struggling (Muslim, though more on that later) Indian American 
actor, as he navigates the mores of technology, race, dating, and family in New York. Ansari 
casts his own parents in the roles of Dev’s parents, Ramesh and Nisha. Though the show’s 
primary thread is about Dev’s love life, each episode dips into a different contemporary social 
issue that millennials face. Among the topics the show addresses are how one reconciles a 
workable relationship with one’s parents as an adult child, the daily acts of harassment faced by 
women that men are oblivious to, the limited roles for Indian men on TV and the pressure to play 
up accents and stereotypes, the complexities of “coming out” to one’s family, religious 
difference among family members, and the racism inherent within dating app algorithms. Both 
seasons of Master of None include romance arcs for Dev that center sustained relationships with 
white women. During its two-year run, Master of None accrued several award nominations and 
wins, including a Peabody, two Emmys, and a Golden Globe for Ansari’s acting.  
 
22 Elbert Wyche, “Emmys 2017: Aziz Ansari Talks ‘Master of None,’” Screen Daily, accessed March 15, 
2020, https://www.screendaily.com/features/emmys-2017-aziz-ansari-talks-master-of-
none/5119193.article. 
23 James Poniewozik, “Review: Aziz Ansari, in ‘Master of None,’ Negotiates Technology and Social 





Standup remained a constant in Ansari’s life, though, and he continued to release 
multiple specials over the decade, primarily with Netflix: Intimate Moments for a Sensual 
Evening (2010), Dangerously Delicious (2012), Buried Alive (2013), Live in Madison Square 
Garden (2015) and Right Now (2019). In each special, except Right Now, Ansari dresses in a suit 
and tie. He has publicly held up Chris Rock as his main comedic inspiration, telling New York 
Magazine, “Those two Chris Rock specials, Bring the Pain and Bigger and Blacker, in high 
school I knew every single word.”24 In his early specials, Rock’s influence on him comes through 
primarily in Ansari’s embodied performance. His rapid pacing on stage, repeating and 
punctuating specific phrases all harken towards the ways that Rock carries himself on stage. 
Rock’s signature overt and racially oriented content, however, is not present. Ansari’s early 
specials not only avoid politics, but were even overtly anti-political (“I don’t do political stuff; I 
talk about my own life and what I’ve done and been through).25  
That initial material mainly dealt with everyday mundanities like the difficulties of dating 
(he has a lengthy screed against people who do not text back right away in Dangerously 
Delicious), the types of people you meet at bars, and wasting time on the internet (“Man, I 
wonder if Home Alone 2 made more money than Home Alone 1. I gotta look into this NOW”).26 
Later specials, like Buried Alive and Live in Madison Square Garden, would address social 
issues, but in vague and deliberately non-controversial fashion. Not until the run-up to the 2016 
 
24 Jada Yuan, “Chris Rock on Becoming Aziz Ansari’s Mentor,” Vulture, New York Magazine, May 12, 
2017, https://www.vulture.com/2017/05/chris-rock-aziz-ansari-mentor.html. 
25 Express, “Funny Man: Rising Indie Comedian Aziz Ansari Comes to Washington,” Washington Post, 
accessed March 16, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/express/wp/2009/09/24/aziz-ansari/. 
26 Aziz Ansari, Dangerously Delicious (Comedy Central, 2012). 
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presidential election and the increasingly antagonistic comments of then-candidate Donald 
Trump did Ansari begin to work more socially-conscious observations into his routine.  
Of course, it was not until 2017 that Ansari became somewhat of a household name as 
another prominent #MeToo culprit. The website babe.net published an account by a woman 
anonymized as Grace, who detailed Ansari’s aggressive sexual advances and disregard for her 
discomfort over the course of an evening she spent with Ansari. She ultimately understood this 
as sexual assault, and the column spurred a spirited debate among the nation’s cultural literati 
ranging from whether Ansari’s behavior constituted assault or even misconduct to the insistence 
that the “ordinary” nature of this date needed to be re-examined for its power dynamics and rules 
of consent. Ansari released a statement to E! Online, which did not contain an explicit apology to 
Grace, but did provide his perspective on the night’s events and his continued support for the 
#MeToo movement. He lay low for the following year, re-appearing in late 2018 at comedy 
clubs in Milwaukee workshopping a new set that maligned “outrage” culture and “political 
correctness.”27 #MeToo and his scandal were conspicuously absent from that material, though he 
did finally attend to the episode when this new act was conclusively finalized in the 2019 Netflix 
special Right Now.  
 
Hasan Minhaj 
Hasan Minhaj was born September 23, 1985 in Davis, California. His father, Najme, was 
a chemist while his mother, Seema, was a medical student. She and Najme had married in 
Aligarh, India, and she returned to finish her schooling while Hasan was still young. Hasan spent 
 
27 Eren Orbey, “Aziz Ansari’s New Standup Tour Is a Cry Against Extreme Wokeness,” The New Yorker, 




the first eight years of his life with his father in Davis. Immigration issues kept Seema from 
returning to the U.S. until 1993, when she brought with her Minhaj’s sister Ayesha, who was 
four years old by then. At home, they spoke Urdu, and Hasan’s interest in comedy was relatively 
limited (he recounts thinking that standup was “the stuff that Seinfeld did before Seinfeld, where 
he’s just like… what’s the deal with laundry? And I was always like, oh, I hate that part of 
Seinfeld”).28 Not until his freshman year at UC Davis was Minhaj introduced to Chris Rock’s 
work, specials like Bring the Pain and Never Scared. Rock’s “honesty and candor around politics 
and race in America” set him on a path for standup, attending open mics around Davis, San 
Francisco, and eventually LA after graduation.29 
He calls the routines he was workshopping at the beginning of his career “desperate” and 
“assimilation comedy,” notably distancing himself from the types of jokes he used to make like 
imitating his father’s broken English on the phone.30 Like Ansari, Minhaj was frequently offered 
trite and formulaic roles written explicitly for a demure South Asian. Disappointed with the 
offerings, he and a troupe of three other South and Southwest Asian men formed a sketch group 
called Goatface in 2012, which began on Youtube in earnest but received a Comedy Central 
special in 2018 thanks to Minhaj’s rapport with top brass at the network. “One night over dinner 
 
28 Terry Gross, “Comic Hasan Minhaj On Roasting Trump And Growing Up A ‘Third Culture Kid,’” 
Fresh Air, NPR.org, November 2, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/11/02/663389616/comic-hasan-
minhaj-on-roasting-trump-and-growing-up-a-third-culture-kid. 
29 Anna Menta, “How Hasan Minhaj Went from Demeaning Auditions to Netflix’s ‘Patriot Act,’” 
Newsweek, October 26, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/hasan-minhaj-patriot-act-profile-1187920. 
30 Menta; Lynn Hirschberg, “For Hasan Minhaj, the Best Part About Making His Show Patriot Act Is 




they were like, ‘What are the other things that you’re working on or things that you’re interested 
in?’…. Surprisingly, it was one of the fastest green lights that I’ve seen in my career.”31  
In those interceding years, Minhaj continued with his own independent standup, and was 
called to interview with Jon Stewart at the Daily Show. He was hired in one of Stewart’s final 
acts as showrunner in 2014. There he stayed as a “Senior Muslim Correspondent” or some other 
droll iteration of a title for 4 years, during which he continued to amass standup material and was 
called to give the keynote speech at the first White House Correspondents’ dinner of the Trump 
presidency, after several other comedians had declined before him.32 And though both the 
president and his staff all skipped the event, Minhaj’s monologue landed with a splash. Poking 
fun at all the major news networks, he saved his sharpest barbs for the person not in attendance. 
Said Minhaj: “We have to address the elephant not in the room. The leader of our country is not 
here. But that’s because he’s in Moscow. It is a very long flight. Vlad can’t just make it on a 
Saturday. As for the other guy, I think he’s in Pennsylvania because he can’t take a joke.”33 
At the same time, Minhaj was crafting a one-man show, a step away from his usual 
standup material because this “allows the performer to show all sorts of different notes: comedic, 
or pensive, or thoughtful.”34 Working with the Moth storytelling community, he tinkered with 
 
31 Jaya Saxena, “Goatface Is Comedy for Brown Americans, and Everyone,” GQ, November 27, 2018, 
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Dinner,” The New York Times, April 11, 2017, sec. Business, 
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versions of the show for two years that eventually resulted in the polished Netflix joint 
Homecoming King. In it, Minhaj relays much of the biography listed here, peppering in old 
family photos alongside Urdu jokes and highly-specific South Asian American references. He 
narrates the story of his parents’ arranged marriage and journey to the United States, his own 
experiences growing up in Davis, California, being subjected to anti-Muslim hostilities and hate 
crimes after 9/11, and falling in love with a white woman in high school only to be denied the 
opportunity to take her to prom by her kind, but racist parents. For Minhaj, this show is about 
“love, the American dream, forgiveness” – all soupy themes that get spliced against his honed 
witticisms and one-liners.  
The special premiered to rave reviews and went on to receive a Peabody Award. The 
program called Homecoming King “equally from comedy pioneer Richard Pryor and monologist 
Spalding Gray… [it] blends soulful intimacy and wry satire, equal parts profound, illuminating, 
delightful, personable, and witty.”35 The venture with Netflix proved to be enduring – within 
months, the streaming service offered a 32-episode order for a comedy news show with Minhaj 
at the helm. Patriot Act with Hasan Minhaj premiered on October 28, 2017 and has now entered 
its sixth season. In each 26-minute segment, Minhaj leads his audience through a deep-dive on a 
given news topic, similar in pacing and format to the other politainment programming like the 
Daily Show, Last Week Tonight, and Full Frontal (the latter two of which are also hosted by 
Daily Show alumni).  
He has taken on a wide swath of personally controversial subject matters: the second 
episode of the first season looked at Saudi Arabia, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and how 
 




Mohammed bin Salman’s treacherous political moves affect Minhaj’s Muslim faith.36 Other 
episodes have explored ICE detention policies, the anti-CAA protests in India, student loan debt, 
Bolsonaro’s logging policies in the Amazon, and the importance of the Asian vote in the 2020 
elections. Patriot Act is ongoing, and Minhaj was set to host the 2020 White House 
Correspondents’ Dinner once more, though this time alongside SNL’s Kenan Thompson. This 
was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
Kumail Nanjiani 
Kumail Nanjiani was born in Karachi, Pakistan in 1978. His father, Aijaz, is a 
psychiatrist in New Jersey. As a child growing up in Pakistan, Nanjiani recounts playing a lot of 
video games and watching the X-files. He attended the most prestigious and highly selective 
secondary school in the country, Karachi Grammar School, before matriculating into Grinnell 
College in Iowa in 1997. There, he studied computer science and philosophy. During his senior 
year, he attended an open mic on campus and performed for 35 minutes, having also been 
introduced to Jerry Seinfeld’s HBO special by friends.37 The experience gave him a taste for 
standup and influenced his decision to move to Chicago after graduation in 2001 to keep 
performing while maintaining a job in IT to make ends meet.38 Nanjiani has referred to the fact 
that he witnessed the rise of the post-9/11 Muslim comedians of AMMF and AoE but made a 
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conscious decision to not replicate what he saw as their source material; i.e. discussing his 
Muslim heritage. “I had seen so many jokes about plays on being cabdrivers or working at 7-
Eleven or working at Dunkin’ Donuts, so for better or worse, I decided I would not talk about 
that stuff at all.”39 Instead, the material he wrote mostly circled the topics of video games, horror 
movies, and American pop culture references. “I’ll be more like the comedians that I enjoy,” he 
had thought to himself “which at the time were Seinfeld and stuff.”40 
 The New York Times referred to the aura of Nanjiani’s work on the New York comedy 
circuit as “slightly absurdist and occasionally free-form,” though this would change with the 
increasing success of another production that he had cultivated on the side. Unpronounceable, a 
one-man show, spoke about his upbringing in Pakistan and more potently foregrounded his 
family, background, and religion.41 He dissects various hadith and Qur’anic verses, particularly 
ones on the topic of punishment and the Day of Judgment, and points to the daraba verse in the 
Qur’an (4:34) as the tipping point when he no could longer consider himself a believer.42 
Unpronounceable only ran for about a year, with a smattering of performances in LA and New 
York as well. He caught the attention of several comedy kingmakers and was set to open for 
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Zach Galifianakis’s 2008 national tour. This was canceled when his then-girlfriend, Emily 
Gordon, fell ill and was placed into a medically-induced coma. They married soon after her 
recovery, and Nanjiani secured an agent, quit his job in IT to pursue comedy full-time, and 
moved to New York.43 
Between 2008 and 2013, Nanjiani worked a series of jobs in the entertainment industry – 
hosting various podcasts, guest-starring on Veep, Newsreaders, and Adventure Time, as well as 
earning a supporting series arc on the television show Franklin and Bash.44 He also appeared on 
Stephen Colbert’s Colbert Report as the recurring Guantanamo Bay detainee Omar who lived 
under Stephen’s desk, who in his words, “subverts the stereotype... I try to stay away from stuff 
that’s just caricaturish. It’s not for me.”45 Nanjiani premiered his first standup special on Comedy 
Central in 2013, titled Beta Male. This springboarded him into his most lucrative position to 
date, being cast as the series regular “Dinesh” on the HBO sitcom Silicon Valley. The show 
debuted in 2014 and ran for six seasons until 2019. The character of Dinesh Chugtai, as played 
by Nanjiani, is a lazy, insecure, and venal Pakistani computer programmer who is juxtaposed 
often against his programming partner Bertram Gilfoyle, a monotone but brutally funny 
Canadian Satanist. Several jokes over the course of the show picked on Dinesh’s foreignness, his 
penchant for gold jewelry, and his difficulty gaining citizenship.46 
 
43 Marantz, “Kumail Nanjiani’s Culture-Clash Comedy,” May 2017. 
44 “IMDb: Kumail Nanjiani,” IMDb, accessed March 17, 2020, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm3529685/. 
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With Gordon, Nanjiani set out to write a screenplay about their relationship and ultimate 
marriage, surrounding the episode of her coma. During that time, he had stayed by her side in the 
ICU for just over a week, met her parents during that time, and told his parents about Emily. 
They married within months and went on to work together on the podcast The Indoor Kids and 
The Meltdown with Jonah and Kumail. Gordon, previous to her coma, had worked as a therapist 
but switched over to comedy writing and production around the time that she and Nanjiani wed.47 
Together, they penned a script for either television or film that would go on to become The Big 
Sick. Judd Apatow agreed to produce it as a full-length feature, and it premiered at the 2017 
Sundance Film Festival. The Big Sick was acquired by Amazon Studios for distribution in one of 
the biggest deals in the history of the festival (to the tune of $12 million). The film has 
maintained a 98% fresh rating on the film review site Rotten Tomatoes, with a general consensus 
among critics that the film is simultaneously “funny, heartfelt, and intelligent.”48 It collected 




 This dissertation moves through an analysis of the literature currently in existence on 
humor and Islam before offering several theoretical and historical considerations as they apply to 
the work of these three comedians. Rather than following a linear progression of argument, the 
chapter outline below demonstrates the highly interlocked and intercommunicative nature of 
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religious, racial, and gendered formations as they are actualized in the performance and 
consumption humor. These forms are at times overlapping and at other times competing, but they 
are always mutually constitutive patterns that depend on the agency of various actors and the 
context in which they operate during those specific moments in time.  
Chapter One asks that we (re)examine how humor has generally come to be understood 
and theorized in a contemporary American context. I chart how humor has gone from describing 
bodily fluids and what they say about the body’s internal goings-on to referring to a state of 
being and a trait one can cultivate to better fit into a Euroamerican state structure. I also provide 
an overview of how humor has been typically studied in the United States, from theorizations on 
what induces laughter (superiority, marginality, etc.) to how incongruities of power have been 
taken to task by minoritized populations like Jewish, Black, and women comedians. This humor 
is also disciplinary for its use of public mockery, which provoke changes in social behavior.  
Chapter Two considers Muslim humor, especially as it pertains to the commonly 
assumed baseline that Muslims are unwilling and perhaps even incapable of engaging with 
humor. There is, of course, a wealth of academic literature to the contrary, thematically ranging 
from Islamically sanctioned humor during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the classical 
age to jokes told in the face of totalitarianism in the modern period to the rise of American 
Muslim comics after 9/11. Despite the diverse range of Muslim humor that these frames of study 
encapsulate, they still obliquely reference, in some fashion, the baseline assumption of essential 
Muslim solemnity, which gets reinvigorated in the wake of episodes like Danish cartoon 
controversy and the Charlie Hebdo shootings.  
Chapter Three lays out my argument that humor operates today as a mode of secular and 
secularizing discourse. This involves the historical shifts in how we have come to define a 
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“sense” of humor and its relationship to the increasingly disciplining nature of secularism as a 
social system. Humor, I contend, is a fundamental pillar within the conception of the modern 
secular subject and has come to stand in for what makes nonnormative subjects worthy of 
inclusion within a secular state. This secularization feeds into the racialization of Islam and 
Muslims, something that is imposed on but also taken advantage of by the comedians in my 
study. When Islam “acts” like race – a phenotypical marker with limited power over the secular 
prerequisites for public life – it gains social legibility and accommodation under the broader 
secular hegemon of multicultural diversity. This racialization is fomented by what I am calling 
the “progressive consensus” of recognition, impelled by the results of the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election and high level calls for further institutionalizing anti-Muslim hostilities in federal public 
policies.  
Chapter Four provides specific examples of “humor work” by Ansari, Minhaj, and 
Nanjiani that align within and reinforces the progressive consensus in addition to pointing out its 
deficiency in addressing how Islam is understood in public discourses. The language of the 
master category of race has been lifted up in order to understand and combat anti-Muslim 
hostility, but also asks us to re-probe Shahab Ahmed’s foundational question: what, then, is 
Islam within and outside of these confines? When is Islam a collection of experiences, a 
discursive tradition, but also something embodied? How does this authenticate a vision of Islam 
in the public sphere? “My” comedians employ a humor that is sanctioned by while also 
simultaneously sanctioning the progressive consensus. This scaffolds the kind of Islam that they 
stage, and is further facilitated by the affects of pleasure, laughter, and comfort. How might an 




Chapter Five surveys the histories and narratives of embodiment that have culminated in 
the affective realities that these comedians face in their present day. The Muslimness that inheres 
to their bodies is historically tied to sexual deviance in the early premodern era, a 
characterization that finds continuation in the form of fantastical stories meant to inspire fear and 
dread. As we move through the 20th century and into the 21st, the terrifying Muslim appears 
within and is made integral to discourses of securitization and protection of the populace as their 
antagonist. Muslim masculinity bleeds into the dual formations of hypersexuality and effeminacy 
across South Asian Hindu and Muslim men, tying their intelligibility to the Yellow Peril of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, as well as the language of the Black brute and sexual deviance 
of the Black American man. Taken together, these taxonomies and their inconsistencies result in 
an essentialized Muslim being who must be distanced and dispossessed.  
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight focus specifically on one of the three respective 
comedians (Ansari, Minhaj, and Nanjiani) and their attempts to counter-script this essentialized 
Muslim being out through their own self-articulation by “becoming” the Right Muslim Man. I 
examine how caricature and impersonation are employed to make and keep the “terrifying” 
Muslim’s sexuality strange, as well as the ways that whiteness is centralized as aspirational and 
desirable. Alignment with progressive consensus politics similarly undergirds what makes 
transmutes this Muslim into proper secular subjecthood.  
Chapter Nine hones in closer on what – and who – have enabled these comedians’ ascent 
to stardom through the progressive consensus. Here, I introduce the idea of representative 
#resistance and what consequences this act of universalizing universalism has for other 
minoritized people, specifically Muslim women and Black Muslims. In staging a form of 
opposition to a secular hegemonic order that reads largely as white, Ansari and Minhaj’s 
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performance of resistance rely on co-opting and manipulating significations of American 
Blackness in ways that are meant to authenticate themselves but also reinforce racial logics of 
hierarchy. Nanjiani’s notable refrain from taking on aesthetics of American Blackness speak to 
another phenomenon at work in his self-stylization, the performance of a “poor” immigrant who 
is both economically but (more importantly) culturally impoverished. When class gets 
obfuscated by Islam, by brownness, and (in Nanjiani’s case) by accent, so too does the fact that 
class and capitalism facilitated and these comedy careers in the first place. Narratives of poverty 
positions America as an attainable economic and political safe-haven, once more erasing the 
realities that Black Muslims and other working class peoples. 
I conclude the dissertation with a brief meditation on what social futures have been 
opened to Muslims through the comedy and representation of performers like Ansari, Nanjiani, 
and Minhaj. How, if at all, does one break free of the discipline imposed by secular white 
consumption and its expectations? The works of Audre Lorde and comedian Ramy Youssef 
offers some insights. 
 
Decisions on Methodology 
Like Lila Abu-Lughod, I am not simply interested in the critique of media 
representations, nor simply in the ways that popular rhetoric serve political ends.49 I looking 
foremost to utilize methods of critical study to read my sources in conjunction with theoretical 
concepts like discourse, humor, secularism, racialization, gender, and sexuality and how they 
work through the people and worlds they’ve created. This methodology is familiar to religious 
studies by way of gender and queer theory, critical race theory, and postcolonial theory. To 
 
49 Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 20. 
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augment Joan Scott’s words, I find gender, sexuality, and race to be “useful categor[ies]” of 
analysis as they enable a complex and intersectional examination of social difference, exposing 
structures of power and its uneven exchanges.50 Social phenomena can then be understood as 
sites of power and knowledge in which conflict, not consensus, creates meaning. Excavating that 
conflict tells a story that critical race scholars recognize as less grand but more importantly 
attuned to the systems of inequality that purposefully obscure those already oppressed under 
their weight. Gayatri Spivak’s concerns in Can the Subaltern Speak? similarly guide my methods 
of inquiry on the question of subjecthood, especially in terms of what it means to represent an 
Other while maintaining “the West as Subject.”51 I model Jasbir Puar’s method of assembling 
and reading sources that veers “away from the instinctual, the natural, or the commonsensical” 
and instead creates an “alternative historical record, archive, and documentation of our 
contemporary moments.”52 I also draw on Gary Okihiro’s recognition that binaries need 
breaking, while still remaining conscious of their staying power and of their occasional utility in 
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51 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313, 271-272. 
52 Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2007), xv. 
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While this study is located primarily within the bodies of religious studies and Islamic 
studies, it is also an interdisciplinary experiment that takes its cue from scholars like Juliane 
Hammer, Harshita Kamath, and Sylvia Chan-Malik – my mentors and academic role models – to 
seek out analytical moments of disruption, contestation, and conflict in order to map out points 
of departures from the well-worn intellectual trails of what are too often disciplinary silos. Their 
respective scholarship showed me early on what kinds of insight are possible – and why they so 
urgently matter – when we embrace the political in our work. To that end, my own affective 
engagement with the material appears copiously throughout this dissertation. This is a 
methodological intervention that affirms my positionality and investment in scholarship that does 
not envision itself as somehow outside of and untouched by the phenomena under scrutiny. My 
inclusion broadens the scope of encounter. It presents an opportunity to interpret who is afforded 









CHAPTER 1: THE TRAVELS OF HUMOR 
 
The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very 
important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections 
between them. 
 
- Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism1  
Introduction 
In 2014, the anti-affirmative action organization, Students for Fair Admissions, filed a 
lawsuit against Harvard University alleging that the college’s “race-conscious” admissions 
process discriminated against Asian Americans in favor of “less qualified” Black, Hispanic, and 
white applicants. The filing forced Harvard to release hundreds of documents related to its 
secretive and hyperselective methods for choosing its freshmen class each year. Among the 
information made public was the college’s internal ratings system. This system, broken into 
approximately 14 categories, included a predictable set of designations ranging from academic 
achievement to extracurricular activities to teacher recommendations.  
But there was also a category for something called the “personal rating,” an avowedly 
subjective assessment of whether the applicant had a personality conducive to promoting “a 
more robust academic environment with a greater depth and breadth of learning, encourag[ing] 
learning outside the classroom, and creat[ing] a richer sense of community.”2 Chief among the 
 
1 Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), xiii. 
2 Alison Dale Burroughs, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc v. President and Fellows of Harvard College 
(Harvard Corporation), No. 14- cv-14176- ADB (United States District Court, District of Massachusetts 




characteristics that would fulfill this slate? Humor, of course.3 It was here that Asian students 
were consistently (an in the words of the lawsuit, “systematically”) penalized the most, as white, 
Black, and Hispanic counterparts were rated higher. Five years later, U.S. District Judge Allison 
Burroughs ultimately ruled that Harvard’s overall ranking system had not discriminated against 
Asian applicants, and the College could continue this form of race-consciousness as there were 
no viable race-neutral alternatives that would allow it to maintain its accustomed levels of 
excellence and diversity.4 
This episode exposes a critical sideshow within a larger portrait of what merits inclusion 
within a prestigious social hamlet. Humor is not just a distinguishing attribute among a group of 
already-accomplished young people – it is prized, sought after, and considered essential to 
maintaining a consummate community that hums along at an ideal and orderly clip. Though 
Burroughs may deem the “Asian Personality Penalty” inconsequential, the assumption remains 
that a sense of humor is a quality that some people – the best people – have. Others are deficient, 
and that deficiency is an impediment to a cultivated social order. 
 How and why has humor come to be the esteemed personality trait it is here and now? In 
our common everyday discourses, humor is assumed – much like religion – to be something 
people everywhere have always participated in. This frequent and routinized desire for 
individuals to strive towards a “sense of humor” – and here I mean the quality of being amusing 
or comical in order to induce pleasurable laughter as well as the ability to find something funny – 
would imply it is a hardwired human property, albeit one that needs nurturing. Yet as a term, as a 
concept, and as a personality trait, “humor” and the sense of it have a history. That history 
 
3 Caroline Engelmayer, “Harvard Ranks Applicants on ‘Humor’ and ‘Grit,’ Court Filing Shows,” June 18, 
2018, https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/6/16/harvard-admissions-behind-the-scenes/. 




emerges at a particular time and fills particular social gaps, transforming as social needs 
themselves transform, gain coherence, and eventually sediment into a presumed nature of things. 
In the academy, humor has been studied for those very reasons, though often in their efforts to 
illuminate this history and nuance, scholars have also cast a shadow on other equally instructive 
issues that emerge from this trait and the larger social system it scaffolds.  
This chapter is meant to act as a setup, a foundation for the critical inquiries that will 
eventually build up and out from it. I bring together relevant materials into a detailed sketch of 
the terrain of humor studies, so that my readers will be familiar with the background, the 
particularities, and the overall stakes that accompany my arguments in subsequent chapters. In 
the pages that follow, I offer an outline of the history of this idea of humor. First, I seek to make 
strange the familiar notion that humor is a natural human trait while charting the history of its 
conception in a Euroamerican context, beginning roughly with the early 15th century’s 
medicalized language referring to bodily fluids as humors to the gradual shifts towards its 
attachment to a person’s interior sensibilities, their agency, and its relation to the functions of a 
broader secular state. Secondly, I lay out the ways that humor, and comedy specifically, have 
been studied in the United States, ranging from humor’s signature observation of incongruities in 
power to the purported “punch up” politics of American standup to the role of minoritized people 
in bringing this conscientious form of humor to mainstream (read: white and Christian) 
audiences.  
 
Humoral Theory, From Body to Personality 
 The earliest consistent references to humor are traced to medical scholarship in the 
premodern era, in which theories of the “humors” focus on the balance of bodily elements from 
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which good health derives. Ayurvedic traditions across South Asia describe a tripartite doṣa 
shared between vāta (air) pitta (bile), and kapha (phlegm). These humors are linked to somatic 
processes, related to the environment and influenced by food, climate, seasonal changes, and 
even social activities.5 The aggravation of any one or combination of doṣa results in illnesses that 
manifest mentally, physically, and within one’s emotional life. Of course, to even translate the 
doṣa as “humors” is itself a sort of misleading back-projection of Anglicized terminology. 
Humoralism, as historically understood in Euroamerica, stylizes its linguistic and conceptual 
origin with the Greek development of medical thought in the writings of Hippocrates. Yet even 
within the same Hippocratic corpus, the given definitions of humors are inconsistent. 
Characterizations slip, change, and are sometimes outrightly contradicted within the same text.6 
Nonetheless, the 4-5th BCE Hippocratic model is argued to have coalesced around a system of 
four humors; blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. Similar to Ayurvedic prescriptions, the 
Greek humors involve notions of hot/cold and wet/dry; here, health is achieved through the 
regulatory balance of the four fluids which emerged from within the body, intuiting to those on 
the outside what is happening inside of it. Contemporary scholarship notes a growing consensus 
that this model lived in a world of other competing humoral theories and was likely a late 
addition to the Hellenistic and Roman worlds.7 
This Hippocratic model finds continued life in part due to the Roman physician Galen’s 
commentaries (d. 210 CE). His theory of four elemental qualities (hot, cold, dry, and wet) does 
 
5 Jean M. Langford, Fluent Bodies: Ayurvedic Remedies for Postcolonial Imbalance (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002), 4. 
 
6 Peregrine Horden and Elisabeth Hsu, The Body in Balance: Humoral Medicines in Practice (New York, 
NY: Berghahn Books, 2013), 2-5. 
 




draw from Hippocrates, but only in terms of how his four elemental qualities correspond to the 
humors.8 Instead, Galen is far more interested in the classification of the mixtures of these 
qualities in people. He describes only one good mixture in which all qualities are proportionately 
present alongside eight possible bad mixtures of imbalanced proportions. In four of the bad 
mixtures, a single quality (either hot, cold, wet, dry) dominates while in the remaining four, two 
qualities in combination dominate (hot/wet, cold/wet, hot/dry, cold/dry).9 All of these mixtures 
result in four temperaments (De temperamentis): phlegmatic, sanguine, bilious, and melancholic. 
The specific physical and moral characteristics associated with each would flesh out over the 
course of several centuries, writes Jacques Jouanna, “whether this theory was expressly linked 
with Hippocratic or Galenic teaching or not.”10 In the early days of the Italian Renaissance, for 
example, the School of Salerno medical tradition painted the melancholic personality as sad, 
poor, and timid, but also as tenacious in one’s goals and even disposed towards trickery.11 
This longevity is facilitated largely by Muslim medical research beginning in the ninth 
century, which saw a flurry of translation of Greek medicinal texts into Arabic, some by way of 
Syriac. These translations served multiple purposes: preservation, education, and ultimately 
undergirded original medical research throughout West and South Asia for the next several 
hundred years on topics that were unaddressed in the Greek/Latin writings. In particular, the 
scholar Ibn Sina’s Canon of Medicine is a protracted build on the Hippocratic and Galenic 
theories of humors. In this text, he systemizes Galen’s work, formulaically describing 
 
8 Jacques Jouanna, Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen: Selected Papers (Leiden, NL: Brill, 
2012), 229-230.  
 
9 William V. Harris, Mental Disorders in the Classical World (New York: Brill, 2013), 329.  
 
10 Jouanna, Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 340. 
 
11 Jouanna, Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 256. 
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corresponding tastes (sweet, salty, sour, and “insipid”), and adds that “even imagination, 
emotional states, and other agents cause the humours to move,” like seeing particular colors 
when ill.12 The Canon also refers extensively to how the humors are impacted when interacting 
with herbal or chemical properties, foods, healing regiments, and surgical treatments. As 
Lawrence Conrad notes, it is thanks to the Latin translations of the Canon that European 
Galenism would have a basis for the next six hundred years.13  
In The Senses of Humor: Self and Laughter in Modern America, Daniel Wickberg writes 
that the conception of humor is gradually unmoored from such a bodily-based constitution 
around the 15th century, following instead a parallel trajectory to developing models of 
personhood and individualism in which an increasing ontological importance is placed upon the 
“interiority of persons – the proliferation of senses, the valuation of intuitive and emotional 
judgment over ‘objective’ criteria or reason, the capacity for feeling associated with 
sentimentalism or sensibility.”14 This translates to new potential for what may elicit laughter: 
where the distance between object and subject collapses, non-derisive laughter becomes a 
possibility. Instead of laughing at someone, there is a positive ontological value placed upon the 
capacity to laugh at oneself as well, a “sympathetic perception of incongruity.”15 The self is both 
 
12 Avicenna, The Canon of Medicine of Avicenna, Volume I, trans. Oskar Cameron Gruner (New York, 
NY: AMS Press, 1973), 81. 
 
13 Lawrence Conrad, “Medicine,” Database, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford 
Islamic Studies Online, accessed February 19, 2020, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0524. 
 
14 Daniel Wickberg, The Senses of Humor: Self and Laughter in Modern America (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2015), 8. 
  
15 Wickberg, The Senses of Humor, 8. 
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subject and object within this new frame of humor, holding a paradoxical valuation of the other 
in place.  
Wickberg believes this to also coincide with a growing “bureaucratic individualism” that 
comes to dominate modes of thought in the United States in the 18th and 19th centuries. Here, 
humor transforms into an attitude that can be adopted, not just an object of perception. The word 
thus begins to appear as a descriptor (not just as an object) in the 1840s, more succinctly 
articulated as an endorsable personality attribute in American vernacular during the 1870s. This 
individualism is informed by the pervasive ways in which economic and market forces dissemble 
within shifting social formations. Engagement with these forces requires an augmented valuation 
of the self vis-à-vis an increased subjectification and interiorization of that subjectivity. Here, as 
Charles Taylor and Talal Asad might argue, “choice” or “agency” are marked as distinguishing 
factors of one’s encounter with the dominant social order. This ideology takes on a common-
sense appeal, cultivating a deep sense of interiority that constructs the individual as unique prior 
to his – and it is a he, of course – place within a larger communal setting. This also allows him to 
stand outside of himself in ways that allow him to see, manipulate, and control that self. It is a 
quality that he values just as the market values it, an ability to perceive incongruity and adapt – 
even transcend – oneself against those incongruities so as to balance the sanctioned order put in 
place by these very bureaucratic market forces. Humor as a distinctive characteristic of a person 
and self becomes similarly prized alongside the commensurate qualities of morality, choice, and 
bureaucratic individualism.16 
 




Elsewhere, Philip Deen writes that a sense of humor is a virtue “conducive to the cardinal 
political virtues of sociability, prudence, and justice.”17 In a study of Donald Trump, Deen 
contends that the U.S. president’s inability to sustain mockery from others or to even mock 
himself is indicative of deeper foibles – “a dangerous self-seriousness” – which are all the more 
dangerous when the person in question is politically powerful.18 More adept political leaders, he 
writes, would understand their position as custodians that seek to preserve and incrementally 
change a broad yet unstable order. Contempt for established norms and one’s place within them 
indicates an inability to recognize one’s own limits which ultimately means that “one will not be 
a good citizen or shepherd of the political community.”19 These views were especially shared 
across commercial industries during the Trump presidency, as witnessed by the 2020 White 
House Correspondents Association’s decision to once more ask comedian Hasan Minhaj 
(alongside Saturday Night Live performer Kenan Thompson) to headline their annual banquet 
celebrating the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment and freedom of the press. The 
Association’s president, Jonathan Karl, introduced new awards that would recognize 
accountability journalism and reportorial courage, but insisted that comedy belongs alongside 
this slate of events: “The dinner has a serious message, but we also believe it is as important as 
ever to be able to laugh — at ourselves, as well as at the people we cover. I’d argue that humor is 
more important now than ever.”20 
 
17 Phillip Deen, “Senses of Humor as Political Virtues,” Metaphilosophy 49, no. 3 (April 1, 2018): 371-
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The Analytic of a Joke 
While the idea of a sense of humor finds itself reconceptualized by the 18th century, its 
outward manifestation – the joke – gets similarly re-objectified as a commodity and tool within 
the era’s changing commercial market, engendered by the internalization of humor as a mode of 
seeing. Following the logic set out by bureaucratic individualism, Wickberg understands the joke 
as a literary form that is “contractive, concerned with abstraction, detachment, formal 
condensation of meaning, and the mechanistic interchangeability of parts”; now an object of 
exchange and commodity that is neutral to its surrounding circumstances.21 This neutrality feeds 
off of the overall ethos that is cultivated by these distinctly modern notions of personhood and 
the self. An autonomous individual is universally applicable (an essential “type”), as is the 
humor that the individual then chooses to exhibit. By the 20th century, the humorless person was 
caricatured as a useful inverse against which to further cultivate the most correct and modern 
model of personhood. “The stereotyped figure of the man without a sense of humor provided an 
image of the incomplete, the deficient, the lacking… described by examples: the ardent patriot, 
the fanatic religionist, the prohibitionist.”22 
Historically, four general theories of humor have been developed to explain what about a 
given narrative engenders laughter: superiority, relief, incongruity, and rhetorical marginality. 
Superiority theory describes derisive or devaluating laughter, built on feeling superior to others’ 
conditions or one’s former state (after having overcome it). Wickberg refers to this as the most 
prevalent mode of laughter up until the 18th century, though its application does not correspond 
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with all instances of superiority.23 Francis Hutcheson offers the example of a man riding in a 
carriage as he passes beggars in the street. While he may feel better off than them, that 
superiority does not induce laughter. He is far more likely to feel pity; “in greater danger of 
weeping than laughing.”24 Relief and incongruity theories then attempt to fill the gaps left behind 
by superiority theory. 
Relief theory assumes internal pressure and is famously taken up by Sigmund Freud in 
Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. Freud contends that laughter releases nervous 
energy that was previously busy repressing internal emotion. The most repressed among them 
are in relation to sexual desire and hostility. Thus, upon hearing a lude joke, Freud says one is 
able to express their libido by way of laughter.25 
What seems to be the now dominant theory of humor, incongruity theory, supposes we 
laugh when perceiving something that goes against what we would otherwise expect. This 
incongruity violates mental patterns or a certain conceptual schema. John Morreall adds that the 
incongruity must also be an enjoyable incongruity, connecting it to the notion of play carried out 
in a setting devoid of real-life stakes. In humor, then, “the abilities we exercise in unusual and 
extreme ways in a safe setting are related to thinking and interacting with other people.”26 
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 Mary Douglas reads power and political possibility into the inquiry of humor, adding that 
the inherent incongruity within jokes lends itself well to acts of subversion, where a normalized 
or hegemonic pattern is ultimately upended. This requires two elements: “the juxtaposition of a 
control against that which is controlled, in which the latter triumphs … The successful 
subversion of one form by another completes or ends the joke, for it changes the balance of 
power.”27 The reception of subversive jokes relies entirely on the social dimensions in which 
they are told. Douglas writes: 
In every period there is a pile of submerged jokes, unperceived because they are 
irrelevant or wrongly balanced for the perspective of the day… Social requirements may 
judge a joke to be in bad taste, risky, too near the bone, improper, or irrelevant. Such 
controls are exerted either on behalf of hierarchy as such, or on behalf of values which 
are judged too precious and too precarious to be exposed to challenge... Since its form 
consists of a victorious tilting of uncontrol against control, it is an image of the levelling 
of hierarchy, the triumph of intimacy over formality, of unofficial values over official 
ones... The joke merely affords opportunity for realizing that an accepted pattern has no 
necessity. Its excitement lies in the suggestion that any particular ordering of experience 
may be arbitrary and subjective.28 
 
The notion of humor that “punches up” builds on what Douglas has offered here. Richard 
Zoglin views the heyday of this type of comedy as coinciding with the American counterculture 
movement, in which comedians like Lenny Bruce (d. 1966) led the charge for a new generation 
of standup comics in the 1950s U.S. to move away from generalized witticisms and instead 
speak directly to the social ills they witnessed around them. Bruce easily incorporated politics, 
social commentary, and personal struggles into his act. In one popular bit, he enacts a scenario in 
which Christ asks Moses why Puerto Ricans are crammed into squalid tenements in Spanish 
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Harlem while Cardinal Spellman “has a ring on worth eight grand.”29 This type of overt “line 
crossing” when it came to issues of growing wealth inequalities, suburbanization, white flight 
(all while being liberal with his language) gained Bruce the reputation of a renegade comedian 
who paid the price every step of the way. For Bruce, that manifested in a literal rap sheet that 
eventually swallowed his finances and time. He spent the last several years of his life fighting 
obscenity lawsuits due to the “indecent” nature of his material and was unable to get bookings at 
clubs similarly worried about getting busted by the police. His material, however, did not 
change. Today it is remembered for its intense candor and audacity. George Carlin, who met 
Bruce twice during the beginning of his career, reflected on how Bruce’s influence led him to 
ultimately take up that mantle in the 1970s until his own death in 2008: “The honesty, the fact 
that he didn’t ignore or avoid unpleasant truths or realities. That told me that you could tell your 
own truth – and you might even think of it as the larger truth – and that you could make it 
entertaining and interesting and a bit daring.”30  
 
Purveyors of Conscientious Humor 
 Amarnath Amarasingam suggests that these types of comedians – one who wraps astute 
social observations in a joke – fulfills the conceptual possibilities laid out by Antonio Gramsci’s 
“organic intellectual,” a social figure who works to create counter-hegemonies against the 
sedimented common-sense realities of everyday life.31 Whereas the traditional intellectual is 
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removed from social life and dominant social groups, the organic intellectual has the ability to 
convey the needs and desires of a given class of people because they are both part of and 
representative of that community. The organic intellectual defends the perception of this group in 
public and works to “inspire its self-confidence as an historical actor and to provide it with 
social, cultural, and political leadership.”32 Today, those figures can be found in the culture 
industry, and Amarasingam names Chris Rock, Paul Mooney, Russell Peters, Margaret Cho, and 
Dave Chappelle as exemplary organic intellectuals for taking a characteristically American 
activity like standup comedy and using it to critique American institutions such as racism and 
other “common sense beliefs” about their respective racial or ethnic communities. 
Indeed, in the context of American humor and standup, this type of “truth to power” 
rhetoric has come through most acutely in the work of Black, women, and Jewish comedians.  
John Limon observes that Jewish men made up the majority of recognizable American standup 
comedians around 1960; he approximates around 80 percent.33 Unlike their co-religionists that 
made up the “borscht-belt” by performing in Catskills hotels in the 1950s and 1960s, comedians 
in the vein of Lenny Bruce like Carl Reiner, Mel Brooks, Mike Nichols, and Elaine May created 
acts that responded to the shifting sensibilities surrounding public morality among postwar 
American suburbanites. Jokes that seemingly teased at their Jewishness easily slipped into sharp 
critiques of Christian hegemony. In one example, Lenny Bruce enacts an extended bit in which 
he embodies televangelist Oral Roberts on the phone with the pope, assuring him that “No, 
 
32 Walter L. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci’s Political and Cultural 
Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 143.  
 
33 John Limon, Stand-up Comedy in Theory, or, Abjection in America (Durham: Duke University Press, 




nobody knows you’re Jewish.”34 Elaine May and Nike Nichols’s tag-team act made light of 
concerns surrounding adultery and sin through a shared Jewish sensibility on the topic (in which 
May would take on the role of an overbearing Jewish mother).35  
At the same time, Limon writes that the homosocial “odd couple” act of Carl Reiner and 
Mel Brooks relies on the abjection of queer bodies and black bodies that turns these bodies into a 
gag. Reiner’s low voice and the use of fastidiously-pronounced English makes for a straight (in 
more than one way) man against Mel Brook’s possibly gay but certainly ethnic punch-line. 
“Whereas Brooks quarantines all possible contagions, Reiner stands next to them, enjoying them 
on behalf of the audience without infection: suburbanite in commuting relationship to the 
dangerous (sexual, aggressive, ethnic) city he moved out of.”36 Jewish comics that emerged in 
later years, characterized best, perhaps, by someone like Jerry Seinfeld have moved into the 
terrain of observational comedy with muted politics. Rosalin Krieger calls Seinfeld 
“ambivalently” and “transitionally” Jewish, emphasizing an apparent desire to fully assimilate 
into a Protestant etiquette of civility. This is facilitated by the fluidity of race and class mobility 
in the latter half of the 20th century, which culminates in a white-passing or full assimilation into 
whiteness for “ambivalent” Jews like Seinfeld. Jewishness, argues Krieger, operates largely as a 
cultural designation in Seinfeld’s comedy, in which he otherwise marginalizes or eliminates the 
appearance of social and cultural differences “in the interest of shared and universal similarity.”37 
 
34 Stephen E. Kercher, Revel with a Cause: Liberal Satire in Postwar America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), 400.  
 
35 Limon, Stand-up Comedy in Theory, or, Abjection in America, 57-63. 
 
36 Limon, Stand-up Comedy in Theory, or, Abjection in America, 41.  
 
37 Rosalin Krieger, “‘Does He Actually Say the Word Jewish?’ - Jewish Representations in Seinfeld,” 





 Standup is still far from being a gender-neutral meritocracy, and Joanne Gilbert contends 
that there is an immediate need for women comedians to perform their marginality by way of 
performing femaleness. Capitalizing on gendered difference and disparities calls immediate 
attention to one’s subordinate status but has historically required “a delicate balance - projecting 
enough power to take control of the audience and enough vulnerability to be non-threatening.”38 
Queer women comedians like Wanda Sykes, Margaret Cho, and Ellen DeGeneres toe the line in 
their routines that stays within the bounds of risk so as not to alienate audiences due to their 
already present embodied risk of being both women and queer. Joanne Gilbert sees DeGeneres, 
for example, take on the rhetoric and diction of a “kid” to remain within her audience’s comfort 
zone: speaking in run-on sentences, using words like “scary” or “squishy,” and relating stories in 
the halting, breathless fashion of a young child.39 Others will center their marginality as the act 
itself. Lea Delaria, for example, began her performance on the Arsenio Hall Show in 1993 with 
“It’s great to be here because it’s the 1990s and it’s hip to be queer and I’m a big dyke!”40  
Humor by women is decidedly feminist, and has often taken to task their own profession 
and the men within it for their indifference and complicity within broader social ills like rape 
culture. Elayne Boosler jokes:  
I’m walking in New York with my boyfriend last week. He says: “Gee, it’s a beautiful 
night. Let’s go down by the river.” I said: “What are you, nuts?! I’m not going down by 
 
38 Susan Horowitz, Queens of Comedy: Lucille Ball, Phyllis Diller, Carol Burnett, Joan Rivers, and the 
New Generation of Funny Women (London: Routledge, 2012), 13.  
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the river. It’s midnight; I’m wearing jewelry; I’m carrying money; I have a vagina with 
me! Tomorrow I’ll leave it in my other pants. Then we’ll go down.”41 
 
The woman in this joke is not only the “first person,” she is also not the butt of the joke. Rather, 
the butt is her boyfriend and his “nice guy” obliviousness. Within such feminist routines, both 
hegemonic forms of masculinity and supposedly “feminist” masculinity are being held to 
account when it comes to women’s realities. The #MeToo movement, which began in earnest in 
2006 through the work of Black activist Tarana Burke and became an international phenomenon 
in 2017, has further facilitated feminist comedy.42  
In its wake, audiences have seen the rise of women like Hannah Gadsby who use the 
genre to complicate whether or not this form can truly be liberating for the artist or her 
audiences. In her 2018 show, Nanette, Gadsby splices jokes with deeply personal testimonies of 
pain, homophobia, and internalized oppression. She breaks down that a typical joke must have a 
setup followed by a punchline, but that this pattern ultimately does not allow one to tell a full 
story. A joke about a man thinking Gadsby was hitting on his girlfriend but is ultimately relieved 
to learn she is a woman does not give space to the full ending of that story – that when he learns 
that Gadsby is a queer woman, he beats her while bystanders watch. She ends her show by 
refusing to release this tension with laughter, because “this tension is yours. You need to learn 
what this feels like because this, this tension is what not-normals carry inside of them all of the 
time because it is dangerous to be different.”43 
 
41 Lara Cox, “Standing Up against the Rape Joke: Irony and Its Vicissitudes,” Signs 40, no. 4 (2015): 963-
984, 973-974. 
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Black Comedy and the Endurance of Richard Pryor 
 Richard Pryor (d. 2005) and his body of work are easily the most transformative and 
representative of the social possibilities enabled by standup comedy. Pryor’s stage presence 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s is stylized in the mold of Black Christian preachers. Erica Britt 
notes that Pryor’s blend of Southern inflection, working-class speech, and the punctuation of the 
Black Arts Movement results in a “linguistic subterfuge” that not only witnessed the crossover of 
Black sacred performance into a supposedly “secular” domain, but saw Pryor become an 
embodied point of recognition for mixed-race audiences, cloaked with the respect and authority 
of someone like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. as they take on topics of pressing social concern and 
controversy. In Pryor’s case, this recognition invited audiences to actively engage, redefine, and 
even align themselves with his critiques. Shouts of “take your time,” “all right,” “yes,” “preach,” 
and “for sho” would pepper and ratify his performances and assertions.  
The content of his shows reflected on the racial chasms between the fictions white 
Americans told themselves and the realities that Black Americans lived throughout the 70s and 
80s. This jagged forwardness and rage – complete with impersonations of people ranging from 
“dope dealers, addicts, prostitutes, street thugs, criminals, drunks, racists, and crazed spouses” – 
meant his audience itself quickly and openly divided into racial proximates.44 Pryor was among 
the first to do so unabashedly; other Black comedians like Moms Mabley, Red Foxx, and Bill 
Cosby eventually settled on routines that downplayed explicit social disparities in favor of 
commentary on the low stakes, mundane issues of race. Pryor’s work only continued to be more 
and more unequivocal in its messaging: the 1974 release of That Nigger’s Crazy Pryor took the 
 
44 Eddie Tafoya, Icons of African American Comedy: A Joke of a Different Color (Santa Barbara: ABC-




notion and supposed application of equality and openly teased the mechanical ways in which 
racism continued to pervade the nation. The final track of his album Bicentennial Nigger 
lampoons the idea of a grateful black-faced slave celebrating the U.S. bicentennial. “We are 
gathered here today to celebrate this year of bicentenniality,” he says, “in the hope of celebrating 
two hundred years of white folks kicking ass.” The parody ends abruptly when Pryor reassumes 
his own voice and says, “we offer this prayer and the prayer is … How long will this bullshit go 
on? How long?! How long?! That is the eternal question.”45  
 Later Black comics like Chris Rock and Dave Chapelle, performing in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, draw heavily from the well left behind by Pryor. Terrence Tucker sees the affect of 
Pryor’s rage, in particular, come through in Rock’s confrontational approach to politics and his 
brash allegiance to Black life and culture on stage.46 In one bit, he addresses the audacity of 
white privilege, depicting a scenario in which a white person insists that “I don’t mean anything 
bad by it. I’ve traveled the world. I got a yacht. I fucked Raquel Welch. Now, if I could just say 
‘nigger,’ everything would be complete.”47 In another, he professes a fear of “young white boys” 
due to the frequency of mass shootings, but adds that “there’s not a white person in here that 
would trade places with me, and I’m rich!”48  
Similar to Rock, Dave Chapelle’s comedy plainly articulates the everyday 
discriminations Black people face in the United States, but also inserts a clear malaise to his 
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racial analysis, a wariness about whether the legislative political mechanisms in place can bring 
about discernable change. Chapelle is most famous, perhaps, for his short-lived television 
program Chapelle’s Show, which ran on Comedy Central from 2003-2006. After two wildly 
successful seasons (which are credited with saving the network at the time) and a $50 million 
deal for a third season, Chapelle famously walked away mid-production in 2006 and traveled to 
South Africa. Back in the U.S., a churning media rumor mill implied he had gone on a crack 
bender. Upon his return, he tells Oprah that “I was doing sketches that were funny, but socially 
irresponsible. I felt like I was deliberately being encouraged and I was overwhelmed. It’s like 
you’re being flooded with things, and you don’t pay attention to things like your ethics.”49 When 
pressed to elaborate, he reveals that while he very much saw an anti-racist ethos running through 
his work, he was not in control of its reception. This realization culminated when he witnessed a 
white employee laughing too gleefully at a sketch that featured blackface. “I know the difference 
between people laughing with me and people laughing at me,” he says.50  
This episode is a glimpse into how the inherent politics and ethics of humor bleed freely 
into the social and corporeal realties of a performer who – despite his radical attempts to shine a 
light on the pervasive nature of anti-Black racism – remains a nonnormative subject within a 
social order that continues to racially overdetermine him as such. For minoritized comedians like 
Bruce, Chapelle, and Gadsby, humor is most certainly a site of resistance. But it is also always a 
site of violence, epistemic and physical. Chapelle’s trip to South Africa was an attempt to 
remedy that violence by removing himself from an actively antagonistic world and forging 
 
49 Why Comedian Dave Chappelle Walked Away From $50 Million, The Oprah Winfrey Show (YouTube, 
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connection with another. This came in the form of a South African Muslim community that 
“don’t know anything about the work I do, and they just treat me like I’m a regular dude… They 
were feeding me and taking care of me… it just made me feel good. It reminded me that I was a 
person.”51 Yet a fuller picture of his relationship to Islam (which he converted to in South Africa 
some years before) does not materialize in media interviews before or during his sojourn unless 
he himself actively brings Islam up on his own. What does come up - and what further drive 
Chapelle’s anxiety – are blindly repetitious questions that are levied about whether he was 
actually smoking crack, had actually checked into a mental institution, or even if he had 
graduated from high school. After a careful explanation of the circumstances surrounding his 
departure, even Oprah gratifies this racialized over-determinism: “So would you say that you lost 
your mind, sort of?”52  
 
Conclusion 
 The concept of humor has traveled a long way from its physiological roots, but a 
common notion pervades the various ways that it has been named and deemed universally 
present. From Hippocratic humoral theory to conceptions of laughter, tension release, and 
incongruity, “humor” has historically been employed as a gauge of fitness and suitability for 
public life. Its tightly policed boundaries, whether they are referred to as “good” or “bad” 
mixtures and their resultant temperaments or by simply as pointing out what is considered 
“taboo,” indicate a range of permissibility within which one may still contribute to the social 
 
51 Dave Chappelle - Being a Muslim and Going to Africa, Inside the Actor’s Studio, accessed February 
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order. Yet humor draws attention to the presence of an arbitrary social “line” that dare not be 
crossed. Of course, every definition of humor is a capsule of its own moment and space, filling a 
taxonomic and disciplinary need by way of describing a particularity that ascribes to broader 
constructions of the self, the communal, and their respective interplay.  
All of this takes place as social contracts increasingly propose different expectations from 
those that opt (or are swept) in. I must note, once more, my own positionality in such a survey. 
As a scholar reviewing these histories for what they divulge about the limitations of this most 
ardently insisted upon sensibility – to be and to find someone/thing humorous – I am vigilant to 
its capacity to enact violence on one through another’s joy. Through the deployment of humor of 
the “punch up” variety, however, the social line is teased not for its arbitrary location, but for its 
deliberate placement and the exclusionary practices that stem from it. When wielded by those 
whom violence visits with ease in every other social dimension of public and private life, humor 
is a weapon, albeit one that remains heavily surveilled. It is for such paradoxical possibilities, I 
believe, as both an enforcer and destabilizer of power, that the genre of humor is an excellent 
case study for the environment within which Muslims negotiate and ultimately challenge the 













CHAPTER 2: HUMOR AND/AMONG MUSLIMS 
 
Muslims are the most peaceful people on the planet Earth. Y’all don’t believe it? Think 
about it. Mike Tyson ain’t won a fight since he became a Muslim. 
 
- Azeem Muhammad, Allah Made Me Funny1 
 
Introduction  
There is a presumed dissonance between humor and something as “serious” as religion, 
which becomes all the more pronounced when religion gets specified to Islam. In an academy 
still lit up and beckoned by the glow of easy Orientalist tropes and conditions, the role of religion 
is frequently characterized on the periphery as humor’s archnemesis. When religion is 
configured as a category of analysis directly alongside humor, however, a radically different 
understanding of the self, the secular subject, and modernity are made evident. This chapter 
looks specifically at the ways that scholarship on Muslim humor (in English) has emerged over 
the last fifty years. I am mindful of the ways that authors demonstrate their alignment with 
dominant humoral boundaries and hegemonic presumptions of religion and Islam, frequently 
anticipating assumptions of humor’s rarity among Muslims. The need for legibility within the 
field maintains these limitations. While some scholars seek to consolidate Muslim humor into the 
broader but minoritized category of “ethnic” humor, others affirm an authentic Muslim “archive” 
of humor. Still other studies enact a drama that bestows autocratic governments and rageful 
Muslim mobs an oversized role in fostering a reactionary production of humor in Southwest 
 




Asia. Depictions of comics that emerge in the wake of September 11th follow a similar trajectory. 
This body of “Muslim humor” literature distorts and capitalizes Islam into a singular unit: 
severe, routinized, and anti-modern in its general practice, while humor is presented as the 
natural corrective for these danger to modern society. By placing religion at the center of 
analysis, however, one may more clearly discern how Islam came to occupy this position, and 
how Protestant Euroamerican conceptualizations of religion, secularism, and their attendant 
institutions are not the antithesis of humor, but its authors and continued collaborators. 
 
The “Humorless” Muslim 
As developed in Chapter 1, Wickberg’s humorless subject in the 19th century was viewed 
as being incomplete and deficient, a useful opposite against which to define “a more appropriate 
model of personhood.”2 This opposite (overt in their fanaticism but dull in ways of thinking) 
mirrors the language used to describe Muslims at that time and well into the present day. The 
simple descriptor of “humorless” betrays how Islam has been historically conceived of and 
constructed in relation to the secular modern and its “place” in civil life throughout Euroamerica. 
This vision of Islam, at its core, is of a dry, legalistic tradition bound to desert orthopraxy derived 
from seventh century text and man.  
In 2006, the Warner Independent Pictures studio released Looking for Comedy in the 
Muslim World, in which comedian Albert Brooks is sent to India and Pakistan to “write up a 
500-page report on what makes the Muslims laugh” at the behest of President Bush and the U.S. 
 
2 Daniel Wickberg, The Senses of Humor: Self and Laughter in Modern America (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2015), 89. 
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government.3 It is quickly clear that the title and the setting are not a clever sendup of the fiction 
of a “Muslim world” a la Cemil Aydin, and instead the film leans heavily and repeatedly on 
jokes at the expense of “the millions of Muslims around the world that hate our guts.”4 The 
film’s trailer cuts to the seemingly requisite scene of a bewildered Brooks stepping out of a cab 
onto a bustling South Asian street replete with rickshaws, cars, pedestrians, and cows. The 
remainder of this mockumentary features cringe-inducing humor, where audiences respond 
stone-faced to Brooks’ various routines, as well as cracks that never rise above the stereotypes 
they are poking fun at. In one instance, Brooks holds interviews for an assistant and finds one 
candidate that fits the bill. Just before he can offer her the position, she turns the questions on 
him. “You’re not a Jew, are you?”5  
The latter part of the film finds Brooks illegally crossing the Indian border with Pakistan 
to meet a group of hashish-smoking would-be comedians in what is implied to be the Tora Bora 
mountains (where Bin Laden famously hid away in a cave complex). The jokes throughout this 
half all rely on the fact that these comedians are likely terrorists, though for what cause is unclear 
(and ultimately unimportant for the director). The prudish, dogmatic Muslim subject remains 
intact by film’s end. Looking for Comedy received a lukewarm response from viewers and critics 
upon release, though the critics’ reasoning for deeming it a weak performance has more to do 
with the fact that the titular quest remains unfulfilled. “The film is left with a big soft spot in the 
 
3 Albert Brooks, Looking for Comedy in the Muslim World, Comedy (Warner Independent Pictures, 
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middle,” Variety critic Deborah Young remarks, “because we never find out what makes 
Muslims — or anyone else — laugh.”6 
 
Muslim Jokes and Joking Muslims 
Can Muslims take a joke – why is this such a critical question? Comedic traditions 
among Muslims, oral and written, abound both historically and today. Sabra Webber, in her entry 
on “Humor and Islam” in the Encyclopedia of Religion, writes extensively about examples of 
Islam and humor across centuries, regions, and classes. For the most part, she discloses, Muslim 
humor follows the logic set out by Mary Douglas, “tend[ing] toward breaking down hierarchies, 
creating liminal spaces that offer a chance to see facets of the Muslim experience afresh as they 
are played out in personal and congregational, micro and macro situations.”7 Webber details a 
variety of ways that humor can be traced across normative religious practices in Islam, as well as 
oral traditions and literature written. Humor is a resource for those that wield it, she argues – it is 
a safety valve and provides protection for the sulbaltern, women, children, and minorities, a way 
to resist those more powerful. The jokes of children, such as those they play while their parents 
pray, show their outsider status as uninitiated into ritual. They further demonstrate the 
constructedness of religious practices.8  
Webber also relates an Egyptian joke about an elderly woman going through a security 
check in Makkah. A young guard, armed with a gun, finds a bottle of whiskey in her bag. She 
 
6 Deborah Young, “Review: Looking for Comedy in the Muslim World,” Variety, December 16, 2005, 
https://variety.com/2005/film/markets-festivals/looking-for-comedy-in-the-muslim-world-1200519650/. 
7 Sabra J. Webber, “Humor and Religion: Humor and Islam,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Lindsay 
Jones, 2nd ed., vol. 6 (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 4210–18. 4211. 
8 Webber, “Humor and Religion,” 4211. 
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responds that it is difficult to go around the Kaaba at her age, but after a few sips the Kaaba goes 
around her! The guard laughs and lets her go.9 Still another example comes from the Arab 
American poet H.S. Hamod, who details a story of driving through South Dakota as the sun sets 
with his father, grandfather, and several uncles. They insist on pulling over the car on the 
highway to pray the Maghrib salah. Hamod depicts his sheer panic as headlights flash before and 
behind them, the suns colors growing darker, and the sound of “Allahu Akbar” and “Ameen” 
ringing against the din of passing cars. Webber sees this humor illustrating a betwixt and 
between moment, in which the poet is the mediator between two different worlds.10  
Still then, Webber finds humor through recovery in old Orientalist texts. In Edward 
Lane’s influential survey of Egyptians in the 1800s, he writes of a situation in which a passerby 
asks him for his watch. Lane’s Egyptian colleague responds to the passerby by saying “Verily, 
the Time will come: I will surely make it to appear.” Lane recounts this moment with irritation, 
declaring that Egyptians always confound the sacred with the everyday. But here, he has missed 
the joke: his Egyptian friend has made a witticism (watch/time being the same word in Arabic) 
that points to the stylized humor of the Muslim literati, which requires knowledge of both Arabic 
linguistics and scripture.11 In a similar vein, bhānd satire in Pakistan features a popular comic 
duo composed of a cynical figure juxtaposed against a Sufi wise-fool, both of whom praise and 
demean each other in their dialogue. This tradition, argues Claire Pamment, stands tall among 
 
9 Webber, “Humor and Religion,” 4212. 
10 Webber, “Humor and Religion,” 4212. 
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the “diverse expressions of comedy in Muslim worlds, past and present.”12 Ignorance of its 
longstanding presence speaks to a greater desire to imagine Islam as encompassing a bland 
sedation that is suited to a life of fundamental sobriety. 
 
Frames of Muslim Humor 
Given such an illustrative diversity of Muslim humor, it remains curious that the English-
language academic study of this subject has largely been confined to what I see as four main, 
though often interlaced, frames with a single origin story: 1) a subsuming of Islam within a 
broader category of ethnic humor, 2) “dissident humor” as resistance in the face of 
authoritarianism, 3) “Islamic humor” sanctioned by the authorities vested within the Prophet 
Muhammad, the Qur’an, and 4) the rise of Muslim standup post-9/11. Each of these frames 
derives from the presumptive starting point of a stock figure, the humorless, unmodern Muslim, 
making each study more or less reactive in its content and theorization. Flashpoints like the 2005 
Danish cartoon controversy reinvigorated such studies, and scholars responded by way of 
counter-narration in one of the four forms above.  
The counter-narrative, however, maintains its starting point, thereby re-entrenching the 
public discourse that imagines unmodern, illiberal Muslims as largely incapable of humor with 
some notable exceptions. The societal stakes of a sullen – and possibly dangerous – Muslim 
majority remain operative, without consideration of the role of religion and religiously-informed 
discourses play in that operation. The how and the why of this reality are the subject of Chapter 
3. For the time being, however, I would like to review the rooted nature of these four frames, the 
 




utility and omissions of their counter-narrations within the broader purview of humor studies, 
and how a religious studies lens can retrain the focus of these projects to reveal why we 
inevitably return to the same civilizational questions as before.  
 
Ethnic Humor 
Studies of Muslim humor are often obscured within alternative categories, chief among 
them being studies of “ethnic” humor. A recent volume on Arab culture contains a chapter on 
humor in Egypt by Devin Stewart, which relates a bevy of translated jokes ranging from 
wordplay and double entendre to jokes based on one’s identity, stinginess, or stupidity.13 
Reference to Islam is tucked within a small sub-section of the article titled “Religious Jokes” and 
relay witticisms that find a shaykh or famous discipline of the Prophet Muhammad (like Abu 
Hurayrah, for example) at the center of the joke. The irreverence of these jokes, surmises 
Stewart, “may come as a surprise to Western audiences.”14 At the same time, the section 
reiterates the danger one faces from the state when joking about religion, while also listing out a 
string of jokes not necessarily about Islam but “Islamists” and terrorism.15  
Mucahit Bilici refers to “Muslim ethnic comedy” as a communal occupation that 
develops in the shadow of September 11th, an event that provides a common language to Muslim 
comedians to come together “like every other ethnic group” and perform in view of mainstream 
 
13 Devin Stewart, “Humor,” in The Cambridge Companion to Modern Arab Culture, ed. Dwight Reynolds 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 236-240. 
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audiences.16 This is what brings coherence to otherwise racially diverse groups like the Allah 
Made Me Funny (AMMF) Tour and the Axis of Evil (AoE) Tour, made up of comics like Azeem 
Muhammad, Preacher Moss, Mo Amer, Maz Jobrani, Dean Obeidallah, Aron Kader, and Ahmed 
Ahmed.  Jaclyn Michael writes elsewhere that such comedy relies on Islam reading as race or 
ethnicity, as Muslim comedians make light of the vagueness behind “looking” Muslim – dark 
skin, beard, turbans – which has come to encompass a wide, massified span of people ranging in 
religious, regional, or ethnic markers, as well as the gendered impositions of a pathologically 
violent and abusive Muslim man. Azhar Usman, she says, jokes that he wouldn’t own 9/11 – 
“but a 7-Eleven, maybe” – in a way that creates a moment of incongruity that also feeds into 
another offensive, but certainly less dangerous stereotype for his viewers. The spillover into 
stereotypes that also capture non-Muslim South Asians with this joke mitigates the solely 
“Muslim” difference that would otherwise be attributed to him.17 
 
Dissident Humor 
The frame of “dissident humor” is set up as a narrative of resistance by way of political 
jokes against authoritarianism, personified by an autocratic Muslim government or strongman. 
Egyptians, once more, take center stage in this genre for their decades-long string of jokes about 
Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak, and Morsi for their deleterious expenditures of power. A Foreign Policy 
article published in January 2011 (just days before the first days of the Egyptian Revolution) 
describes how jokes about Mubarak began in the 80s by poking fun at his boorishness and 
 
16 Mucahit Bilici, “Muslim Ethnic Comedy: Inversions of Islamophobia,” in Islamophobia/Islamophilia: 
Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2010), 197. 
17 Jaclyn Michael, “American Muslims Stand up and Speak out: Trajectories of Humor in Muslim 
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fellahin (rural peasant) background, a departure from the charismatic and elite leaders Gamal 
Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat.18 After the year 2000, commentary shifted towards his 
ruthlessness and liberal use of state security to put down any type of opposition, political or 
simply playful. Shortly after Mubarak’s ouster, the cardiologist Bassem Youssef – commonly 
referred to as “the Egyptian Jon Stewart” in the wake of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution – began 
recording satirical responses against state media narratives on a webcam in his laundry room.  
In those days, the object of his ridicule was usually the Muslim Brotherhood politicians 
and their party messaging after their democratic assumption of power in 2012. Youssef clocked a 
strident following of millions, and within months, the private Egyptian television network ONTV 
asked him to produce the show under the title Al-Bernameg on their network. In its heyday 
between 2011 and 2013, Al-Bernameg was the number one show across the Arab world.19 
Youssef also caught the attention of the muse himself, Jon Stewart, who appeared on the show 
during a visit to Egypt in 2013. The same year, Youssef was bestowed several honors in the US, 
including an inclusion in TIME’s 100 and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)’s 
International Press Freedom Award. Stewart introduced him with the following:  
He hosts his program in a country where freedom of expression is not settled law. He 
helps carve out space through his show to help that country understand the importance of 
dissent and satire’s role… If President Mohamed Morsi wore a funny hat, that Friday, 
Bassem would wear a funnier hat... And then the people took to the streets at the end of 
June, and they drove Morsi from power and the army took over... And Bassem Youssef 
[still] stood up and did his show, and made fun of the new regime and their funny hats, 
and that lasted a day. So it turns out that the new regime in Egypt has less of a sense of 
humor than the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. [laughter and applause]20 
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Al-Bernameg aired on several different networks until its termination in early 2014, with Youssef 
explaining to viewers that the political pressure on him and his family had become too dangerous 
for him to continue. They relocated to the U.S. shortly thereafter, where Youssef was named a 
resident fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.21  
Scholars like Amal Ibrahim and Nahed Eltantawy have commented that their study of 
Youssef emerged out of an interest in how satire can foment social change, and that “poking fun 
at oppressive regimes has been a fundamental part of Egyptian life since the pharaohs.”22 Their 
description of the Daily Show (Al-Bernamig’s counterpart in the US), however, is contextualized 
not within the language of oppression, but as “a hybrid blend of comedy, news, and political 
conversation.”23 The scholarly literature about the Daily Show and American political humor is 
almost exclusively focused on the propensity for what gets termed “edutainment” or 
“politainment,” to expose hypocrisies in media coverage, how young people engage with 
politics, and whether satire can constitute journalism.24 Attention to the asymmetrical dynamics 
of power between the American government and its people is tertiary to these studies.  
 
21 “Spring 2015 Resident and Visiting Fellows,” The Institute of Politics, Harvard Kennedy School, 2015, 
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Muslim political humor, both in academic circles and in popular discourses about Muslim 
comedians like Youssef, settles naturally into the curvatures of David and Goliath, a hyper-
sensitive and despotic bad-Muslim man surveilling his jovial and clever good-Muslim jester. 
“Morsi proved to be more thin-skinned than he promised,” write Joel Gordon and Heba Arafa, 
“but he never shut Bassem Youssef down… however iconoclastic Bassem Youssef may at times 
appear or however broad his comic sweep, his orientation is clearly secular.”25 Similar studies 
can be found on Hafez and his son Bashar Al-Asad in Syria, the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, and 
the Saudi royal family, all suppressing humor articulated at their expense through the threat and 
follow-through of surveillance, imprisonment, and state violence.26 
 
Authentic(ated) Muslim Humor 
Other scholars have turned to the earliest annals of Muslim history in order to document 
that figures like Moses, Khidr, the Prophet Muhammad, his companions, even God herself – the 
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undisputed arbiter of Islam – had a sense of humor. Ze’ev Maghen, in his 2008 article The Merry 
Men of Medina, writes that classical sources point to Muhammad and the sahaba as a group of 
men that were waggish and cheerful in their demeanor.27 Abu Hurayrah recalled that the Prophet 
was “unrestrained in his jesting,” and served as an example for his people and posterity as 
someone that lived a balanced life. Maghen notes that record after record demonstrate that the 
Prophet’s humor spanned from simple witticisms to the vulgar. He had nicknames for most 
people in his life, calling Abu Hurayrah “Father of the Kitten” after noticing his penchant for 
feeding stray cats on the street from his own plate, Bilal “Big Belly,” and all his grandchildren 
“dirty face.” He and his companions would throw watermelons at each other, loosen each other’s 
saddles so they would fall off their camels when riding, and point and laugh when someone’s 
privates were accidentally exposed as a result. Muhammad was not a man above others; he was 
someone who could be approached with serious questions but would also be found on the floor 
playing “camel” with young children. This humor was both a personality trait and an instruction 
to his community. 
Wherever the idea that Muslims are humorless originated, Maghen remarks, it did not 
come from the Prophet. The text of the article itself is vague on its inspiration, but Maghen’s 
very first (and lengthy) footnote makes plain that the 2005 Danish cartoon controversy lays the 
ground for such a study in the first place. “The caricatures episode is in truth a rather poor 
argument against Islam’s sense of humor. Every religion has hallowed institutions and 
individuals that its adherents are wary of holding up to ridicule,” he writes. “How much greater 
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the sense of affront when those engaged in satirizing a given faith’s sacred subjects are not 
followers of that faith but outsiders, members of a different and competing confession.”28  
Maghen’s article itself, however, does not return back to this contemporary politic after 
this initial note. He remains squarely engaged with events and behaviors documented in seventh 
century Arabia. “Far from laying the foundations for a cult of the somber, solemn and sedate - or 
the fierce, furious and fanatical - the Apostle of Allah and his followers presented the world with 
something unprecedented at the time, and never since approximated: a religion that knows how 
to laugh.”29 Even the reproachful hadith al-qawl – a reprimand attributed to Muhammad that is 
frequently drudged up to epitomize Muhammad’s sober nature (“if you knew what I know, you 
would laugh little and weep much”), loses its gusto when contextualized against what happened 
to him shortly after. He narrates that he had made the comment when passing by some of his 
companions as they laughed, but had taken no fewer than forty steps before the angel Gabriel 
appeared before him with a reprimand of their own: “it is God who makes men laugh and 
weep.”30 He had been too obviously a killjoy, Maghen writes, “there is a time to weep and a time 
to laugh, and God is responsible for, and therefore present in, both activities.”31  
Various other accounts within hadith, sira, tafsir, and the maghazi genres spend 
considerable time accounting for just how riotous the Prophet’s laughter was (though, notably, 
that he was not mirthful was never up for debate). Contentions over the degree of force in the 
Prophet’s laughter hover over etymology, particularly with what, exactly, the Arabic word 
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nawajidh refers. Does it refer to one’s “back molars,” “canines,” or “central incisors”? 
Depending on which, one may discern just how wide his mouth opened with laughter. Central 
incisors would indicate the mouth as barely open and barely smiling. Canines would mean a bit 
wider of a grin, while back molars might point to a full-mouthed guffaw. Such polemics on 
dentistry all aimed to understand the Sahih Muslim hadith that narrated “Messenger of God 
laughed that his nawajidh showed.”32 How one translated nawajidh demonstrated a broader 
deliberation among Muslim thinkers on how Muhammad is remembered and the type of 
prophetic example he had set. The association of robust laughter skirted too closely against 
idiocy, or worse, even lunacy. Maintaining that dispositional difference for Muhammad was a 
matter of whether he and his message were serious enough to speak to circumstances of this 
world and the next. Maghen brushes these critiques aside, arguing that Muhammad was able to 
build the grand spiritual movement he did because people liked him, plain and simple. His 
personality was a passionate one, capacious enough to maintain a jocular cheerfulness as well as 
an abiding sensitivity to the injustices of this world. “Lest his followers come to conceive of 
Muhammad in too ‘vertical’ a fashion, rising to heights unattainable by mere mortals, here he is 
in full-fledged ‘horizontal’ mode for all to see forever.”33 
Muntasir Mir returns to the Qur’an itself in order to catalogue the appearance of humor, 
something he notes is infrequent. He warns, however, that this infrequency demonstrates how 
precious its presence actually is. Among those occurrences are sayings by Sarah, Abraham’s 
wife, as well as a litany of Khidr’s mistakes that test Moses’s patience.34 The comedy is largely 
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situational, writes Mir, not deliberate. They appear in the middle of verses or stories, as a buffer 
to the solemn nature of the Qur’an. Above all, though, they bring into relief the psychology of 
the prophets. The humor attests that these were real people and not soothsayers; their surprise at 
the situations they find themselves in illustrates that this was not made up.35  
While there may not appear to be an overarching technique of humor employed in the 
Qur’an, Georges Tamer says that the essence of religion can never be solely solemn. “While it is 
true that there is no religion without God, it is equally true that a religion only with God is 
unthinkable… Religions therefore bear not only divine but also human components, including a 
sense of humor and the ability to laugh.”36 The Qur’an characterizes itself as decisive and not 
meant to amuse in an early Meccan surah.37 Yet this absolutism is meant to induce both joy and 
sorrow through laughter and tears. That laughter is referenced as the humor of superiority, 
triumph and maybe even schadenfreude, where believers will laugh in the face of disbelievers on 
the Day of Judgment.38 Elsewhere, Moses demonstrates a strand of absurdist humor when asking 
his people whether they “worship what you [yourselves] carve,” alluding to the perceived irony 
of praying to their own idol creations.39  
Livnat Holtzman takes the question of humor to God directly, shadowing a debate across 
centuries among Muslim thinkers as to whether God can laugh, examining hadith chains and 
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medieval texts that attest and condemn this idea.40 She begins with the 14th century scholar Al 
Gawziyyeh, whose treatise Hadi Al Arwa notes that God will greet the believers into heaven with 
boisterous laughter, a laughter that is joyful and welcoming. He traces this back through a series 
of hadiths that lead, of course, back to the Prophet. Holtzman follows the isnads of these hadiths 
and tracks references to hand gestures, tones, and other contextual remarks on God’s laughter. 
For example: the Prophet’s companion, Abdallah Ibn Masud, recounts a hadith about the Last 
Day in which disbelievers are revealed through physical absurdities as they cross a bridge over 
the Hellfire. For example, they are unable prostrate before God correctly (they “remain on their 
buttocks like young calves”) and carry lanterns on their toes that frequently extinguish.41 After a 
series of their ineptitudes are related, Ibn Masud laughs out loud. A listener to the hadith, who 
had heard it once before, asks why Ibn Masud laughs at this moment, because he had done so at 
the exact same moment the first time the hadith was recounted, as well. Ibn Masud replies: “I 
have witnessed the Prophet telling this hadīt time and again, and every time he reached this 
point, he laughed until his last molar was revealed.”42 
Why is the act of God laughing important to know? The stakes of the debate differ 
depending on which medieval thinker you ask. Ibn Hanbal in the 9th century argued that God sits 
on his throne, he hears, talks, laughs, and is joyful, though a later Hanbali scholar in the 13th 
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century, Ibn Gawzi, argues vehemently against this type of anthropomorphizing of God.43 The 
dangers, for him, were two-fold. First, he noted how popular these stories of God’s laughter had 
become in sermons and study circles among ulema and their audiences. He believed that relating 
these hadith of God’s laughter, in the course of the excitement that accompanies giving a popular 
sermon, had lent themselves to making mistakes in their transmission of the hadith. At the same 
time, what was the nature of God’s laughter? Among humans, laughter could signal joy, yes, but 
also materialized in moments where the reaction (laughter) was uncontrolled. Was the Prophet 
uncontrolled in his actions sometimes? Could God be? Holtzman tracks this debate only into the 
next century, at which point she witnesses the conversation abate and nearly disappear after an 
intervention by Ibn Taymiyyah. His interpretation, a rationalization of literalist readings of the 
Qur’an and of laughter, brings about a consensus among medieval male thinkers that proceeded 
him that yes, God laughs.44 
 
Muslim Humor after 9/11 
 Still others have turned to more immediate examples of Muslim humor, looking 
particularly through the frame and phenomenon of the September 11th attacks. American Muslim 
stand-up comedians and collectives emerge as a response to anti-Muslim discrimination and the 
then-nascent War on Terror. These individual acts and comedic troupes – performers like Dean 
Obeidallah, Preacher Moss, and Azhar Usman – feed a growing American appetite for Muslims 
and their (supposed lack of) humor. Mucahit Bilici reasons that 9/11 is what gives rise to the 
explicitly “Muslim” comedy of Obeidallah, who even works this into his comedy routine, joking 
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that on September 10th, he was white (with friends named Rachel, Ross, and Monica), and on 
September 11th, he “became a (hated) minority.”45 It is this reference point – September 11th – 
that Bilici argues various ethnic groups made up of Muslims gather around, which brings 
coherence to otherwise ethnically diverse groups like the Allah Made Me Funny (AMMF) and 
Axis of Evil Tours (AoE).  
These Muslim comedians, Bilici writes, can be seen as cultural entrepreneurs who have 
knowledge of “both worlds,” as seen through their ability to weave between accented and 
American speech patterns.46 Their jokes, many of which rely on insider humor, create group 
solidarities while also policing group boundaries. In those moments, the structure (common view 
of Muslims) becomes the anti-structure and vice versa, and the audience has been momentarily 
disciplined into changing their social behavior. Given that a Muslim is an oddity in American 
life, a Muslim acting ordinary – as these comedians try to prove – is worthy of laughter. 
“Islamophobia is what has made Muslim comedy a phenomenon of our times,” Bilici claims. 
“They are perhaps the only beneficiaries of the negative charisma associated with being 
Muslim.”47 He also observes the phenomenon of U.S. state institutions promoting these Muslim 
cultural productions in order to provide outreach and recruitment for their own organizations. He 
notes that the FBI has sponsored performances of the Axis of Evil Tour in order to “demystify 
the FBI, show people that we [the FBI] are human, not just cold FBI agents coming out to arrest 
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people.”48 Both the Muslims at the center of the performance and the state institutions share the 
goal of appearing unthreatening, though only one party has the full legitimacy and power of the 
American government behind them.  
 Amarnath Amarasingam constructs these comedians as the product of a confrontation 
between the First Amendment and other tightly-held values of democracy and the “joyless 
religious strictures” of those who committed the 9/11 attacks.49 Amarasingam quotes comedian 
Dean Obeidallah, who notes that all Middle Eastern comedians are engaging in activism through 
their comedy, while comedian Azhar Usman puts himself in line behind a variety of Black, 
Jewish, and Latinx comedians – venturing even to include the Blue Collar Hillbilly Tour in that 
lineup – as examples of speaking truth to power. This is an American lineage, he adds.50 At the 
same time, women comedians like Maysoon Zayid are reminded of their peripheral status 
through their comedy more often than their male counterparts. She recounts an interview with 
John Stossel in which he insists that her comedy can only exist in a place like the US, and that 
she would not be able to make these types of jokes “over there.”51 She argues back that she could 
and in fact does (she has performed across the U.S. and the Middle East). This response was then 
cut from the interview before it aired.  
There are gendered assumptions and insinuations here that Amarasingam does not remark 
on, especially with respect to Stossel’s comments about Zayid’s need to be grateful and her 
assumed inability to perform in the Middle East as a woman. This gendered Islamophobia thread 
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runs through the works of others that also examine these same comedians. Jaclyn Michael, for 
example, comments that this popular post-9/11 brand of Muslim humor is not uniformly sharp in 
its social critique.52 She gives two examples of comedians, Azhar Usman and Preacher Moss, 
who employ jokes about naggy wives and polygamy/marrying one woman with four 
personalities, respectively. These jokes get easy laughs within a larger normative patriarchy that 
uphold marriage, heterosexuality, and monogamy, and are indicative that humor can be used to 
promote, but just as easily undercut, social justice orientations.53 
Studies of AMMF and AoE by and large turn on the axis of 9/11, which stands as a 
moment of both rupture and continuity. Like Obeidallah’s joke, Muslim comedians performed in 
obscurity and without reference to their affiliation with Islam before 2001. Preacher Moss’s 
comedic career consisted primarily of writing for non-Muslim comedians like Darryl Hammond 
and George Lopez. When he performed his own standup material, he spoke to his experiences as 
a Black man. The “common language” of Islam in comedy only emerged as anti-Muslim 
hostilities ramped up in the U.S. and the War on Terror turned towards predominantly Muslim-
populated nations abroad and American Muslim subjects at home.  
Munir Jiwa witnesses a similar question of agency in such identifications among Muslim 
women artists in New York. Works created by these women even prior to 9/11 “were read only 
in the context of Islam, current affairs and mass media/ news representations in the United 
States.”54 This moment of translation, in which one could speak acutely to Islam in a way that 
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would have gotten lost before, also meant reception of one’s art would be reduced to only Islam, 
as well. Attempts at controlling this reception, through gallery talks and artist statements pinned 
alongside their productions, become obscured in their third person retellings. Shahzia Sikander’s 
watercolor Utopia, a meditation on “dislocation” through Muslim and Hindu iconography, 
makes its way into O Magazine as the opposite of its intention. The headline instead reads as a 
diachronic: “From Pakistan to Providence: Shahzia Learned How to Paint Her Way Out of 
Traditional Thinking.”55 
 
A Humorless Sequence 
9/11 does not operate as an isolated watershed moment, either. It is compounded, four 
years later, by the 2005 Danish cartoon controversy which erupts as a subsequent node on the 
longer confirmatory sequence of Muslim humorlessness. In 2005, the Jyllands Posten 
newspaper, generally considered to be ideologically aligned with the nation’s Center-Right 
movement, ran a contest at the behest of its culture editor Flemming Rose, who invited 
cartoonists to “draw Muhammad as they see him.”56 Flemming had been riled by the difficulty 
faced by the children’s writer Kåre Bluitgen in finding an illustrator for his book on the life of 
the Prophet. In September of that year, Jyllands Posten published a feature titled “Muhammad’s 
Face.”57 It included 12 caricatured drawings of Muslims and the Prophet Muhammad (the most 
memorable among them featuring the Prophet’s turban as a lit explosive), along with an editorial 
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by Rose that the special consideration of Muslim feelings was antithetical to “contemporary 
democracy and free speech.”58 
Danish Muslims mobilized to oppose this decision in the months that followed. They 
lodged formal legal complaints, wrote letters to other media outlets and politicians, and 
organized more publicly visible protests in Copenhagen.59 Many of these formal criticisms were 
begrudgingly addressed by Danish leadership, but in their delayed response, news of the cartoons 
were being translated and disseminated well beyond Denmark. Giselinde Kuipers attributes this 
spread to a group of Danish imams touring the Middle East in hopes of garnering support for 
their protests in Denmark itself.60 Global protests, many led by governments of predominantly 
Muslim-populated countries, began in late January 2006 and continued into February, leading the 
news cycle for weeks. Editorializing across news media in Euroamerica cited the protests as 
“proof” of an outright incompatibility between Muslims and “western” values of “modernity.”61 
A third internationally-magnified node occurred nine years later in France, 2015. On 
January 7th, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi killed 12 people and injured 11 others at the headquarters 
of the satirical Charlie Hebdo magazine. The motive of the gunmen is said to be the magazine’s 
publishing of an on and off series of satirical cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad since 2006. 
Following the Jyllands Posten controversy, Charlie Hebdo reprinted their cartoons in solidarity 
and added one of their own. The issue earned triple its usual circulation, as well as a hate speech 
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lawsuit from the Great Mosque of Paris and the Union of French Islamic Organizations.62 
Another cover image of Muhammad, printed in 2011 during the Arab Spring, depicts him 
announcing, “100 lashes if you don’t die laughing.”63 The offices of Charlie Hebdo were 
firebombed in the early hours of the next morning.  
No one took official responsibility, but the bombing is typically coupled with a Charlie 
Hebdo website hack the same day that stated “you keep abusing, Islam’s almighty Prophet with 
disgusting and disgraceful cartoons using excuses of freedom of speech.”64 Charlie Hebdo 
published additional caricatures in 2012, some even nude. Gerard Biard, the magazine’s editor at 
the time, explained the decision was in response to the news of the week: the U.S. consulate in 
Benghazi had been attacked, and the anti-Muslim film titled the Innocence of Muslims had been 
released on YouTube. “We are a satirical, political magazine, we publish in France, which is a 
laic [secular] nation and... we are against all religions,” Biard told the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC).65 Stephane Charbonnier, who drew the cover image that week, reasoned that 
Muslim “extremists” had cultivated a culture of fear that “make[s] everyone afraid” and would 
“shut us all in a cave.”66 He would be among those killed in the 2015 shooting. 
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 These events have fused themselves to the already present public discourse that opines 
Muslims as incapable of frivolity, fun, and humor, drawing an unambiguous line towards their 
overall unsuitability for “modernity” at large. These episodic revelations have calcified an 
impression that works on Muslim humor are constantly reconfiguring themselves against. 
Maghen’s work on the Prophet and the sahaba 1400 years ago opens his 65-page treatment by 
setting up “a long-held belief about Islam: that it is a stern, glowering, humorless religion,” while 
Bilici declares that “If someone has a sense of humor, then he is just like us: likable.” 67 Even 
when the Australian news program Lateline interviews Bassem Youssef ostensibly about Al-
Bernameg, the conversation quickly turned into a predictable why don’t Muslims speak out 
more? line of questioning.  
Youssef’s vocal affect and body language can be interpreted as conveying more than just 
words he espouses in response. He holds his own in Tony Jones’s cross-examination (“Well, 
there’s a lot, but you don’t know because they speak Arabic”), but a notable exhaustion escapes 
from his voice as his shoulders fall. For a brief moment, a Du Boisian moment of double 
consciousness is visible – a dutiful smile followed by a canned but clever reply, bemoaning 
having to answer some variation of this demand but measuring himself so as to not offend.68 The 
accusation of gravity is ever-present and ever-accusing, despite the presence of active 
subversion. Muslim humor is always obliquely responding – for then, for now, and for the 
inevitable affair that will continue the work of categorically fusing humorlessness to Islam. 
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The Uninterrogated Thesis 
This is not to say that these thematic frames of studying Muslim humor are not didactic – 
indeed, they fill a rich burgeoning corner of the study of Islam and religion at large. They are, 
however, unsatisfactory for identifying what premises the Muslim humor question from the start. 
For the most part, these works do not seek to rise above their status as a counter. Some, like Mir 
and Tamer, “prove” the existence of an “authentically” Islamic archive. Given that the sources 
derive from originating Islamic texts like the Qur’an, hadith, and premodern Arabic manuscripts, 
one may assume that there is something inherently true, yet sullied over the course of time in 
connecting this thread to contemporary social formations among Muslims. It is only because of 
history or politics, then, that Muslim proclivities have meandered, but are very much capable of 
(and perhaps obligatorily must?) return.  
Bilici and Amarasingham see American Muslim comedy as an opportunity for inversion, 
turning symbolic structures on their head to undo their Otherness that masquerades as common 
sense. But even Bilici concedes that the act of undoing is temporary. Why? That there is a 
relationship between humor and modernity, between humorlessness and Islam, is simply a given. 
Toni Morrison’s logic is particularly apropos in describing this kind of phenomenon:  
It’s important, therefore, to know who the real enemy is, and to know the function, the 
very serious function of racism, which is distraction. It keeps you from doing your work. 
It keeps you explaining over and over again, your reason for being. Somebody says you 
have no language and so you spend 20 years proving that you do. Somebody says your 
head isn’t shaped properly so you have scientists working on the fact that it is. Somebody 
says that you have no art so you dredge that up. Somebody says that you have no 
kingdoms and so you dredge that up. None of that is necessary. There will always be one 
more thing.69 
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Let us not be distracted, then, waiting to respond to that next “one more thing.” Let us 
instead interrogate the premise more directly: why has this question of Muslim humor comes to 
be so frequently and urgently asked in the first place? Why do we assume that the relationship 
between humor and modernity is, in fact, “a given”? I take up these questions directly in the 
following chapter. This task requires an approach to the notion of Muslim humor that account for 
the history and literature laid out in the preceding pages, but differentiates itself through an 
abiding engagement with Islam beyond the crude fundamentalism it is envisioned as otherwise. 
As has been made evident here, the study of humor, Muslim or not, involves notions of the 
interiority of persons and the proliferation of senses – the self, the body, and the ontological 
relationship between their produced and felt affects. Such beings, becomings, and the imperial 
infrastructures of discipline that contain them cannot be recognized in isolation from secular and 
religious discourses in the United States.  
Understandings of humor develop alongside these increasingly hegemonic discourses, 
especially in their encounters with and applications against nonnormative subjects like Muslims 
through the 20th century into the present day. Furthermore, comedic articulations of the Muslim 
self do not map onto the ways that the American academy and humor studies have, for the most 
part, theorized the gendered, raced, and classed dimensions of American stand-up and humor. 
The existing literature has characterized Islam as a second order categorization of race and 
ethnicity, a presence that draws surveillance from outside itself. How do we account for and 
understand humor as conduit towards a religiously-oriented ethic - and perhaps even Islamic – 
modality of being? Can we read just and moralistic consciousness deriving from being among 
what the Prophet’s companion Anas ibn Malik called the “afkah al-nas” – the merriest of men? 




 This chapter has surveyed the terrain of Muslim humor and its study. Four key frames 
emerge for the ways that Muslim humor has typically been conceptualized in academic 
scholarship: ethnic humor, authentic Islamic humor, dissident humor, and humor drawn out of 
the experience and accusation of 9/11. Each frame provides useful insights into the dissonance 
between the ways Muslims are seen in Euroamerica and the ways that they themselves joke 
among themselves, the myriad of ways that religion links up and even functions as race, and the 
role humor can play in enacting social change and justice. None, however, take their inquiries to 
the very premise of the matter: why is it assumed that humor is an essential trait of an ideal 
person, and why has that fundamental nature come to be tied so closely with modernity and 
being modern?  
A study of humor without an interrogation of this thesis keeps its presumptions in place 
and further sediments their hegemony, especially as they applies to Islam and Muslims. I propose 
placing the constructedness of religion and secularism at the center of theoretical registers like 
race, gender, and sexuality in order to allow a clearer picture to emerge in terms of what is at 
stake in essentializing the humorless subject as Muslim in a self-avowed secular state like the 
U.S. This theoretical intervention underpins my study of Aziz Ansari, Hasan Minhaj, and Kumail 
Nanjiani, who represent what I designate as the second phase of U.S. American Muslim humor 









CHAPTER 3: RACIALIZING MUSLIMS THROUGH SECULAR DISCOURSE 
 
In the words of the Somali-born Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the integration of 
Muslims into European societies has been sped up by 300 years due to the cartoons; 
perhaps we do not need to fight the battle for the Enlightenment all over again. 
 
- Rose Flemming, editor of Jyllands-Posten1 
 
Introduction 
 In February 2006, I was a senior in a suburban Michigan high school. My American 
history teacher’s priority that year had been to sporadically inject global current events into our 
daily meetings in a noble attempt to demonstrate nothing happened in the U.S. in isolation of the 
world. That first week of February, we began class with a review of the then-rising tide of 
protests against the cartoon controversy brewing out of Denmark. As one of two Muslim 
students in the class, the conversation quickly morphed into an impromptu litmus test from our 
friends and classmates in the room: what did we think? Did we believe in the freedom of speech 
or were we, too, “offended”? I recall my face burning as I firmly planted myself in their camp: of 
course, free speech! Whoever does find these images offensive doesn’t get what the rules of 
living in a secular society are! They’re just images, after all. The teacher nodded in approval; my 
confession was accepted, and the class moved on without further incident to that day’s lesson.
 I mention this anecdote to illustrate the transnational and disciplinarian reach of the 
Jyllands-Posten cartoon controversy, which operates as a confirmatory node in the broader 
 




pattern of global events that demonstrate a deeply entrenched and continued investment in 
principles such as reason, freedom, critique, and equality, among others, within a larger secular 
order. These principles are perceived to be under active attack and imminent danger by the 
vociferous self-appointed guardians of secularism which include individuals and institutions 
ranging from media conglomerates to politicians to the nation’s citizenry. Investment in their 
protection by way of proliferation is shared just as much in the United States as it is across 
western Europe (“Europe and her daughters” as classified by one Orientalist).2 Humor is central 
to the conception of these notions, insomuch as it helps dictate the boundaries of a subject’s 
legibility and agential capacity within that order. Academics who recount the events of 
2005/2006 refer to the line in the sand that this incident drew: where humor comes to “stand for 
humanity,” as Mucahit Bilici puts it.3 For Fadi Hirzalla, Liesbet van Zoonen, and Floris Müller, 
humor must be conceived of as a democratically-sanctioned civic practice that will release 
tension and even create space for political reconciliation when it comes to “a controversial issue 
and experience like Islam.”4  
This chapter aims to make plain the inherency of humor within disciplining secular 
narratives of modernity and its attendant norms and institutions like the democratic nation-state. I 
begin by examining how modernity and secularism have generally been theorized, drawing 
attention to their recursive vocabularies on religious qua civilizational difference. Who gets 
 
2 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic, September 1990, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/. 
3 Mucahit Bilici, “Muslim Ethnic Comedy: Inversions of Islamophobia,” in Islamophobia/Islamophilia: 
Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). 195. 
4 Fadi Hirzalla, Liesbet van Zoonen, and Floris Müller, “How Funny Can Islam Controversies Be? 




attributed what values, and how do those values translate into visible and felt configurations of 
power? How is humor both value and power? How has it been used to historically and presently 
discipline? When Foucauldian “regimes of truth” further distill into what Giselinde Kuipers has 
called a “humour regime” - a systemized discursive control over who can joke about what, where 
some topics are considered entirely off-limits – some subjects, Muslims in particular, must 
demonstrate their ability to “take a joke” by enduring caricature at their own expense and with 
limited recourse to respond.5 The centrality of a “sense of humor” within modern subjecthood 
reveals the limited room to exercise agency that Muslims must occupy and contend with in the 
21st century across the United States and Europe. Because the expression of humor is a central 
signifier of the constitution of the “modern” 21st-century American self and subject, its 
utilization contributes to the construction of legibility for Muslims.  
This legibility is produced through what I deem to be a secular process of racializing 
Muslims. Aziz Ansari, Hasan Minhaj, and Kumail Nanjiani have all come to be represented (and 
have represented themselves) as Muslim comedians, as opposed to just Indian/South 
Asian/Brown ones, by way of such racialization. I discuss the ways in which racialization has 
come to be conceptualized in U.S. scholarship, especially as a historically contingent process that 
relies on a combination of visually “read” cues emanating off particular bodies and their 
associations with specific practices, beliefs, and political demands of the state. The endurance 
and proliferation of racialization as a channel for Muslim legibility in the United States relies on 
a progressive consensus of recognition, a conceptual reordering that foregrounds race and racial 
 
5 Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980 
(London: Pan Macmillan, 2016), 98; Giselinde Kuipers, “The Politics of Humour in the Public Sphere: 
Cartoons, Power and Modernity in the First Transnational Humour Scandal,” European Journal of 
Cultural Studies 14, no. 1 (February 2011): 63-80, 69. 
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categories as a predominant language through which to recognize difference, inequity, and 
oppression within a secular political apparatus.  
 
Humor as a Secular Discourse 
Giselinde Kuipers has called the Danish cartoon controversy “the first transnational 
humor scandal” to be framed in terms of a clash of civilizations, in which Muslims proved their 
social exclusion by demonstrating a lack of humor. The cartoons were published alongside an 
essay which explained that the images were intended as satire and a mockery of Islam, given that 
“modern secular society is rejected by some Muslims… It is incompatible with contemporary 
democracy and freedom of speech, where you must be ready to put up with mockery, ridicule 
and derision.”6 By virtue of their medium, the cartoons were seen as derogatory, flippant, and 
unserious critique; they were simply meant to ridicule. A then-prominent French Muslim scholar 
urged fellow Muslims in Europe to retool and accept that such satire was a European cultural 
tradition dating back to Voltaire.7  
Kuipers sees a discursive “humour regime” where there are dictates in terms of what can 
be joked about, endowing some with the capacity to joke while silencing others into simply 
“taking” the joke. As localized protests were uprooted and supplanted into the global theater, 
different discursive regimes came up against one another, though the unwritten rule of “punching 
up” satire went unabided in this case. Instead, global inequalities were simply mirrored, not 
challenged. “Rather than playing the part of the court jester, critics argued, Jyllands-Posten 
 
6 Giselinde Kuipers, “The Politics of Humour in the Public Sphere,” 69. 
7 Tariq Ramadan, “Free Speech and Civic Responsibility,” International Herald Tribune, February 5, 




functioned as a guardian of the social order.”8 Within the rules of this humor regime, Kuipers 
notes that the only “dignified” response would be to joke back, though this would also require 
power, access, confidence, and detachment. She gives the example of Iran, which hosted its own 
cartoon contest to mock that Europe, too, has its own sacred no-go zone – in this case, the 
Holocaust. These cartoons only further fed the alienation of Danish Muslims, however, and feeds 
further alienation within their discursive European humor regime. Kuipers has homed in on the 
key relationship between humor – a seemingly universal value divested of hierarchy – and its 
very real attachments to regimes of discipline power. Yet where would one position humor 
within secular discourses? How does one engage Islam and religion beyond crude 
fundamentalism, beyond racial and racialized identity markers?  
Humor, I argue, is a fundamental pillar within the larger conception of the secular 
modern, and ultimately translates to an avenue of social access and cultural citizenship within the 
contemporary secular imaginary of the United States. In the chapter 1, I briefly outlined the ways 
that Daniel Wickberg conceives of humor’s voyage from the strictly corporeal to ontological as 
part of my overview on the history of humor. He pinpoints the 18th and 19th centuries in the 
United States as a critical juncture for the transitive development of humor as it corresponds with 
the growth of “bureaucratical individualism.”9 The individual – now an increasingly subjective 
and interiorized notion of self, separate from the social whole – imagines values and morality to 
be intrinsic to that self, while economic pursuits come to be understood as “self-interest,” 
penetrating all realms of social living. Indeed, Wickberg argues that “all qualities of objects 
 
8 Kuipers, “The Politics of Humour in the Public Sphere,“ 72. 
9 Daniel Wickberg, The Senses of Humor: Self and Laughter in Modern America (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2015). 75-78, 94. 
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either becomes qualities of subjects – individuals – or lose their social character altogether and 
take on the features of commodities.”10 The world of Euroamerica during the 18th and 19th 
centuries sees a boon of nascent market imperatives, all working to cobble together a shift away 
from proprietary capitalism towards a style of economy that is managerial and increasingly 
corporate.  
In this social schema, the individual affirms both the interior self as well as the world of 
growing industrial production around them, rationalizing service to that world as a gallant civic 
responsibility. Bureaucratic individualism is thus “the union of apparent opposites: the individual 
self as the highest value, and the priority of rationalized institutions and social relations to which 
the individual must adapt.”11 A humorous disposition – conceived of as a desirable characteristic 
that each person had inherent within them – most easily and expediently enables one to 
demonstrate their self’s best version. This self is so interior as to be separate from one’s ego but 
also adaptable, accommodating, and deferent to the wider needs of the market. The market 
rewards this now naturalized ethic as a commodity, worthy of individuated praise, to be sure, but 
also worthy of financial stability and a place in the shifting economy. 
 
The Omission of Religion 
This history, as laid out by Wickberg, is immensely useful for moving away from the still 
ubiquitous assumption that a sense of humor is endemic to human nature, somehow temporally 
and culturally a priori. Indeed, that the idea of humor can have a traceable history is indicative of 
the opposite. Such a history of humor and its development, then, acts as a catalogue for coming 
 
10 Wickberg, The Senses of Humor, 15. 
11 Wickberg, The Senses of Humor, 78. 
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to grips with older conceptions of personhood within Euro-America and the emergent ones that 
take the form of bureaucratic individualism in the 18th and 19th centuries. Wickberg does well to 
link this model of personhood and the self to the broader sea change of industrial capitalism. 
However, there is a jarring omission in the history provided here; the absence of another rapidly 
mounting corporate endeavor that would serve – for many across the world – as their 
introduction to western modernity: colonial missions and conquest. This is, after all, why 
capitalist economies were able to expand at the rates they did, though Wickberg makes no 
mention of this symbiosis and its political ramifications in places like Africa, the Americas, and 
Asia. 
Without that connection, it would appear that Wickberg has failed to recognize this 
commonality between forces of rampant industrialization and colonial expansion. Whether these 
forces rely on each other or are in some way mutually constitutive across the grand scheme of 
modernity is a question other scholars have occupied themselves with.12 For the purposes of this 
project, I seek to make plain their discursive connection and correspondence. This occurs within 
the language of Enlightenment-era notions of religion and secularism mirror the discourses being 
enacted and reproduced by Wickberg’s bureaucratic individual. Without the contextual framing 
that is activated by such self-articulated conceptions of religion, secularism, and the power 
 
12 In particular, Sudipta Kaviraj’s “Modernity and Politics in India” clarifies the dangers of presuming 
such mutual constituency across platforms and places. The plurality of processes that make up modernity, 
he says, do not result in same outcomes across location because the initial conditions of modernity differ 
between modernities. In the case of modern India, the presence of democratic political practices and 
capitalist development have produced social structures and institutions markedly different than those 
found in Europe, rendering the theories put forth by Marx and de Toqueville historically imprecise. 
Emulation of the west may not be possible or even not desired, as “Western modernity is diverse and not 
uniformly attractive.” See Sudipta Kaviraj, “Modernity and Politics in India,” Daedalus 129, no. 1 
(Winter 2000): 137-162, 137-141. 
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relationships inherent within them, we cannot fully comprehend how, by the end of the 20th 
century, the humorless subject was assumed to be and then came to be represented by Muslims. 
 
The Inclusion of Religion 
That humor would imagine itself to be universal yet neutral in the larger construction of 
personhood concedes an inattention to the exchanges of power within its own logical structure. 
Charles Taylor notes that in line with an interiorized self, secularism as a political doctrine 
emerged after years of religious conflict in Europe, in which an “overlapping consensus” – 
absent of any distinct religious favor – would be a net common good and neutral in its 
application to all.13 The individuals under that order understand themselves as an Andersonian 
imagined community within it. A value required for the functioning of such a community, 
maintains Taylor, is the primacy of citizenship, which must transcend over other classed, raced, 
gendered, or religious identities – the same type of transcendence a sense of humor is capable of 
and prized for.14  
Yet Talal Asad sees secularism not just for its transcending management of identities. It 
is rather, he suggests, “an enactment by which a political medium (representation of citizenship) 
redefines and transcends particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated 
through class, gender, and religion.”15 Tracey Fessenden similarly writes that “unmarked” 
Protestantism finds an easy home in what comes to be legitimated as secularism in an American 
 
13 Charles Taylor, Dilemmas and Connections: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011), 105-110. 
14 Taylor, Dilemmas and Connections, 86-89. 
15 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 5. 
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context, in which “good” religion is unobtrusive and fully compatible with the new liberal state 
while the “bad” or regressive religious practitioners were sequestered and driven out of the 
national mythos.16 These subjects are newly classified through the language of empirical secular 
rationality; they are not religiously different, but racially so. In fact, decolonial scholars of the 
Americas and trans-Atlantic increasingly appraise an even earlier date of colonial encounter, 
1492, that inaugurates the dual advent of coloniality and the modern notions of religion.  
Such a form of racialization, speculates Peter Coviello, “has at its core a biopoliticizing 
calibration of religiosity prosecuted along the axis of an adherence to the many interwoven 
norms of liberal subjecthood and sociality.”17 Thus, when Muslims were violently initiated into 
modernity and secularism in later iterations of colonial incursion, they were conferred a notion of 
the self that saw them, by dint of religion/race, as already deficient in their subjecthood. This 
secular schema was built directly upon the models of personhood and self that are described by 
Wickberg. Their maintenance requires the act of prescription out and beyond, a sustained 
dissemination of those models across empires and within its hinterlands. Secular forms of 
political economy, government, and memory were erected in the name of liberation and 
egalitarianism, hard won through the act of “taming” the frontier.  
A narrative of liberation and freedom “erases the seizure of lands from native peoples, 
displaces migrations and connections across continents, and internalizes these processes in a 
national struggle of history and consciousness,” warns Lisa Lowe. The endurance of these 
profound polarities “are a legacy of these processes through which ‘the human’ is ‘freed’ by 
 
16 Tracy Fessenden, Culture and Redemption: Religion, the Secular, and American Literature (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 136. 




liberal forms, while other subjects, practices, and geographies are placed at a distance from ‘the 
human.’”18 This larger normative political apparatus distinguishes itself first and principally as 
modern, all while still reproducing and transforming what Wendy Brown, Saba Mahmood, and 
Judith Butler say are “religiously inflected (albeit disavowed) modalities of law, ethics, subjects, 
and consciousness.”19 This religious inflection, of course, is most closely encapsulated by 
presumptions of Protestant Christianity in the United States. 
It is no surprise, then, that during the same critical period of the 18th and 19th centuries, 
the articulation of the self and its attendant humor are actively erected alongside the rapidly 
changing social reforms and laws of the nation-state – the secular, democracy, freedom, and 
choice. Within this reimagination, society is made of persons with subjective rights and moral 
agency in their decision making. “The extension of universal suffrage was in turn linked—as 
Foucault has pointed out—to new methods of government based on new styles of classification 
and calculation, and new forms of subjecthood.”20 Moral agency is meant to be exercised in 
various fora of social life (including political representation) but also through the interiorization 
of belief under this secular aegis. Therefore religion, too, is reconceptualized as a social 
formation: “Insomuch as religion is primarily about belief in a set of propositions to which one 
lends one’s assent,” infers Saba Mahmood; it too “is fundamentally a matter of choice.”21 The 
myth of such visions of modernity also maintain that it spreads out solely from a western center 
 
18 Lisa Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 3.  
19 Talal Asad et al., Is Critique Secular? : Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2009), x. 
20 Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 24. 
21 Saba Mahmood, “Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?,” in Is Critique 
Secular? : Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, ed. Talal Asad et al. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2009): 64-100, 67. 
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of political power with the aim of reproduction by way of replication. When such replication 
inevitably fails among societies whose initial conditions of modernity are radically dissimilar 
from the western models – particularly because modernity arrives in the form of colonialism – 
those societies are deemed as “choosing” to remain traditional, by extension choosing to remain 
insufficiently modernized. 
 The concomitant projects of secularism and the modern nation-state have sought the 
naturalization qua institutionalization of these values – humor, freedom, choice, equality, 
democracy, the ability to critique – all of which has resulted in spaces of social exclusion and 
inclusion in the 20th century. For the most part, the differentiation between these spaces go 
undetected until they clash with non-normative approaches to religion. Today, says Wendy 
Brown, this vision of secularism anticipates the clash through its self-articulation, in which it 
constructs itself and its value through what it also constructs as its opposite: “Islam.”22 Inclusion 
requires that religion be approached through an immaterial habitus – physically imperceptible, 
dispossessed of political demands, and privatized into interior belief. Muslims, Asad posits, 
translate into modernity only “once they have divested themselves of what many of them regard 
(mistakenly) as essential to themselves.”23 Thus secularism is not just the enactment of liberalism 
and its principles, it is also a range of naturalized sensibilities that ignore and exclude any 
affinities in order to deem themselves separate, apart, and superior.24 These sensibilities are now 
coherently intrinsic to the self, and are enacted through individualistic social conduct out in the 
 
22 Wendy Brown, “Introduction,” in Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, ed. Talal 
Asad et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 7-19, 10. 
23 Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 169. 
24 Talal Asad, Secular Translations: Nation-State, Modern Self, and Calculative Reason (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2018), 90-91. 
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world. Freedom, choice, equality – these are worth personally upholding with conviction against 
those that threaten them.  
 
The Civilizational Stakes of Humor 
In 2006, the Jyllands-Posten newspaper editor Flemming Rose wrote to the Washington 
Post during the height of protests against his decision to publish the cartoons. “The cartoonists 
treated Islam the same way they treat Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions. And 
by treating Muslims in Denmark as equals they made a point: We are integrating you into the 
Danish tradition of satire because you are part of our society, not strangers. The cartoons are 
including, rather than excluding, Muslims.”25 He had acted upon, in his mind, a civic duty to 
ensure that Muslims and the Prophet Muhammad had been caricatured; this was an act of 
equality, not discrimination. Within this logic, the humor being offered was an object of 
exchange and (as Wickberg would call it) “circumstance-neutral.”26 But there was also a test 
buried within this demonstration of secular values, and it measured Muslims by their ability to 
endure caricaturing, to “take the joke,” and tolerate the moral injury that came with it.27  
The presence of such a goalpost meant that it was not expected that the conceptions of 
self in relation to secularism were held among Muslims. Here was a question, not a naturalized 
given, where humor had been deputized to test for the boundaries of subjective legibility within 
the sanctioned secular order. Flemming added that he had even offered a broad platform to those 
 
25 Flemming Rose, “Why I Published Those Cartoons,” Washington Post (Washington DC, February 
2006). 
26 Wickberg, The Senses of Humor, 10. 
27 Mahmood, “Religious Reason and Secular Affect,” 64-73. 
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Muslims that recognized and abided by this order, running “three full pages of interviews and 
photos of moderate Muslims saying no to being represented by the imams,” who “insist that their 
faith is compatible with a modern secular democracy.”28 That there were enough Muslims still 
registering their lack of interest – or even be an inability? – in transcending their offense was 
indicative of something far more pathological: what kind of subject is this Muslim? And what of 
the Muslims who endure and tolerate moral injury: what happens to their essentially endowed 
subjective agency when they cannot assert it within a secular schema? 
Anne Norton identifies this – “the Muslim question” – as a fundamental social question 
of the 21st century, a repackaged version of the Jewish question that dogged Europe, its 
philosophy, and its institutions for centuries. The Muslim, here an idea, is today a site upon 
which the stakes of contemporary Western politics and ethics play out. Are they a danger to 
politics, Christians, Jews, secular humanists, women, sex, and Enlightenment values and 
institutions?29 The idea of the Muslim reveals what is perceived as an innate and pathological 
tendency towards tribalness, “never having achieved the state, a state that Hegel marked as 
essential to the fullness of civilization. They are after the state, which is to say they are the 
rootless cosmopolites of a post-Westphalian order,” says Norton.30  
Humor, its composition made up of a now-coherent and consistent engagement of the 
subjective and objective self, has ingratiated itself as a discourse of the secular. By Wickberg’s 
definition, there is an imparity between the Western self and the Muslim: an inability to 
distinguish objective and subjective as it relates to an understanding of this most fundamental 
 
28 Rose, “Why I Published Those Cartoons,” February 2006. 
29 Anne Norton, On the Muslim Question (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 227-229. 
30 Norton, On the Muslim Question, 5. 
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state. What I am saying, however, is that society’s existential questions no longer need to be so 
brazenly framed today. Instead, by asking an even simpler question - can’t Muslims take a joke? 
- the stakes of the secular, of the self and the subject, are disciplined and made evident. The 
coded language plays itself out in state policies, in political jockeying, and basic social 
interactions between individuals.31  
 
Secular Recognition 
The Muslim that cannot/will not take the joke occupies an illegible state within the 
secular schema. This illegibility necessitates vigilance, accounting for the incongruous 
application of U.S. law and the Constitution for Muslim citizens. The possession of citizenship 
“has not protected America’s Muslim citizens from surveillance, detention, unlawful searches, 
and the assaults of discrimination.”32 Far from being limited to attention on solely Muslim 
bodies, the frenetic obsession with the Muslim question has simultaneously swept up those that 
come close in resembling the essentialized type, those that share the same politics, race, 
ethnicity, or religious proclivities. In service to a social order that is securitized in the name of 
secularity, these communities are controlled through deportations, detentions, and overt violence 
– separated and secured away from the parts of the American citizenry deemed worthy of 
 
31 See the life and legacy of the Orientalist Bernard Lewis, whose article “The Roots of Muslim Rage” 
and countless other publications influenced American policy decision-making in the Middle East across 
multiple decades and presidencies. The U.S. President Donald Trump’s claims that “Islam hates us” 
resulted in the institution of a no longer temporary ban on Muslims entering the US “until our country’s 
representatives can figure out what is going on” in January 2017. See Theodore Schleifer, “Donald 
Trump: ‘I Think Islam Hates Us,’” News, CNN, March 10, 2016, 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/index.html; Lewis, “The Roots of 
Muslim Rage.” 
32 Norton, On the Muslim Question, 3. 
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protection. The Muslim is an embodied and illegible anxiety, a figure that demonstrates the end 
limits of secular subjecthood. 
While I am wary of naming Muslims living under a U.S. secular system as subaltern 
subjects, it must be acknowledged that running parallel alongside the category of the rational and 
cultivated subject is the primitive “raw man” devoid of culture – an axiomatic discourse that 
formed the contours of and continued to fuel civilizing missions in Africa, Asia, and the 
Americas.33 This caricatured colonial Other was generated as Europe pursued colonial projects in 
line with the demands of shifting market forces, the remaking of economies, and frontier 
territories. In later years that notion of culture would inverse - white settler culture would 
become so normative as to go unmarked (the “bland nothingness” of whiteness) in opposition to 
the “cultures” of people that were also markedly raced.34 But the subaltern is not an identity that 
the American Muslim subjects like Hasan Minhaj, Aziz Ansari, and Kumail Nanjiani embody, 
let alone one that can be taken on and worn today. The subaltern lives in a state of violent 
displacement and inbetweenness, shuttling within patriarchy, imperialism, and the status of being 
an object and subject; this is far from the circumstances of Minhaj, Ansari, and Nanjiani. 
 
33 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing 
Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 14. 
34 Historian Nell Irvin Painter refers to as a “toggle switch between ‘bland nothingness’ and ‘racist 
hatred’,” to illustrate how Spokane NAACP chapter leader Rachel Dolezal opted out of her white identity 
to instead identify as Black in 2015. This toggling logic can be found stretching back into the early 20th 
century, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the citizenship of Bhagat Singh Thind in 1923. 
Thind, an Indian man seeking to demonstrate his whiteness on the basis of Aryan ancestory, offers a case 
study of the capricious definitions of whiteness that ultimately settled on the authority on empowered 
white people’s own “common sense” about themselves. The court’s unanimous decision to reject Thind’s 
claim came after a back-and-forth on inconclusive biology of “Caucasian” and linguistic heritage. They 
conclude that “common understanding” and “congressional attitude” would not include Indians as white: 
“the great body of our people instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of assimilation.” See 
George Sutherland, United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (United States Supreme Court February 19, 




So though the Muslim as a figure is made subjectively illegible through and within 
hegemonic secular discourses in the United States, these men are not. They very much speak and 
are heard – to varying degrees – on mixed agential terms. The question, then, is what are those 
terms and what is being sacrificed in favor of some form of legibility over none? A basic theory 
of recognition, as described by Charles Taylor, consists of a positive public valuation of a given 
group identity granted by the state, where identity is a designation of a person’s understanding of 
their own fundamental human characteristics.35  
Yet what happens in the case of Minhaj, Ansari, and Nanjiani is an embrace of identity-
interchangeability, where markers can effectively “stand in” for one another. In this case, an 
illegible religion is substituted in favor of a more legible “race” or “ethnicity” or “culture.” I 
argue that these are agential moments of “opting in” on the part of these three men, but remain 
conscious that this agency is enabled by the broader secular power to confer of legitimacy to 
those identifying categories through racialization over a category like religion. At the same time, 
Muslimness is still read from and endowed upon their bodies in what Jasbir Puar calls a “queer 
perversity of terrorist bodies.”36 Racialization is shown to operate on multiple registers. What 
determines when Minhaj, Ansari, and Nanjiani are named and produce themselves as Muslim? 
 
Brown, Desi, and/or Muslim 
The site of the comedy stage and screen shines a literal spotlight on the comedian’s body, 
training the audience’s focus and then asking it to respond with non-derisive laughter. Even 
 
35 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): 25-73, 25. 
36Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2007), 169.  
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before the comedian speaks, the body has. It is raced as South Asian/Brown, an allusion to 
difference that is just unspecific enough that it must prove its legibility within secular social 
categories. This dynamic is not an unfamiliar one for nonnormative subjects across the United 
States. Indeed, W.E.B. Du Bois gives it a name in 1903: “double consciousness.” He describes 
“a peculiar sensation… of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring 
one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.”37 At the turn of the 
century, this speaks to a deep internal desire to merge two sides into one person, dogging Du 
Bois as he bears witness to the impossibility of this task in the Reconstruction Era American 
South. Historically, it has made the American Black man appear weak and without power. It is a 
fruitless venture of double aims, to ceaselessly abide by the expectations of white people while 
trying to meet the needs of Black people, ultimately irreconcilable.  
The legibility sought by Minhaj, Ansari, and Nanjiani expresses itself through a similar 
form of double consciousness in their standup material. In his Netflix special Homecoming King, 
Hasan Minhaj recounts how his family responded to 9/11, explaining: 
That’s the way our parents are, right? Our parents are like a firewall to the outside world. 
They disseminate information to us. It’s like living in North Korea. My dad is the leader 
of the household. So when 9-11 happened I was in high school. My dad sits everybody 
down. He’s like, ‘Hasan, whatever you do, do not tell people you’re Muslim or talk about 
politics.’ Alright, Dad, I’ll just hide it. This [pointing to the skin on his arm] just rubs 
off.38 
 
The joke provokes scattered laughter across the wide auditorium, but the reference to “us” is 
something Minhaj deliberately leaves untranslated, a joke “for us” – references Minhaj 
deliberately weaves into his standup in order to speak directly to the experiences of being 
 
37 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk: Essays and Sketches (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Company, 
1903), 3. 
38 Hasan Minhaj and Christopher Storer, Homecoming King (Netflix, 2017). 
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Brown/Muslim/Desi. He borrows this move from Black hip-hop artists of the 1990s. Elaborating 
in an interview with New York Magazine, Minhaj says “They wouldn’t dumb down their lyrics to 
make us understand. We had to catch up to them. For me I was like, ‘I want to do this poem 
about bravery that my dad told me, and you’re going to catch up to me and understand it.’ For 
better or for worse, let’s see how this choice works out.”39 
Aziz Ansari does something similar in his monologue for Saturday Night Live (SNL) on 
January 21, 2017, the day after Donald Trump was inaugurated as President. He reflects on the 
rise of what he calls a “casual white supremacy… this new, lower-case k.k.k. movement.” The 
members of this movement, he reasons, see the election as an open license to abuse racial 
minorities. “[They’re] saying stuff like, ‘Trump won! Go back to Africa!’ or ‘Trump won! Go 
back to Mexico!’ They see me: ‘Trump won, go back… [his eyes narrow with suspicion] to 
where you came from.’ Yeah. They’re not usually geography buffs.”40 In the same vein, Kumail 
Nanjiani opens his film, The Big Sick, with a scene of him performing standup at a club in 
Chicago.  
I grew up in Pakistan. And people are always asking me, what was that like? Really not 
that different from here. I mean we played cricket, which is just a spicier version of 
baseball. And we prayed a lot. Well not a lot, just five times a day. And we marry 
someone our parents find for us. Arranged marriage, you know. For me, it was probably 
that we got episodes of the A-Team a little bit later. And by a little bit later, I mean we 
just got episode two. But other than that, it was exactly the same.41 
 
In all three instances, there is an acute perception of how the particular bodies of these 
men operate and move through public spaces and their attendant social structures. The very 
 
39 Mallika Rao, “Hasan Minhaj Took a Job No One Wanted,” New York Magazine, 2017, 
http://www.vulture.com/2017/05/hasan-minhaj-took-a-job-no-one-wanted.html. 
40 Aziz Ansari, “Aziz Ansari Saturday Night Live Monologue,” Saturday Night Live (New York: NBC, 
January 22, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Whde50AacZs. 
41 Kumail Nanjiani, Emily Gordon, and Michael Showalter, The Big Sick (Lionsgate, 2017). 
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presence of such bodies evokes tension – they are personified as “matter out of place” and must 
then make place for their continued presence. This works to the comedian’s advantage, of 
course, whose chosen vocation relies on the release of tension through laughter. This ultimate 
objective, of eliciting amusement and doing so quickly and frequently, works in tandem with 
double consciousness by pushing those tensions to the surface and back into a realm of legibility, 
simplified referents, and even caricature. Laughter is how an audience demonstrates recognition. 
It makes the place where their matter becomes legible. That legibility, in turn, is produced by 
way of racial or ethnic nomenclature – a racialization – which has come to stand in for Islam not 
just in Minhaj, Nanjiani, and Ansari’s comedy, but also in academic literature and social justice 
activist circuits. This triangular relationship feeds its pervasiveness. 
 
The Racialization of Muslims: A Review 
This racialization of Islam emanates from the presence of material Muslim bodies which 
induces apprehension and outright alarm within discourses of securitization, masculinity, and 
white supremacy in the United States. Much of the scholarship on the racialization of Muslims 
comes out of the study of anti-Muslim hostility and its deployment. What marks one as somehow 
“worthy” of this specific kind of discrimination? The impulse to conceptualize Muslims as a 
collective body has relied increasingly on thinking about them not within a religious category but 
a racial or racialized one as religion cannot be outwardly perceived due to the “interior nature” of 
belief. Omi and Winant write that the formation of race signifies “the extension of racial 
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meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice or group. Racialization 
is an ideological process, an historically specific one.”42  
That extension has since come to subsume Muslims within such classification, as well. 
Such a connection, forged in the last several years within the academy, has been brought about 
specifically to understand anti-Muslim hostility and surveillance as racism towards Muslims. 
“Hostility to Islam cannot be separated from discrimination against Muslims in neat and 
unproblematic ways… Religion is ‘raced’, Muslims are racialized,” says AbdoolKarim Vikal.43 
Following this logic, Islamophobia is a set of ideas and practices that form a ring around all 
Muslims as a group associated with characteristics such as oppression, violence, misogyny, 
disloyalty, etc. that are assumed to be intrinsic to these bodies. Steve Garner and Saher Selod 
elaborate:  
This is not due to them all looking vaguely the same, but is because of the unity of the 
‘gaze’ itself. In other words those who produce, absorb and reproduce representations of 
asylum-seekers, and Muslims, can transform the clearly culturally and phenotypically 
dissimilar individuals who fall into this bureaucratic category (asylum-seeker), or are 
simply devotees of the same religion (Muslims), into a homogeneous bloc: this is the 
basis of the racialization of Muslims (the process), and of Islamophobia (the snapshot of 
outcomes of this process).44 
 
Junaid Rana adds that the element of race is what conjures the Muslim as enemy. “The foe is 
defined in relation not only to democracy and freedom,” he claims, “but also to the moral 
 
42 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 3rd edition (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 64. 
43 Abdoolkarim Vakil, “Who’s Afraid of Islamophobia?,” in Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global 
Perspectives, ed. Salman Sayyid (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010): 271-278, 276. 
44 Steve Garner and Saher Selod, “The Racialization of Muslims: Empirical Studies of Islamophobia,” 
Critical Sociology 41, no. 1 (2015): 9-19, 14. 
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precepts of the ideologically motivated formation of a Christian subject that argues for just war 
as an obligation of secularity and imperialism.”45 
There has been a renewed political urgency to tackle both incidents of and the underlying 
causes behind anti-Muslim hostility in recent years, further fomented by the explicit and cavalier 
proposals for Muslim registries and the implementation of what has openly been referred to as a 
Muslim Ban. A collective reading list compiled in 2017 by several scholars across academic 
disciplines declares “Islamophobia is Racism” so as to more acutely reflect the intersection of 
race and religion within the context of empire building, drawing explicit inspiration from similar 
projects that shed light on Islam and Blackness, the Standing Rock protests in North and South 
Dakota, and the Black Lives Matter protests in Ferguson.46 “This syllabus insists on thinking 
about anti-Muslim racism as a global project that overlaps and intersects with the exclusion of 
other marginalized groups (e.g. Black, queer, Latinx, immigrant, indigenous, etc),” the preface 
reads. “It also connects the histories of various racial logics that reinforce one another, including 
anti-Muslim racism, anti-Black racism, anti-Latinx racism, anti-Arab racism, and anti-South 
Asian racism.” Selod and Embrick echo this charge, adding that such acts of solidarity also 
ensure that these acts of discrimination are addressed in the first place: “if the Muslim experience 
is divorced from racism, collective action and public outcry will be minimal.”47 
 
45 Junaid Akram Rana, Terrifying Muslims: Race and Labor in the South Asian Diaspora (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2011), 5.  
46 Su’ad Abdul Khabeer, Arshad Ali, Evelyn Alsultany, Sohail Daulatzai, Lara Deeb, Carol Fadda, 
Zareena Grewal, Juliane Hammer, Nadine Naber, and Junaid Rana, Islamophobia Is Racism – Resource 
for Teaching & Learning about Anti-Muslim Racism in the United States, 2017, 
https://islamophobiaisracism.wordpress.com/. 
47 Saher Selod and David Embrick, “Racialization and Muslims: Situating the Muslim Experience in Race 
Scholarship,” Sociology Compass 7, no. 8 (2013): 644-653, 652. 
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This urgency has also found solidarity in social justice activist circuits, indebted to the 
work of Black feminist public intellectuals whose theorizations have sought deliberate utility in 
lived realities.48 The popular organizing hashtag #nobannowall joins together issues of the 
Muslim Ban and Latinx migration at the southern border, while debates surrounding the makeup 
of the 2017 Women’s March leadership committee resulted in new co-chairs that centered Black, 
Latina, and Muslim activists (though later accusations of anti-Semitism in 2019 resulted in their 
departures as chairs).49 Even among the elder statespeople of social justice organizing and Black 
radicalism, established leaders like Angela Davis draw parallels between the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security after 9/11, the militarization of police in suppressing Black 
Lives Matter protests, and the Palestinian struggle. In Freedom is a Constant Struggle, she 
writes: “the Black radical tradition has to embrace the struggles against anti-Muslim racism, 
which is perhaps the most virulent form of racism today. It makes no sense to imagine 
eradicating anti-Black racism without also eradicating anti-Muslim racism.”50  
It is worth noting how the language of race and racialization as governing analytics have 
come to dominate over a term like “ethnicity” as it pertains to Muslims. Susan Koshy comments 
on the rise of ethnicity as a marker of difference after 1965 which enabled white ethnicities to 
 
48 Brittney Cooper’s Beyond Respectability studiously profiles this genealogy through the work of Black 
women activists like Anna Julia Cooper, Pauli Murray, Mary Church Terrell, and others. See Brittney C. 
Cooper, Beyond Respectability: The Intellectual Thought of Race Women (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2017). 
49 Kirsten Gillibrand, “TIME 100: Women’s March Leaders,” Time, 2017, 
https://time.com/collection/2017-time-100/4742711/tamika-mallory-bob-bland-carmen-perez-linda-
sarsour/; Farah Stockman, “Three Leaders of Women’s March Group Step Down After Controversies,” 
The New York Times, September 16, 2019, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/16/us/womens-
march-anti-semitism.html. 
50 Angela Y. Davis, Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: Ferguson, Palestine, and the Foundations of a 
Movement (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016), 48. 
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also participate in the category. This amalgam upheld an ethos of multiculturalism and worked to 
ultimately obscure the operations of race and class by forging alliances instead between white 
people and middle-class and wealthy immigrant communities.51 Ethnic sameness in this regard 
rewards abidance to the idea of a “color-blind” American meritocracy, offering those that utilize 
this rhetoric not access and opportunity to capital but its simulacrum. One is shown to be “fit” 
within capitalism by “transcending” the language of race and promoting market individualism. 
This narrative culminates in the myth of the model minority, to which many Muslims subscribe, 
particularly among those that can trace their presence in the United States to the relaxation of 
immigration quotas in 1965. The overwhelming force and blind application of anti-Muslim 
hostility, however, has muted the use of this distinction among both academics and activists 
working on their behalf. 
Muslim community organizations like the Muslim Justice League (MJL) and the Muslim 
Anti-Racism Collaborative (MuslimARC) position themselves as human rights-oriented Muslim 
community organizers, driven especially in response to state-sponsored incursions by the FBI, 
the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and “countering violent extremism” programs, all of which 
continue to ingratiate themselves in mosques, schools, and community centers. These U.S. 
government agendas are the latest addition to a long historical precedence of reading religion as 
race. Young men from Muslim-majority nations were monitored through the Bush-era NSEERS 
registry, which drew from even earlier legal machinations like the Plenary Power Doctrine and 
Chinese Exclusion Act. Moustafa Bayoumi identifies an underlying assumption that “a terrorist 
is foreign-born, an alien in the United States, and a Muslim, and that all Muslim men who fit this 
 
51 Susan Koshy, “Morphing Race into Ethnicity: Asian Americans and Critical Transformations of 
Whiteness,” Boundary 2 28, no. 1 (March 2001): 153-194, 181, 187-189.  
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profile are potential terrorists.”52 Religion determines race, and there is no escaping from it. This 
inescapability from the eyes of the state drives the work of MJL, recognizing that 
“discrimination towards any group endangers the rights of all.”53 MuslimARC similarly offers 
trainings and workshops that probe the ways that racism has been internalized but also made 
interpersonal and institutional with respect to, by, and against Muslims. “While the majority of 
our members are currently in the United States, we stand in solidarity with oppressed people and 
incorporate global voices because our community is cosmopolitan, reflecting transnational 
identities with local particularities,” their website says.  
Cemil Aydin observes a similar phenomenon among Muslims who continue to exercise 
the use of the geo-civilizational term of the “Muslim world,” descending from the racialized 
colonial discourses that forged this idea into something uniform and universal.54 This currency is 
present especially among those postcolonial nationalists and internationalists interested in 
building global solidarities in the face of western hegemony. Aydin sees the use of this secular 
essentialism as strategic on the part of its Muslim practitioners then and now, serving some sense 
of shared humanitarian or political goals.55 This type of ubiquitous solidarity enables broader and 
sustainable coalition-building across social justice activist circles. As a feminist ethic, this 
creates space for a shared dispositional vulnerability, writes Desiree Melton: “an awareness of 
self-dependence on others for understanding and respect, and an awareness, in turn, of the 
 
52 Moustafa Bayoumi, “Racing Religion,” CR: The New Centennial Review 6, no. 2 (2006): 267-293, 275. 
53 Muslim Justice League, “Our Work,” Muslim Justice League, October 17, 2015, 
https://www.muslimjusticeleague.org/our-work/. 
54 Cemil Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2017), 57-64. 
55 Aydin, “The Idea of the Muslim World,” 236-237. 
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other’s dependence for understanding and respect.”56 She notes that it is easier for racial 
minorities to cultivate and condition vulnerable dependence given their own existential 
awareness of self and the requirement to then de-center that self in the interest of others. This 
exercise of vulnerability, far from connoting weakness, encourages the type of recognition that 
empowers racial minorities to resist in the face of white supremacy. 
 
The Progressive Consensus 
Taken together, this is indicative of what I have come to call a progressive consensus of 
recognition, which speaks to a process in the contemporary American moment around the year 
2017 that foregrounds sites of racial struggle and the discourse of race/racialization as the 
primary mode through which to distinguish difference, inequity, and oppression within a secular 
political apparatus. Like Michael Omi and Howard Winant, I agree that race stands as a “master 
category” for difference in the U.S. for the otherwise racially unclassified. 57 Though the 
dominion of race within the progressive consensus conception of difference does not, on its own, 
displace other categories of distinction like gender, sexuality, or class, the progressive consensus 
has worked to ensure that they are additionally indexed by race. This move draws from Kimberlé 
Crenshaw’s paradigm on intersectionality, which has gained traction across political, academic, 
and activist discourses albeit in ways that do not always correspond with, and in fact frequently 
misconstrue, Crenshaw’s original intent.58 
 
56 Desirée H. Melton, “The Vulnerable Self: Enabling the Recognition of Racial Inequality,” in Feminist 
Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal, ed. L Tessman (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2009):  149-164, 150. 
57 Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States.106-108. 
58 Some self-identified leftist opponents of intersectional feminism accuse it creating a “caste system” of 
oppression wherein “power and privilege are profane.” For an example see Bari Weiss, “I’m Glad the 
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Locating the progressive consensus in this time period (roughly between 2015-2019) 
should not lead one to believe that cross-racial resistance is a recent phenomenon. Indeed, the 
consensus of the progressive consensus implies its mainstreaming, where race and racialization 
are deemed legible in and of themselves because the broader system of secularity and its 
attendant institutions of white supremacy and patriarchy have swelled to accommodate it. Race 
and racialization are contained and made containable as their demands to be seen and placed in 
positions of leadership do not require institutional abolition or even significant reform.59 The 
utilitarian grip of this regime can sustain the cosmetic changes the mainstreamed progressive 
consensus asks of it.  
I must also note here that the progressive consensus I have proposed is not a clear overlay 
across the American public.60 Many quadrants of society remain overtly hostile to raced and 
racialized peoples, gender justice, and queer rights. Part of that hostility can also be attributed to 
the regulatory power of this consensus, however, which continues to grow into a form of 
 
Dyke March Banned Jewish Stars,” The New York Times, June 27, 2017, sec. Opinion, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/opinion/im-glad-the-dyke-march-banned-jewish-stars.html; For 
Crenshaw’s original conceptualization, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of 
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics,” University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989, no. 1 (1989): 139-167, 140-143. 
59 A final reiteration for my readers that the progressive consensus speaks to a moment in time that has 
passed; the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020 and the pulpit that these solidarities and movement have 
given to notions of prison and police abolition (as institutional homes of white supremacy) demonstrate 
that while they are still considered “radical” and “fringe” proposals, the needle of mainstreamed public 
opinion has nevertheless shifted in their direction. 
60 Jasbir Puar provides a similar caveat in Terrorist Assemblages, where she writes: “To aver that some or 
certain homosexual bodies signify homonormative nationalism – homonationalism – is in no way 
intended to deny, diminish, or disavow the daily violences of discrimination, physical and sexual assault, 
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regularly endure; in short, most queers, whether as subjects or populations, still hover amid regimes of 
deferred or outright death.” See Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, 10. 
104 
 
“progressive” political hegemony across multiple social institutions ranging from state 
infrastructures to corporations to university systems to entertainment studios.  
This modality of difference overlaps with the hegemony of secular exception that, by 
upholding multicultural diversity, equality, and freedom of speech as universally applicable, still 
manages to exploit and subjugate the very subjects in whose name the progressive consensus 
aligns. Islam has found a subjective legibility since being subsumed within this categorical 
understanding, whereby at any given moment, the Muslim can be “seen” as Brown or Desi, 
accounting for the ways that these comics articulated and presented themselves. In many ways, 
the progressive consensus inches back towards what Koshy has called “parallel” minoritization 
over “stratified” minoritization; a prominent organizing strategy of the 1960s among Asian 
American activists focused so stringently on opposition to white supremacy that the positionality 
differences among non-white minoritized peoples were undertheorized and even unattended.  
The utility of racializing Muslims follows an analogous rationality. The process of 
racialization opens up rhetorical room to identify as a racialized Muslim in order to register 
resistance to a hegemonic secular order that draws from a similarly unmarked (thus racially 
white) Protestantism. This progressive consensus affirms grander teleologies of progress and the 
“valorization of life” as the United States moves towards its eventual demography of destiny: an 
increasingly “diverse” populace in which white Americans no longer retain their status as the 
majority racial group.61 This browning of America means the secular values of multicultural 
diversity are simultaneously national values, recognizing race as a difference worth celebrating 
while providing annotation of the otherwise egregious lies and hypocrisies that white supremacy 
 
61 Rey Chow, The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002), 9-10.  
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has born. The consensus is thus very much a protected product of the secular, but still continues 
to be buoyed by social justice efforts and academic literature on racialization in an effort to 
combat the immediacy and prevalence of anti-Muslim hostilities across the country.  
 
Conclusion 
To demand legibility not as racial subject but religious ones would otherwise return us to 
the dynamics laid out by the exclusively “Muslim problem” vis-à-vis its opposition to the secular 
order and its attendant norms. As a religious subject, the Muslim occupies a place of unique 
againstness, facing down the secular sentinel alone and without solidarity. Again, this is not to 
say that coming off as a racialized subject exempts one from registering as a problem against the 
broader social order; it is simply ceases to be an isolated venture. In the following chapter, I 
demonstrate ways that this consensus disciplines its subjects through regular embodied and 
vocalized demonstrations of loyalty to its secular standards of liberalism, democracy, free 










CHAPTER 4: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSENSUS IN ACTION, ENACTION 
 
As I write, highly civilized human beings are flying overhead, trying to kill me. 
 
- George Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn62 
 
Introduction 
The progressive consensus I propose in the previous chapter was symptomatic of the 
popular culture landscape in the United States between the years 2015 and 2019. This moment is 
facilitated by the hyperconnectivity between social justice activism and celebrity and further 
fomented by the added number of publicly available platforms from which one’s position on 
these topics are assessed. In this chapter, I chart the changes in how Aziz Ansari, Hasan Minhaj, 
and Kumail Nanjiani refer to their Muslimness as the progressive consensus grows in its own 
authority. I also provide specific examples of the ways that the consensus sanctions and 
manifests as a profession of fidelity in the comedy routines and the conception of that comedy by 
these men. These professions not only enable future vocational opportunities and platforms for 
these men, they reinscribe the authority of the secular by racializing religion into a legible 
category of identification as well as enabling but also restraining the types of acceptable political 
comedy these men can perform. I describe how those theoretical limitations extend to common 
conceptions of religion in American public life, and how they ultimately do a disservice to 
beliefs and practices of Islam that are not captured by racialized sociality, particularly for Black 
Muslims. How can one account for an Islam outside this schema? Can we conceive of humor – 
 
62 George Orwell, My Country Right or Left (1940-1943) (New York: HBJ Book, 1971), 56. 
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of joy, of affective pleasure – in ways that are not beholden to the strictures that secularism 
demands of its nonnormative subjects and constitute a form of resistance to it? I conclude with 
the possibilities that Muslim humor is both bound by, and resistant to, the disciplinary gaze of 
secularism and its institutions. 
 
Islam Makes Its Appearance 
Prior to this period, Ansari, Minhaj, and Nanjiani tended towards quieting their Muslim 
affiliation, though not all in the same way and to the same extent. As described in Chapter 2, 
Ansari’s early public persona and comedy content did not address his Muslim background at all. 
His Indianness makes peripheral appearances, mostly in reference to his family members (“I’m 
from South Carolina, but my parents are from India,” or referring to Tamil as “this obscure, 
southeast Asian language that we [him and the British Sri Lankan rapper M.I.A.] both happen to 
speak”).1 Up until 2015, most of his routines spoke to observations and mundanities he had 
experienced personally, like frustrations with untruthful thread-count claims among various 
bedsheet brands, using his Blackberry while driving, and recounting his capers with musician 
Kanye West. Once introduced, the political flavor of his comedy continued to remain mild. A 
recurring topic, homophobia and gay marriage, is attended to not for its controversy, but as the 
setup for an absurdist antic: 
I was walking down the street once, and this guy came up to me with a clipboard. He 
goes, “Hey, man. Do you have a moment for gay rights?” and I went, “Sorry, man. I’m in 
a little bit of a rush,” and then that dude watched me walk into a Jamba Juice. And he was 
a little upset. He was like, “Really, man? You’re in a rush to get to Jamba Juice? I’m out 
here trying to make a difference.” and I was like, “Well, actually, man, there’s a guy that 
works in that Jamba Juice that said some really hateful stuff about a close gay friend of 
mine and I’m going in there to stab him.” Then I pulled out two knives and I tossed him 
one. I was like, “Do you have a moment for gay rights? Oh, didn’t think so. So sit there 
 
1 Aziz Ansari and Jason Woliner, Intimate Moments for a Sensual Evening (Comedy Central, 2010). 
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with your little clipboard and judge me. I kill for gay people. I make a difference. You 
don’t do shit!”2 
 
A political turn that would account for Islam, however, took a bit longer. In fact, the first 
public acknowledgment of his American Muslim-ness appeared in a 2016 editorial for the New 
York Times, written in response to the increasing viability of then-candidate Donald Trump’s 
presidential campaign. The letter read: 
Being Muslim American already carries a decent amount of baggage. In our culture, 
when people think “Muslim,” the picture in their heads is not usually of the Nobel Peace 
Prize winner Malala Yousafzai, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar or the kid who left the boy band 
One Direction. It’s of a scary terrorist character from “Homeland” or some monster from 
the news… Since 9/11, there have been 49 mass shootings in this country, and more than 
half of those were perpetrated by white males. I doubt we’ll hear Mr. Trump make a 
speech asking his fellow white males to tell authorities “who the bad ones are,” or call for 
restricting white males’ freedoms. One way to decrease the risk of terrorism is clear: 
Keep military-grade weaponry out of the hands of mentally unstable people, those with a 
history of violence, and those on F.B.I. watch lists. But, despite sit-ins and filibusters, our 
lawmakers are failing us on this front and choose instead to side with the National Rifle 
Association. Suspected terrorists can buy assault rifles, but we’re still carrying tiny 
bottles of shampoo to the airport. If we’re going to use the “they’ll just find another way” 
argument, let’s use that to let us keep our shoes on.3 
 
Though this is an example of Ansari speaking “outside of work hours,” he is still a funny 
Muslim, and his public statements maintain a signature jocularity even when addressing a topic 
he deems deeply personal. Here, Ansari’s acknowledgement of his Muslimness is thoroughly 
imbricated in the anti-Muslim hostility he and his family have experienced. Yet this 
acknowledgement does not stand alone; it is linked to the frequency of mass shooting in the US 
and calling out politicians that have waffled on the introduction and passage of legislation for 
stricter gun laws. His self-identification is endorsed by the standard progressive establishment 
talking point on gun restrictions. There is a cover of marginality that has made room for Ansari 
 
2 Ansari and Woliner, Intimate Moments for a Sensual Evening. 





as a Muslim - a minority who experiences racism more than anti-Muslim hostility – within this 
progressive corner of America’s secular politics. 
 Hasan Minhaj’s comedy prior to 2017 was more forthcoming on the intersection of race, 
culture, and politics than Ansari’s. But even here, Islam is not frequently named as part of his 
own identity until he joins the Daily Show. He is also a member of a sketch comedy troupe, 
Goatface, which is comprised of all South/West Asian American Muslim men, though their jokes 
surround being “Brown.” In one sketch titled “Indian Spiderman,” uploaded to YouTube in 
2012, Minhaj stars as a version of Peter Parker who does not manage to sneak out of his window 
to fight crime because he is constantly being summoned by his parents about taking the LSAT, 
berated for leaving the window open while the air-conditioning runs, and is pointedly compared 
to the city-destroying Doctor Octopus who at least “is a doctor.”4 Minhaj’s Muslim identity takes 
centerstage during his time at the Daily Show, where he auditioned with a monologue titled 
“Batman vs. Bill Maher,” discussing an episode of the HBO television show Real Time with Bill 
Maher. In this episode, actor Ben Affleck called Sam Harris and Maher’s observations about 
Islam “racist” and “gross” after the two contended that “not all religions are alike” as Islam alone 
is “the only religion that acts like the mafia that will fucking kill you if you say the wrong thing, 
draw the wrong picture, or write the wrong book.”5  
The premise of his hiring was with reference to his Muslim background, and it sanctioned 
many of the news pieces he helmed moving forward with the network. Minhaj would often join 
Stewart and later host Trevor Noah at the main desk as the “senior religious correspondent” 
 
4 Aristotle Athiras, Indian Spider-Man, Goatface Comedy (YouTube, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wW6okVZuN-k. 




(though of course, Minhaj is not asked to report on any religious tradition other than Islam) to 
review news stories ranging from the welcoming of Syrian refugees into Canada, to the history 
behind the Muslim ban, to the growing frequency of Muslims getting kicked off of airplanes. 
“We’re crafty, Jon,” he says straight into the camera for that final segment. “Anything on a plane 
is a weapon to a Muslim. The corner of a Dorito chip can slice a neck! You think that seat 
cushion is a flotation device? You are wrong! That is a smothering pillow. You see a Sky Mall? I 
see a papercut katana.”6 
As described in his biography, Kumail Nanjiani did not address his Muslim background 
when initially setting out in the comedy world. While it may have been a consideration, Nanjiani 
told NPR’s Ann Marie Baldonado that “there were all these comedians who were sort of talking 
about being Muslim or being brown and I just felt like ... so many of them were exploring the 
same territory… for better or worse, I decided I would not talk about that stuff at all.”7 For about 
a decade his comedy avoided the topic of his religious and ethnic heritage, but in 2009, a one 
person show he wrote, titled Unpronounceable, centered on solely that. “I made a very specific 
decision to write one show that was going to be very, very personal, that was going to be very 
different than anything I had done, that was going to be one story,” though it focused primarily 
on his journey towards the decision to no longer call himself Muslim.8  
The show premiered in Chicago and went on the road to California and New York, where 
it was billed as providing “the kind of realization most Westerners are never in a position to 
 
6 Minhaj’s Muslim Makeover, The Daily Show (The Daily Show, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hSTywVwZCjw&t=317s. 




experience. Unpronounceable will teach you a thing or two about Islam and Pakistani culture; it 
will also make you appreciate the ideological freedoms New Yorkers take for granted.”9 And 
while Unpronounceable enabled him to quit his second job and concentrate on comedy, Nanjiani 
slowly softens over time with respect to his Muslim identity, consenting to the label in ways that 
Ansari still remains hesitant and Minhaj openly welcomes. In an appearance on the talk show 
Chelsea in 2017, Nanjiani laments that Muslims like him aren’t more visible: “Why do we only 
think of Muslims on the news when we think of Muslims? Look at me, I’m Muslim, I’m cool! 
Right?”10 
 
Political, But Not Too Political 
Even under the shared cover of marginality conferred by way of racialization, the forms 
of recognition that Minhaj, Nanjiani, and Ansari seek and receive in their humor rely heavily on 
an adherence to secular regimes of humor. This recognition continues to make limited political 
inquiries concerning Islam that mainstreamed liberal politics have already adopted. In most 
cases, the demand does not venture afield from asking for more opportunities for positive 
visibility or denouncing low-stakes controversies. The three produce jokes that uphold the 
progressive consensus and are rewarded for it, as demonstrated not just by the jokes they have 
written but the platforms on which they are performed. During the 2018 Oscars ceremony, the 
same year he was nominated for an Academy Award, Nanjiani appeared in a video tribute to the 
#TimesUp/#MeToo movement and a push for more diverse representation of filmmakers, actors, 
 
9 “UNPRONOUNCEABLE in Time Out NY,” Upright Citizens Brigade Comedy, accessed April 1, 2020, 
https://ucbcomedy.com/media/6030. 




and the stories that end up on screen. “Some of my favorite movies are movies by straight white 
dudes, about straight white dudes,” he says. “Now, straight white dudes can watch movies 
starring me and you can relate to that. It’s not that hard. I’ve done it my whole life.”11 In his 
early-career comedy special Beta Male, Nanjiani relates the experience of being heckled and 
jeered at as “Kumar” a la the movie Harold and Kumar Go to White Castle, long the only 
prominent Indian protagonist in a Hollywood film. In response, Nanjiani said “I want to be so 
famous that I’m the pop-culture reference that people would make to try and be racist to me. So 
I’d be walking down the street and someone would be, like, ‘Hey, look at this Kumail Nanjiani. 
Oh, fuck, that is Kumail Nanjiani!’”12  
The politics that Nanjiani establishes in each bit are separated by at least five years (the 
Kumar joke had been a part of his repertoire for several years prior). Each are playful and the 
politics inherent to both are blunted. There is little critique in the commentary he offers beyond 
an absurdist role reversal and a good-natured call for increased representation. While he does not 
extricate himself from his comedy, Nanjiani told an audience at the 2017 Sundance Film Festival 
that he is aware of his representational capacity but is not aiming to rock the boat. ”I don’t go, ‘It 
is now time to change Americans’ perception of Muslims.’ It’s going to be a long day. I think 
you just try to be unique and try to be yourself, and if something good comes of that then 
great.”13 
 
11 Hollywood Reporter, “#TimesUp: Ashley Judd, Annabella Sciorra, & Salma Hayek Take the Stage at 
the Oscars,” Twitter, March 4, 2018, https://twitter.com/THR/status/970503132592533504. 
12 Kumail Nanjiani, Beta Male (Comedy Central, 2013), http://www.cc.com/episodes/d2pis0/stand-up-
specials-kumail-nanjiani–beta-male-season-1-ep-101. 
13 Marantz, “Kumail Nanjiani’s Culture-Clash Comedy,” May 2017. 
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 Ansari, too, is not interested in occupying the position of provocateur. His 2017 SNL 
monologue quoted earlier continues with the following:  
Is that the plan, by the way? We’re all going to move? All the minorities? Forty-some percent of 
the country? Every minority’s going to move? Beyoncé’s going to move? Beyoncé ain’t moving. I 
ain’t moving, O.K.? My parents… moved from India to South Carolina in the early ‘80s. They 
didn’t move until nine years ago. You know where they moved? North Carolina. They love it here. 
They’re not leaving.14 
 
Ansari draws attention to a racialized dimension of difference that is read off his body. 
Brown/Indian/Muslim – the complex confluence of what he is is less important than what he 
reads as, and what he reads as is simple: he is foreign and minoritized, a threat against the 
American citizenry within a white supremacist imaginary. This is the same position, he reasons, 
as Beyoncé and other racial minorities. But while Ansari may recognize the presence and 
pervasive operation of that white supremacist imaginary, his solution lacks precision or any 
insurgent jab that legitimizes Muslims outside of their racial respectability: just treat everyone 
with respect, he says, and remember that “we are all Americans.”15 This minimization of the 
racism endemic within the larger movement that elected Trump ends on a comforting note, with 
Ansari recalling the mollifying speeches by George W. Bush utilized about Islam in the wake of 
9/11. The irony of this is not lost on him as he asks bewilderingly: “What the hell has happened? 
I’m sitting here wistfully watching old George W. Bush speeches?”16  
The SNL monologue was a smash. The internet was flush with commentary the next 
morning, calling his performance a “blistering attack,” “excellent,” “epic,” and “scorching.”17 
 
14 Ansari, “Aziz Ansari Saturday Night Live Monologue.” 
15 Ansari, “Aziz Ansari Saturday Night Live Monologue.” 
16 Ansari, “Aziz Ansari Saturday Night Live Monologue.” 
17 Mother Jones New York Bureau, “Aziz Ansari Just Hit Donald Trump Hard in an Epic Saturday Night 




The tone was just right for Jay Willis of GQ Magazine as well, who wrote in an article titled 
“Aziz Ansari Helps Saturday Night Live Finally Get Its Coverage of Donald Trump Right” that 
Ansari’s remarks were competent and considerate. “Ansari didn’t drag or slam or savage 
President Trump, but instead spoke passionately and eloquently about what comes next for 
Americans,” Willis asserts. “There was no punchline, really - it was a genuine plea for a gesture 
that, if it were to happen, might actually make a difference.”18 Chris Rock, a long-time mentor to 
Ansari, later revealed that he had pushed him to foreground Trump, anti-Muslim hostility, and 
racism in his set. “He was running his set by me and he was going to do all this relationship stuff 
and I was like, ‘Dude, you’re insane. You can’t be on Saturday Night Live the day after the 
inauguration and talk about getting a girlfriend. Tonight, you gotta be George Carlin. You gotta 
be political.’”19  
After being “voluntold” in this fashion, Ansari took Rock’s comments to heart and 
rehearsed the set over 100 times in the month before his appearance. It remains, to date, the most 
Muslim of his material and the furthest departure from his customary stomping grounds. Just a 
few months later in 2017, Ansari admits in a GQ cover story interview to deleting the internet 
browser, email, and all social media off his phone except text messaging. The decision to unplug 
 
night-live-monologue/; Adam Rosenberg, “Aziz Ansari’s ‘SNL’ Monologue Is a Blistering Attack on the 
‘Lowercase Kkk,’” Mashable, accessed March 24, 2020, https://mashable.com/2017/01/22/aziz-ansari-
saturday-night-live-monologue/; Jen Chung, “Aziz Ansari’s Excellent SNL Monologue Addresses New 
Trump Order,” Gothamist, January 22, 2017, https://gothamist.com/arts-entertainment/aziz-ansaris-
excellent-snl-monologue-addresses-new-trump-order; Joanna Robinson, “Watch S.N.L. Host Aziz Ansari 
Deliver Scorching Anti-Racist Monologue,” Vanity Fair, accessed March 24, 2020, 
https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2017/01/aziz-ansari-monologue-saturday-night-live-racist-
lowercase-kkk-donald-trump. 
18 Jay Willis, “Aziz Ansari Helps ‘Saturday Night Live’ Finally Get Its Coverage of Donald Trump 
Right,” GQ Magazine, accessed March 24, 2020, https://www.gq.com/story/aziz-ansari-snl-monologue. 
19 Yuan, “Chris Rock on Becoming Aziz Ansari’s Mentor.” 
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came from the realization that the world’s politics mostly did not affect his life: “If you take 
yourself out of it, you’re not infected with this toxicity all the time,” he tells Mark Anthony 
Green. “Also, guess what? Everything is fine! I’m not out of the loop on anything. Like, if 
something real is going down, I’ll find out about it.”20 This is reflected in the material he writes 
for his acts as well. Most attempts at political material exhaust him, he says. “Because it’s like, 
when you read the news all the time it just kind of puts you in a negative mood. I don’t know… 
that’s just such a bummer.”21 
That is not to say that Ansari does not engage political issues in his comedy after the SNL 
monologue in January 2017. The politics he engages, however, are scaffolding politics. While 
they do not directly speak to the “news of the day,” they are an attempt to position himself in the 
political moment of progressive consensus. Ansari’s much accoladed Netflix show, Master of 
None, stars a semi-autobiographical version of himself. Throughout the various press junkets he 
took part in, Ansari was particularly proud of the precision that went into casting each part in his 
show.22 His protagonist, Dev Shah, begins the first season as a young, down-on-his-luck actor 
living in New York. Dev’s parents (played by Ansari’s real life parents Shoukath and Fatima) are 
named Ramesh and Nisha. All three characters are also shown to speak Tamil, which makes the 
 
20 Mark Anthony Green, “Aziz Ansari on Quitting the Internet, Loneliness, and Season 3 of Master of 
None,” GQ, August 2, 2017, https://www.gq.com/story/aziz-ansari-gq-style-cover-story/amp. 
21 Ellen E. Jones, “Aziz Ansari: ‘I Try to Write Political Material … Then Get Tired of It,’” The 
Guardian, May 27, 2017, sec. Culture, https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2017/may/27/aziz-ansari-
interview-master-of-none. 
22 In an interview on NPR’s Fresh Air, Ansari describes the long search for actors that could capture his 
parents’ essence and ultimately being disappointed: “We auditioned a few people for these parts of my 
parents. And when they read, they just didn’t feel like my parents. They didn’t feel - it felt like people 
doing impressions of Indian people.” See Terry Gross, “Ansari And Yang Explore The First-Generation 





choice of these characters’ names all the more curious. “Dev,” “Ramesh,” and “Shah” would be 
found more frequently among the populations of northern India, not Kerala where Ansari’s 
parents lived prior to the United States and where he continues to visit extended family members 
when he returns to India.  
This was a frequent enough critique from South Asian viewers that Ansari took to Twitter 
to address it twice. “RT. Wait. @azizansari is an Indian named Dev Shah with a Tamil father 
from thirunalveli in Master of None? What am I missing?” asked the user Vivek Shanmugam.23 
“Haha, I just liked the named [sic] Dev. Don’t tell white viewers plz. Season 2 his name will be 
changed to Vivek Shanmugam.”24 Two days later, he posted a version of the same: “@sri__ram I 
just liked the name but Dev, but you are right it doesn’t quite make sense. Don’t tell the non-
Indians about this plz.”25 Without delving into a debate on what constitutes a “Muslim” name 
and the hegemony of Arabic over Muslim authenticity, suffice it to say that Ansari’s desire to 
offer a “genuine” take on his life’s experiences draws more from a well of generalized 
identification with “Indianness” (and its hegemonic overlapping with Sanskrit-derived 
etymologies) than the specific normativities that come with being an Indian Muslim (and the 
commonplace tendencies towards the use of Arabic language first and surnames).  
 
23 Vivek Shanmugam, “Vivek Shanmugam on Twitter: ‘RT. Wait. @azizansari Is an Indian Named Dev 
Shah with a Tamil Father from Thirunalveli in Master of None? What Am I Missing?’ / Twitter,” Twitter, 
November 8, 2015, https://twitter.com/rvivekshanmugam/status/663501144090681344. 
24 Aziz Ansari, “Aziz Ansari on Twitter: ‘@rvivekshanmugam Haha, I Just Liked the Named Dev. Don’t 
Tell White Viewers Plz. Season 2 His Name Will Be Changed to Vivek Shanmugam.’ / Twitter,” Twitter, 
November 8, 2015, https://twitter.com/azizansari/status/663501647654617088. 
25 Aziz Ansari, “‘@sri__ram I Just Liked the Name but Dev, but You Are Right It Doesn’t Quite Make 




Islam does make an overt appearance in Master of None, however, in a second season 
episode titled “Religion.” It opens with a montage of different children being dragged to 
religious services – to a Russian orthodox church, a synagogue, a mandir, and Scientology 
temple. A young Dev sits next to a friend about to eat breakfast, a sizzling plate of bacon and 
eggs. Dev’s mother calls him at that moment, chastising her son and ordering him home for 
nearly eating pork when “we are Muslims!”26 The camera slows down the scene as young Dev 
deliberates, and then chooses to ignore his mother by biting down, savoring the mouthful as 
Tupac raps “Only God Can Judge Me” over the scene. The main plotline involves the adult 
Dev’s struggles with telling his parents that he does not follow customary Muslim prescriptions 
in his personal life like prayer and abstaining from alcohol.  
This difficulty is most exemplified by his love for pork. Hiding the fixation makes for 
much of the episode’s situational comedy through Dev’s furtive attempts at concealing food, to 
convincing his cousin to forgo fasting and instead attend a barbeque festival, to an explosive 
public confession at a Chinese restaurant. “I’m actually not joking,” he exclaims in the episode’s 
heroic final moments. “I’m not that religious, and I eat pork. But it’s okay ‘cause I’m a good 
person, and I’m 33 years old, and I can make those decisions. I can eat what I want, and I want to 
eat the crispy pork with the broccoli!” Ansari’s agency is the touchstone of the episodic arc, 
where Ansari goes from making his own decisions in private to doing so publicly. This sense of 
“being true” to oneself is juxtaposed with jokes about his parents’ own hypocritical desire to 
appear more participatory in Muslim practices than they normally are. Ansari offers 
simultaneously conscious and unconscious strictures on what public space a Muslim can occupy 
in Master of None. The limited discernability of Muslimness – in name, appearance, and practice 
 
26 Aziz Ansari and Alan Yang, “Religion,” Master of None (Netflix, 2015). 
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– makes for an ideal secular subject that affiliates with Islam by way of racial similarity alone. 
That Muslim upholds the principle of freely-assented choice and lives this principle without 
dissonance in public and private life. His interest in politics does not make any demands of the 
system he benefits from, and in fact, he is uninterested and “tired” by the pursuit of its reform. 
This is an “authentic” secular Muslim, one who doesn’t even have to try to “become” secular but 
simply is.  
Minhaj, meanwhile, has considerably ratcheted up the political depths of his comedy 
since his early days of standup. While the seasons of Patriot Act with Hasan Minhaj released in 
2019 have taken on increasingly controversial topics like the Indian election, America’s policing 
system, and billionaire “philanthropy,” Minhaj’s standup routines, White House Correspondents’ 
Association (WHCA) Dinner performance, and Homecoming King all coil around the 
possibilities inherent to the American Dream. In 2017, Minhaj repeatedly returns to his avowedly 
overwhelming sense of gratitude for the exceptional American investment in principles like 
freedom, equality, and a leveled playing field that gives his gumption room to roam. “Do you 
feel fortunate that right now there is such a hunger for the kind of identity-politics-infused 
comedy that you bring?” asked the New York Times reporter Susan Dominus shortly after the 
release of Homecoming King. “Or would you prefer to be sort of liberated from the subject 
matter altogether?” Minhaj was ready with a deferent response. “What I love about comedy is 
that we’re this group of weirdos, and the only language that matters is ‘Are you funny?’ And it 
really is this oddly cool American idea where comedy’s the marketplace of ideas. May the best 
idea win.”27  
 





This gratitude is also professed as the culminating sentiment of his otherwise sarcastic 
monologue for the WHCA, where Minhaj returned to the night’s theme and paid tribute.  
This event is about celebrating the First Amendment and free speech. Free speech is the 
foundation of an open and liberal democracy, from college campuses to the White House. 
Only in America can a first-generation, Indian American Muslim kid get on the stage and 
make fun of the president. [applause] The orange man behind the Muslim ban. And it’s a 
sign to the rest of the world. It’s this amazing tradition that shows the entire world that 
even the president is not beyond the reach of the First Amendment.28 
 
That this gratitude is not recognized produces ancillary sentiments of wariness, but not outright 
anger. Minhaj described such wariness as an experience that he and his family share in a heartfelt 
segment of Homecoming King. 
I know 9/11 is a super touchy subject. I understand. Because when it happened, everyone 
in America felt like their country was under attack. But on that night, September 12th, it 
was the first night of so many nights where my family’s loyalty to this country was under 
attack. And it always sucks. As immigrants we always have to put on these press releases 
to prove our patriotism. We’re auditioning. We love this country, please believe me. 
Nobody loves this country more than us.29 
 
In both instances, Minhaj’s commentary homes in on the frustration that his sincerity about the 
U.S. is seemingly always under suspicion. The content of such remarks are earnest, but they are 
performed as a punctuated grandstand, written to evoke his American audience’s applause, 
which he gets in each instance. “Only in America can a first-generation, Indian American 
Muslim kid get on the stage and make fun of the president,” Minhaj says as the CSPAN camera 
pans to one of the few Republicans in attendance that year, congressman Darrell Issa, who turned 
to the man next to him and can be seen sternly, yet proudly, conceding that “Yes, he can.”30 For 
Nanjiani, Ansari, and Minhaj, their punch-lines force their viewers into a moment of political 
 
28 Minhaj, Hasan Minhaj COMPLETE REMARKS at 2017 White House Correspondents’ Dinner. 
29 Minhaj and Storer, Homecoming King. 
30 Minhaj, Hasan Minhaj COMPLETE REMARKS at 2017 White House Correspondents’ Dinner. 
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confrontation, but do not allow those confrontations to dangle in isolation. The joke’s tension 
release comes in the form of a warm confession – an honest glimpse in an otherwise prepped and 
plated performance – that elicits not laughter, but righteous avowal. They are moments that “feel 
good,” an affective response I will return to at the end of this chapter.  
 
The Limits of Racialization and the Progressive Consensus 
 While the presence of Islam and other Muslims have now become commonplace in the 
comedic endeavors produced by Minhaj, Ansari, and Nanjiani, the progressive consensus that 
authorizes that presence ultimately constrains how we understand religion as a social category 
and enact efforts against anti-Muslim hostility and racism. While “Islam” may corporeally 
adhere to the racialized body, its stickiness adheres to brown-skinned bodies over white ones and 
doubly compounds on Black bodies in an overdetermination of racial subjectivity. Brown bodies 
– be they South Asian, Arab, Latinx – typify a perceived ethos of Islam that slips 
interchangeably with terrorist. In the words of Kumarini Silva, they are a “metaphorical” Brown 
that appears deviant and threatening to the social conventions of securitized secular nationalism 
in the U.S.31 Within the ruling Black/white racial binary in the U.S., differently browned bodies 
are thus browned into a pseudo-Muslim particularity.  
Over the last several years, the growing alarm over Latinx migration into the United 
States does not threaten the white American citizenry on its own, it does so as part of a 
Browned/Muslim massification: right-wing populist screeds parallel one another through a trans-
Atlantic looking glass. In Germany, open agitation against the “annihilation of the German 
 
31 Kumarini Silva, Brown Threat: Identification in the Security State (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2016), 11-13. 
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people,” “repopulation,” and the “the great exchange” finds a home in the increasingly powerful 
opposition Alternative für Deutschland Party’s slogan “We are the People.”32 In the United 
States, the dog whistles are even more explicit. “Make America Great Again” adorn the caps of 
the American president’s elated supporters as he tweets not just that “the U.S. is ill-prepared for 
this invasion, and will not stand for it” but also that “‘We’ve found prayer rugs out here. It’s 
unreal.’… People coming across the Southern Border from many countries, some of which 
would be a big surprise.”33  
At the same time, Black Muslim subjects find themselves overdetermined as Black first 
and only. This can be seen in the ways that the Nation of Islam continues to be discussed in 
prominent reference materials as primarily as an “African American movement” and secondarily 
as “combining elements of traditional Islam with black nationalist ideas.”34 It is also why the 
comedian Dave Chapelle, as discussed in chapter 2, is read as a Black comedian even when 
discussing his Muslim faith and his decision to attempt hajj, while a South Asian 
American/Brown comedian like Aziz Ansari will bristle at the thought of representing Islam but 
is still pointed to as “a model Muslim-American” in media interviews and pop culture colloquy.35 
 
32 Titus Molkenbur and Luke Cooper, “We the People? Dangers and Lessons for Europe on the Rise of 
the AfD in Germany” (LSE Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit, Another Europe is Possible, Europe 
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33 Donald J. Trump, “Donald J. Trump on Twitter: The Mayor of Tijuana, Mexico...,” Twitter (blog), 
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Kayla Wheeler aptly describes how the language of racialization seeks to move away 
from a Black/white binary, but in a U.S. context contributes unintentionally to further 
marginalization of Black people and Black Muslims specifically.36 By conceptualizing anti-
Muslim hostilities solely as anti-Muslim racism, the particularities of anti-Black racism, 
especially as it exists in other communities of color, are dispersed and flattened into the single, 
homogenized plane. The emphasis that the progressive consensus places on white supremacy as 
the primary social ill belies the realities that Black Muslims face from non-Muslims and other 
Muslims, as well, something I discuss in more depth in Chapter 5. The activist organization 
MuslimARC has worked this kind of awareness into their programming, developing toolkits on 
the Black Lives Matter movement and publishing papers that survey intra-Muslim ethnic 
relations across demographics in order to determine how issues of segregation and 
mosqued/unmosqued Muslims experience race within Muslim communities.37  
MuslimARC co-founder Namira Islam notes, however, that activist groups similar to her 
organization – those that work on issues of Muslim community empowerment and representation 
– do not. She detects a disproportionate presence of South Asian and Arab activist voices which 
visually undergirds the public charge that the category of Muslim is and must be Brown.38 
Within Muslim communities, these exchanges further reinforce the invention of Black Muslim 
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externality. “The effect of using Muslim as a cultural identity includes reifying South Asian and 
Arab hegemony in Muslim discourses,” says MuslimARC co-founder and Managing Director 
Margari Hill, “[T]he cultural category has resulted in the exclusion of Black Muslims in the 
discussion of Muslim civil liberties or the effects of Islamophobia.”39 Though it may seem 
strange to speak of anyone as a beneficiary of an oppressive discourse, it is the Brown Muslim 
that emerges as so legible that they are emblematic of the category itself. On the pop culture 
stage, legitimized by the progressive consensus, figures like Ansari, Minhaj, and Nanjiani – 
Brown South Asian men – stand for Islam. 
 
Rummaging Through the Remains 
 What, then, is Islam and who, then, is a Muslim if not just a racialized Brown subject? In 
this secular schema, Islam operates beyond private belief and a declaration of shahada – this 
alone would not foment social distress. It is not just a sticky corporeal construction either, for 
what then distinguishes Islam from race or ethnicity? Carl Ernst discerns a notable perplexity 
among the 8th and 9th century Arab conquerors when approached by their Syrian, Persian, and 
Egyptian subjects about conversion. “Many apparently considered that Islam was basically a 
religion for the Arabs, comparable to Judaism as an ethnically based faith. Conversion to Islam 
was initially only conceivable through the mechanism of adoption into Arab tribes.”40 This type 
of early categorical fluidity, along with its ostensible overlap with ethnicity, ritual practice, 
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linguistics, and sartorial markers, meant religious affiliation was historically dependent on 
multiple authenticating factors.  
Talal Asad’s consequential “discursive tradition” situated the object of Islam as being 
primarily driven by Islamic practices in the present which are understand by practitioners to be 
within a longer lineage of an Islamic past and future.41 These sensibilities and obligations are 
understood in relationship to other Muslim subjects with room for disagreement. Recognition of 
dynamic sociality, in combination with Shahab Ahmed’s notion of a “coherent dynamic of 
internal contradiction,” for me, fortifies a Muslim amalgam. Islam concurrently lives as a 
collection of experiences, a discursive tradition that comes together in recognition of each other 
despite the presence of outright contradiction, while also being embodied and felt by individuals 
that share in a Muslim sociality.42 
Less critical than a grand conceptualization of Islam, however, is what work this Muslim 
amalgam does for us as an analytical category beyond “identity,” as well as the ways that it is 
then staged for consumption in U.S. public square. In this location, the Muslim amalgam lives 
not as the hegemonic norm but as a hyper-detectable anxiety across the broader securitized state. 
Today in the U.S., the authenticating factors that make one appropriately Muslim under the 
secular state blend the racialized brown body with the political quietism of the progressive 
consensus and its ideal secular subject. The Aziz Ansaris, Hasan Minhajs, and Kumail Nanjianis 
of this world ascend thanks to their selection for more and more visible creative opportunities 
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that are underwritten by a constellation of obliging industry networks, each eager for the 
increasingly higher valuations they receive from association with an icon of multiculturalism. 
They are the type of Muslim worth upholding; a symbol of the institution’s self-avowed ethics 
and a publicly tradeable good. But, as Simone De Beauvoir deftly reasons, the language of public 
goods or the “general interest” are what society simply wishes to maintain or establish.43 Thus, 
when the HBO showrunner for Silicon Valley Alec Berg self-effacingly expresses that “it’s such 
a luxury, when you’re trying to write a character that feels grounded in reality, to be able to 
avoid drawing on stereotypes and instead just take Kumail out to lunch and say ‘Tell me about 
your life,’” the inveterate joke about Dinesh Chugtai that emerges from such a secular regime of 
humor is still always at the expense of his foreignness: accent, a penchant for gold jewelry, and 
familial curses.44  
If this is the outfit of the Muslim who fits, then what does this mean for the Muslim who 
does not? What happens to the Muslim who will not drink at “happy” hour, the Muslim woman 
for whom her hijab is not an aesthetic, the Muslim that does not think the joke is funny? What of 
the Muslim who is Black, whose affiliation with Islam offers what Youssef Carter calls “a 
unique form of marginalization,” compounded by the anti-Blackness they must face from those 
who call themselves spiritual kin and those who would certainly not?45 This Muslim chafes at the 
sides of the secular; she is an embodied resistance, subversive by virtue of her being. It would be 
easy, though circumspect, to merely read Ansari, Minhaj, and Nanjiani as her inverse; to read 
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their racialization as gainful and disciplinary despite the limits of its implementation. Is there 
room to be more capacious in our reading of these men? Can we hold their co-optation in one 
hand and the possibility for some form of resistance and activism in another? Can both be true, 
and is there anything Muslim about it?  
 
Affective Pleasure and the Order of Happiness 
 An answer lies in the affective dimension of humor and the pleasure and happiness it 
aims to produce. Sara Ahmed has described happiness as “a will, a wish, a want” in which the 
figure of the feminist openly struggles against and refutes the moral order of happiness.46 She is 
seen as “bringing others down,” getting “in the way,” or creating a “tense” atmosphere by 
bringing up topics like misogyny, racism, or homophobia, and becomes seen herself as a 
negative encounter: a killjoy. This moral order is described as authorizing happiness when 
aligned with the correct object. Misalignment emerges when one does not experience happiness 
from the right things, things like marriage or mothering. “Feminists are read as being unhappy, 
such that situations of conflict, violence, and power are read as about the unhappiness of 
feminists, rather than being what feminists are unhappy about.”47  
Such a double burden – of not only misattributing the source of unhappiness away from 
the actual object and instead having that unhappiness attributed to you – is a distant concern for 
Nanjiani, Minhaj, and Ansari. Once more, they are beneficiaries of an otherwise prejudicial logic 
due to their presentation as cisgender men and their chosen professions. They are comedians that 
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address social problems including feminism, but they are not perceived as killers of joy but 
rather as bringers of it. The sore subject itself is the source of joy, built up through a joke’s tense 
incline but then quickly released through laughter. The fast pace and lack of lingering on any 
given topic in a comedic routine additionally means the audience doesn’t have to sit in a 
discomfiting murk for longer than it takes to set the joke up and serve its punchline.  
Early in his Beta Male set, Kumail Nanjiani reflects on the first time he watched the 
horror film Freddy vs. Jason: 
There’s a part where Freddy has to choose between killing a white girl and killing a 
Black girl, and Freddy says, “How sweet, dark meat!” Yeah! And there’s a collective 
groan in the theater when I watched it. People were disappointed in Freddy Krueger. 
Like, we’re okay with you murdering children with your needle gloves, but racism? 
You’re making it very hard to cheer for you, Freddy Krueger. Now we want Jason to 
win. Mass-murdering monster, but he’s no bigot!48 
 
This joke does several things in the span of the 75 seconds it takes to deliver it. Nanjiani voices 
himself, Freddy Krueger, and the offended moviegoers. As himself, Nanjiani communicates his 
own dismay in response to Krueger’s “dark meat” pronouncement with a wide-eyed and 
disbelieving “yeah!” as his viewers laughs incredulously. Nanjiani establishes himself as on the 
“right” side of the issue before slipping into his personification of the affronted audience 
member, pouting smugly with narrowed, judgmental eyes. His exaggerated performance 
lampoons the absurdity of caring about racism in something ostensibly as fantastical as a horror 
movie – the furthest thing from real life. What this does on the backend, however, is diminish the 
very real and endemic racism written into scripts and found across writers’ rooms to board rooms 
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across Hollywood. Black characters in film are written as so peripheral to the main plot that they 
are dispensable, usually as the first to perish in the horror genre.49  
At the same time, the brisk tempo of a comedy routine means that Nanjiani can speak of 
and name the presence of racism in American culture over and over, returning his audience to the 
topic and compelling their recognition of it over the course of each joke’s ephemeral life. During 
his seven minute and thirty second monologue on Saturday Night Live, Nanjiani obliges a 
captive, mostly white audience to consider anti-Muslim hostility and its victims from four 
different perspectives in rapid-fire succession: its recent resurgence, a fantasy scenario of saving 
someone who was racist towards him, whether Islam has anything to do with the ban on women 
driving, and the difficult misattribution of Islam to Sikhs.50  
Hasan Minhaj’s Homecoming King is set up in a similar fashion, where the frequent “cut 
to” jokes splice otherwise painful recollections of hate crimes after 9/11, the “collateral damage” 
of death among Black Americans, and the rejection he suffered at the hands of bigots “even as 
they were smiling at you.”51 Minhaj descends deeply into such affective wells, but the dives are 
made possible because of how quickly he re-emerges with a smile on his face and a joke at the 
ready. Observe the parabolic vault in the following: 
I wish I could tell 18-year-old me, “Hey, man, don’t let this experience define you. It’s 
good people and bad people. Irrespective of creed, class, color, find those people. 
Because love is bigger than fear.” I wish I could tell him that. I really believe that. Fox 
News has taught me that. Fox News is incredible. I’ve never seen so many people with 
spray tans hate people of color. It is amazing. And Fox News is in New York. They’re in 
New York. Daily Show, Fox News, five avenues away from each other. That’s it. 
Professor X, Magneto, that close. Every day I walk past their building during lunch. I’ll 
see all the employees, Hannity, Coulter, O’Reilly, leave their building, cross the street, 
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walk past me, and line up for halal chicken and rice. I’m like, “Uh, Racist Randy wants 
that red sauce!” Your brain can be racist, but your body will just betray you. I love that so 
much. All morning, they’re like, “Mexicans! All lives matter! Arabs... 12:01! Shawarma 
time!” I love that so much. And I wish I could tell 18-year-old me that, but I can’t.52  
 
It is worth reiterating how very gendered a privilege it is to pierce the moral order of 
happiness without the personal liability of killing joy. Hannah Gadsby’s comedy special Nanette 
has a remarkably similar tenor and format to Homecoming King. A commentary on sexual 
trauma and self-preservation, Gadsby delivers clever high-wire jokes throughout her set, often at 
her own expense, amid a descent into her own debilitating history of damage and the damage 
that men inflict on her and other women. She takes aim at homophobes, hecklers, wife-beaters, 
Van Gogh, and Picasso, among others (“Picasso suffered the mental illness of misogyny. Split 
the room, didn’t I?... Because if you hate what you desire, do you know what that is? Fucking 
tense! Sort your shit out!”).53 The story of Nanette, unlike Minhaj’s Homecoming King, does not 
so cleanly abide by the dictates of the progressive consensus. Gadsby holds her genre to account 
– the supposedly liberal bastion of standup comedy where only funny matters – but concludes 
that, as an institution, it cannot be redeemed from its disciplinary grip. 
I don’t feel very comfortable in it anymore. Over the past year, I’ve been questioning it, 
and reassessing… I built a career out of self-deprecating humor. That’s what I’ve built 
my career on. And I don’t want to do that anymore. Do you understand what self-
deprecation means when it comes from somebody who already exists in the margins? It’s 
not humility. It’s humiliation. I put myself down in order to speak, in order to seek 
permission to speak. And I simply will not do that anymore. Not to myself or anybody 
who identifies with me.54 
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At the same time, Gadsby ends her show with an adamant refusal to indulge her anger despite 
fervently feeling it: “Anger is a tension. It is a toxic, infectious… And it knows no other purpose 
than to spread blind hatred, and I want no part of it.”55  
Minhaj, on the other hand, verbally relishes in his vehement investment in America and 
the American dream. “I actually have the audacity of equality. I’m like, ‘I’m in Honors Gov, I 
have it right here. Life, liberty, pursuit of happiness. All men created equal.’ It says it right here, 
I’m equal. I’m equal. I don’t deserve this. [applause]”56 These two specials premiered on Netflix 
a little more than a year apart. Both were awarded the prestigious Peabody Award for 
Entertainment. The A.V. Club, a popular entertainment review site, called Minhaj’s special is 
“hilarious and spell-binding” (complete with pulled quotes of his best one-liners) while Gadsby’s 
was said to “boil [sic] with real anger” into a “free fall.”57 Audience appraisals, below, were even 
more starkly dissonant.58 
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Gadsby’s humor, despite its routine presence throughout the special, is illegible and goes 
unacknowledged by such viewers. Her whiteness and other secular bonafides do not aid her here; 
Figure 2: Screenshot of YouTube comments below the trailer for Hannah Gadsby’s “Nanette,” on April 
7, 2020. 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of YouTube comments below the trailer for Hasan Minhaj’s “Homecoming King,” 
on April 7, 2020. 
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jokes at the direct expense of men make her a feminist killjoy. Minhaj, though, is both a 
purveyor of truth who maintain his comedic chops despite the dives into solemn realities. His 
masculine presence, coupled with his confirmatory politics, authorize the grievances he presents 
as legitimate. Minhaj does not challenge the being of whiteness or the being of masculinity – 
neither, on their own, are ever portrayed as oppressive or as fundamental to the systemized 
oppressions he cites in his comedy. In fact, he affirms such states of being through an appeal to 
their idealized better angels as they are documented through the legal enshrinement of principles 
like equality, free speech, and diversity.  
Gadsby’s act presents a politic of disavowal – the systems themselves, she says, are 
irredeemable in the form they were originally conceived, and no piecemeal attempts at inclusion 
will change that. Departure – from the rules of comedy and patriarchy - are the only way to 
maintain dignity. “This tension, it’s yours. I am not helping you anymore. You need to learn 
what this feels like. To the men in the room… Pull your fucking socks up! How humiliating! 
Fashion advice from a lesbian!”59 This severe accountability, in combination with Gadsby’s 
presentation as a queer woman, illegitimate both her and her comedic craft within the moral 
order of happiness. Her embodied and vocal challenge to what has been made essential to the 
being of masculinity preclude her from proper subjecthood. Her humor is illegible because white 
masculinity does not find reprieve. Gadsby is not a “happiness-cause;” she is its killer.60 In 
comparing the reception of Minhaj and Gadsby’s work, I wonder about the possibility of 
reconciliation. Can we accept the “bad” (read: power-conscious accountability) message from a 
“good” (read: compliant) subject, even when he has arrived to us by way of a deeply flawed 
 
59 Olb and Parry, Nanette. 
60 Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness, 20. 
133 
 
vehicle – built by patriarchy, secularity, and the progressive consensus – that enabled the 
legibility of both himself and his “bad” message? Can happiness simultaneously raise 
consciousness? Can moral rectitude be inflected with joy and pleasure? 
 
An Ethic of Affect 
The example of the Prophet Muhammad, as portrayed by Ze’ev Maghen, would certainly 
indicate so. He and the first generation of Muslims in his circle are remembered and recorded for 
their extensive range of human qualities: kindness, despair, rage, and joy, “swinging back and 
forth between laughter and tears” as they contemplated the material conditions of this world and 
how their human tread on it would influence the next.61 Muhammad preached about the intensely 
grave – the Day of Judgment and the afterlife, war and revolution in their present – but this, 
Maghen concludes, was part of a broader method of balance and well-rounded living meant to 
influence those that came after him. “Refresh the heart from time to time!” he exclaimed.62 His 
characteristic levity and solemnity made Muhammad a more humanized paragon, where 
depending on how he directed his passion, could result in bouts of serious anxiety or frolicsome 
humor. The social and political inequalities he saw extracted both affective responses from him. 
I am cautious about falling into the frame of Islamic authentication by relying on 
prophetic example. I am relying on an authentication facilitated by Muhammad’s masculinity, 
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his Arabic, or his Arabness. That said, to pursue seriously and find guidance from affect and 
emotion like Muhammad’s points towards a Muslim ethic that is also decidedly feminist.63 
Madeleine Elfenbein similarly recognizes the pragmatism that comes with using the label 
“Muslim” to refer to an unwieldly and inconsistent whole like Islam. She writes: “The expressly 
political nature of Islam’s ideals—its standards for the just distribution of power and goods, its 
protocols for collective decision-making and dispute resolution, its continually evolving set of 
practices for realizing divine justice on earth, and its ability to sanction the disruption of existing 
political structures in pursuit of that justice—are central to its power to inspire.”64 Robert Orsi 
sees the importance of such religious idioms emanating not from their essential place in one’s 
being, but in their lived utility; as needed, “invented, taken, borrowed, and improvised.”65 The 
emphasis on utility through sociality, solidarity, and justice as a governing analytic for the 
category of Islam melds well with the affective joy and comfort that acts of humor evoke. If we 
take being a “merry man” as walking along the path of this prophetic example, where humor 
serves not only at the pleasure of a disciplinary system that wishes to contain it, but instead 
orients itself towards justice in this world, are Minhaj, Nanjiani, and Ansari producing and 
giving utility to non-identitarian Muslim humor? I cautiously venture to say yes, though not 
always, and certainly not in the same ways for each of these men.  
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The Muslim Synecdoche, “Feeling Seen,” and Being Enough 
We have established that the world that Ansari, Nanjiani, and Minhaj move through and 
perform in is overt in its hostility towards Muslims. A joke, a bit, or a story that bears witness to 
the injury that Muslims sustain from that violence is an act of mixed agency on the part of the 
comedian, a spurt of critique that comes to fruition through their overall alignment with the 
secular regimes of humor. For a Muslim viewer, these bursts of pleasure are also bursts of 
comfort and an affective respite that emerge out of the experience of sharing in Muslim 
marginality. Because they emerge despite being subjected to the power endemic to regimes of 
humor, I would argue that jokes that subvert the notion of an inherent Muslim sedition or 
violence – even while leaving the broader hegemonic discourses that enable them intact – qualify 
as a middling practice of Muslim resistance against such overt anti-Muslim hostilities.  
This low-stakes subversion has linked up with the increasingly pervasive language of 
diversity and representation, another mainstreamed political goal of the progressive consensus 
structure that is utilized both by activists outside the entertainment industry as well as in the 
ways that studios and media platforms market themselves. “Diverse” audiences have long been 
conceptualized predominantly through the capitalist-oriented mode of consumer spending power, 
but the last several years have seen entertainment and media studios responding to the call for 
greater representation by affixing themselves to the affective reactions of their audiences. Films 
like Black Panther and Crazy Rich Asians were heralded principally for their representation of 
long-beleaguered communities of color. In particular, the sensory grammar of “being seen” and 
“feeling seen” has emerged as a primary idiom through which viewers respond to expanding 




In his 2010 special Intimate Moments for a Sensual Evening, Ansari presciently remarks 
on this impulse: 
I was doing an interview once and the guy said, you must be psyched by all this Slumdog 
Millionaire stuff. And I was like, “Um, yeah! I am! I have no idea why, though, as I had 
NOTHING to do with that movie!” It’s just that some people who kinda look like me are 
in it, and everyone loved it and it won some Oscars and stuff. And then I was like, “woah, 
woah, woah, are white people just psyched ALL THE TIME? It’s like, Back to the Future 
– that’s us! Godfather – that’s us! Godfather Part 2 – that’s us! Departed – that’s us! 
Sunset Boulevard – that’s us! Citizen Kane – that’s us! Jaws – that’s us! Every fucking 
movie BUT Slumdog Millionaire and Boyz n the Hood is us!”66 
 
While he may not have been able to place his finger on why he felt psyched, Ansari portended a 
phenomenon that would come to define subsequent demands for greater diversity in front and 
behind studio cameras. Social media users in the years since have lauded Minhaj, Nanjiani, and 
Ansari – in that order of frequency – for their comedy and the ways that the content of those 
performances speaks to the viewer’s personal experiences. In August of 2017, Netflix launched a 
social media campaign titled #TheFirstTimeISawMe in an attempt to showcase strides towards 
inclusive media (by showcasing those found on their own platform).67 As a hashtag, it gained 
traction with a flood of responses on Twitter. “#FirstTimeISawMe Aziz Ansari in Parks & Rec. 
Small brown dude who was kinda funny,” said Twitter user Rothnik.68 “#FirstTimeISawMe was 
watching @hasanminhaj’s Homecoming King. An Indian-American who speaks his native 
tongue, fearless against prejudice,” wrote Abhas Misraraj.69 “The small pox scar joke in THE 
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BIG SICK,” Murtada Elfadl added. “@kumailn wrote a very specific anectode, happens only to 
children of the diaspora #FirstTimeISawMe.”70 In one of the slicker promotions for the 
campaign, Netflix interviewed Revolt TV host Amrit Singh and posted the video online; in it he 
raves with sincere admiration for the work of Ansari and Minhaj:  
The first time I saw me… I think about people like Aziz Ansari and Hasan Minhaj who have done 
so much... Aziz has done so much to not just be a face for Indians on TV... he’s really taken these 
issues on. He’s Indian. He’s a brown dude and American. And that’s kind of what we are. We’re 
multidimensional people. If I was 15-year-old me, coming up now, and I could see people like 
Aziz and Hasan, I’d feel like anything was possible. And that’s what these guys are doing. They’re 
heroes for it. I salute them.71 
 
Even beyond this Netflix-led campaign, users on the site still surface every so often to tag 
Minhaj, Ansari, or Nanjiani directly in order to express gratitude for the affective joy of “feeling 
seen” that their comedy has given them. “This week I read big-name magazine profiles of both 
@azizansari and @kumailn,” exclaimed Maha Atal. “I feel seen.” Another user, Asal Helmsly, 
thanked Kumail Nanjiani for “making entertainment that makes people feel seen, heard, and 
understood.”72 Minhaj, however, takes the lion’s share when it comes to the 
#representationmatters crowd. A quick search on Twitter reveals an unending scroll of elated 
audience relatability to Homecoming King and Patriot Act in particular: 
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There are two sensory idioms operative in this context: the desired and satiated “feeling” of a 
double-pronged gaze that “sees” the viewer. This gaze is simultaneously the gaze of the 
performer who bears resemblance to the viewer while also constituting the gaze of the 
hegemonic secular subject that – were it not for this platform and the time spent on it – would 
otherwise dismiss them as incorrect or an illegibility. Being “seen” offers a stand-alone reprieve 
Figure 3: Screenshot of Twitter search terms “feel so seen” and “@hasanminhaj” 
taken on April 10, 2020. 
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in the form of visibility that for once is not as a racialized anxiety but a glow of legibility and 
tacit-approval. “Watching Hasan Minhaj on The Daily Show and on tour brings me more than a 
few laughs; they give me a sense of comfort,” enthused The Tempest staff writer Nelly Kaakaty. 
“I know that our stories and experiences are in the hands of someone who gets it, someone who 
understands what it means to be a part of a marginalized group, and someone who is impacted by 
it every day.”73 There is a desire to see one’s own perspectives mirrored back from the screen, 
but there is an even greater desire for one’s hegemon to see, consume, and value that perspective, 
as well.  
 Making theoretical sense of this sensory grammar becomes all the more demanding when 
conceding that, despite my own misgivings about the limitations, sacrifices, and shape-shifting 
that go into these cultural productions of humor, I too share in the affective pleasure of Nanjiani, 
Minhaj, and Ansari’s visibility and comedy. I initially gave serious consideration to whether this 
was simply an attempt to demonstrate empathy towards my subjects in the face of my own 
disagreement with the political work they see their comedy doing. But how would that explain 
the gust of sincere joy I felt beam across my face as I watched Kumail Nanjiani – in front of the 
suited Brad Pitts and Martin Scorseses of Hollywood – say that “Now, straight white dudes can 
watch movies starring me and you can relate to that. It’s not that hard. I’ve done it my whole 
life”?74 Why did I cheer out loud, alone in front of my TV? Why, as Aziz Ansari stepped out on 
the SNL stage and mused, “The day after Trump’s inauguration… Pretty cool to know, though, 
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he’s probably at home right now watching a brown guy make fun of him though, right?”75 did I 
feel an intense affinity for this person whom I don’t normally like? Why did I watch the entire 
monologue? Why did I seek out the literati’s commentary about his performance across the 
internet the next day? Was this “feeling so seen”? 
It is not because these comedians are committing radical acts of resistance. The vision 
offered by these comedians is not visionary; there are no declarative calls for emancipation or 
even a reformist re-imagining of the orders that be. Yet as those “highly civilized human beings” 
buzzard above, listless at the presence of Muslim subjects below, the brief entertainment and 
recognition provided by one of those Muslim subjects is also a brief victory for the rest. There is 
room in our scholarly study to stretch what may be considered “subversive” as it pertains to the 
resistory power to jostle ever so slightly, with a smile and laugh, preserving the self through a 
cover of shared marginality that ensures some visibility over none. The humor performed by 
Nanjiani, Minhaj, and Ansari darken the contours of such a middling category as it pushes the 
needle ever so slightly, driven by an ethical instinct that – when done in the name of preserving 
Muslim subjecthood and sociality in some small corner of the secular modern – points to a 
Muslim ethic that drives their aptly named Muslim humor. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides examples of how the progressive consensus and its hyper-focus on 
the racialized subject contains the political possibility within his comedic output and messaging. 
For Ansari, Minhaj, and Nanjiani the expanded platform to openly perform as Muslim limits 
their performances to the strictures of secular debate and loyalty, particularly with regards to 
 
75 Ansari, “Aziz Ansari Saturday Night Live Monologue.” 
141 
 
racism, homophobia, and feminism. This racialized sociality limits the categorization of Islam in 
the public sphere to Brown Muslims at the expense of Black Muslims, while also delegitimizing 
and reinscribing engagements with theology, belief, and ritual practice as foreign, anti-modern, 
and outside the bounds of proper secular subjecthood. Conceiving of humor through an ethic of 
joy and affective pleasure pushes back against these prescribed by accounting for and preserving 








CHAPTER 5: EMBODIED HISTORIES AND COUNTER SCRIPTING THE RIGHT 
MUSLIM MAN 
 
Can’t get married, can’t have sex, so they blow things up. 
 
- Mark Juergensmeyer1 
 
Introduction 
Standup comedy is, of course, an embodied performance. Before any given act, a comic 
has prepared carefully penned jokes as part of an even more carefully storyboarded set. Every 
beat, every reference, every callback, every personable tangent, and every break to “work the 
crowd” is calculated and choreographed for minute and mileage. The humor of a joke, however, 
does not exist simply because the words have been written. Sticking the landing – being funny – 
depends entirely on how those words are staged, performed by a body already inscribed with 
imperiled meaning. How do we understand religion, secularism, gender, and cultural critique 
with and through bodies such as these? 
With that, the following chapter contracts in its focus but expands in its scope. Here, I 
attend directly to the Muslim body, its aesthetics, and its comportment as they are cultivated 
through medieval, colonial, and neocolonial discourses of the Muslim Man. These embodied 
histories go on to produce the corporeal realities and fantasies that Hasan Minhaj, Kumail 
Nanjiani, and Aziz Ansari enact in their comedy. The Muslimness that inheres to their bodies is 
historically tied to sexual deviance in the early premodern era, a characterization that finds 
 




continuation in the form of fantastical stories meant to inspire fear and dread associated with a 
specific geography.2 This “terrifying” Muslim, when confronted by the capital-driven, anti-
immigrant imaginaries, is a site of containment and control, further pathologized in the name of 
secularity and rationalized security.3 These men both challenge and preserve that secularity by 
engaging with the frames of duality of an otherwise singularly-named Muslim masculinity: 
concomitantly hypersexual and violent or desexed and deprived, but always improperly sexual. 
This contradiction has roots in the colonial masculinities and gender normativities that are made 
and remade under the aegis of British colonialism in India, in addition to the Black-white binary 
and “yellow peril” within American racial logics during Jim Crow through the present day.4  
While contemporary American scholarship tends towards studying the Muslim figure by 
way of the touchstone of Cold War-era violence, terrorism, and the leadup/fall out to 9/11, 
Muslim bodies carry histories that long predate the commonly-ascribed birthdate of September 
11, 2001. This chapter seeks to engage these embodied histories and narratives from a longer, 
transnational perspective that recognizes the sustained historical encounters between the 
expanding projects of Euroamerican empire and the peoples that were eclipsed in its name. The 
 
2 Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2017), 1-13. 
3 See Junaid Akram Rana, Terrifying Muslims : Race and Labor in the South Asian Diaspora (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2011), 63-65; Kumarini Silva, Brown Threat: Identification in the Security State 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 155-158. 
4 While I discuss the cultivation of these sensibilities in greater detail throughout the remainder of the 
chapter, the following works have been particularly instructive in piecing together cohesive histories and 
their entanglements. See Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity : The “manly Englishman” and the 
“Effeminate Bengali” in the Late Nineteenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); 
Rana, Terrifying Muslims : Race and Labor in the South Asian Diaspora; Ida B. Wells, Southern Horrors 
and Other Writings; The Anti-Lynching Campaign of Ida B. Wells, 1892-1900 (Boston: Bedford/St. 
Martin’s, 1996); Gary Okihiro, Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in American History and Culture 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014); Dorothy E. Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, 
Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New York: Vintage Books, 1999). 
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bodily recognition of these histories manifests in how these men position themselves against 
each other and the specter of the “terrifying” Muslim. 
 
Medieval Scripts of Essential Muslim Being 
 Numerous scholars, including Carl Ernst and Kecia Ali, have catalogued the criticisms of 
Islam focused on the Prophet Muhammad, who – through his biography, social interactions, 
political decision-making, and personal penchants – signified the original Muslim man and 
authentic Islam within premodern Christian polemics.5 Ernst notes a keen emphasis on 
Muhammad’s military conquests and marriages in these writings. Any theological sincerity or 
spiritual appeal that Islam might have had among populations where Islam spread to was 
disregarded as sole political ambition and avarice on the part of the Prophet.6 His marriage to 
multiple wives was considered indulgent lust and sensuality, though Kecia Ali reports that the 
focus tended towards the total number of women he married and thus had sex with, in addition to 
the nature of his marriage to Zaynab, who had once been wed to Muhammad’s adopted son 
Zayd. Only later in the early 20th century did criticism of his marriage to Aisha at the age of nine 
– still an indication of his sexual impropriety – invite attention.7 As Enlightenment-era ideas 
spread among those concerned with Islam in Europe, popular discourses maintained their 
 
5 Such a description does not emerge entirely on its own, of course, as doctrinal references to the Prophet, 
particularly within Sufi metaphysics, uphold him as “al-insan al-kamil,” the perfect person. Perhaps most 
prominently, this reference can be found in the text Bezels of Wisdom by Ali ibn Al-’Arabi, who couples 
this person with the broader philosophy of the unity of existence (wahdat al-wujud). See Masataka 
Takeshita, “The Theory of the Perfect Man in Ibn ‘Arabi’s Fusus Al-Hikam,” Orient 19 (1983): 87–102. 
6 Carl W. Ernst, Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World (University of 
North Carolina Press, 2003), 13-17. 
7 Kecia Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam : Feminist Reflections on Qur’an, Hadith, and Jurisprudence 
(London: Oneworld, 2010), 136.  
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concentration on continuing to reveal Muhammad as a charlatan; his political rapacity was 
otherwise concealed in the language of piety while he openly flaunted his deviant sexual 
proclivities. Humphrey Prideaux’s 1697 The True Nature of Imposture, Fully Displayed in the 
Life of Mahomet returns frequently to the topic of Muhammad’s carnal interest, positing that “to 
have the sovereignty over his country, to gratify his ambition and as many women as he pleased 
to satiate his lust, was what he aimed at, and to gain himself a party for the composing of this, 
was the grand Design of that new Religion which he invented.”8 
 
Colonial Taxonomies 
 As colonial ventures into South and Southwest Asia escalated and put down roots, an 
emergent class of Orientalist literature grew in tandem so as to understand these native subjects 
and how best to restructure, manipulate, and ultimately incorporate them into the broader 
imperial apparatus. Because of this, Orientalists of the 18th and 19th centuries shifted away from 
the enterprise of pontificating on any single scion of Islam. Instead, their reflections 
conceptualized the homo islamicus and his “Muslim mind” as a subject of resolute difference, 
unadaptable to modernity and arrested in their political, social, and cultural development.9 This, 
coupled with an environmental determinism that saw the harsh, unforgiving, and violent desert 
climate as producing a similarly harsh, unforgiving, and violent man who can only comprehend 
the tenors of aggression and brutality. Romantic Orientalism, observes Sophia Arjana, adjusted 
this image into “the wild, unrestrained behavior exhibited by Muslim villains,” and demonstrated 
 
8 Minou Reeves and P. J. Stewart, Muhammad in Europe: A Thousand Years of Western Myth-Making 
(NYU Press, 2003), 160. 
9 Sophia Rose. Arjana, Muslims in the Western Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 9. 
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both a compulsive lure and repulsion to the Muslim figure that remained fixed on his aberrant 
sexuality.10 Those fears attached themselves directly onto “imaginative bodies” that enabled 
exploiting material conditions and human labor throughout colonial outposts worldwide. 
Mahmood Mamdani remarks plainly that European imperialism sought to ultimately rid the 
world of such subjects in service to the future of civilization. This was a “biologically necessary 
process which, according to the laws of nature, leads to the inevitable destruction of lower 
races.”11 
 That the lower races may strike back was not readily apparent until the mid-17th century 
when the 1857 Rebellion commenced. An event that stretched across the Gangetic Plain in north 
and central India, the Rebellion marked a watershed moment for European configurations of the 
Muslim. This body politic was uniformly united in their resentment and capacity to turncoat. 
Any loyalty to the crown could easily be annihilated with one call from the Ottomans that lay 
East, wrote Viceroy Lord Lytton in 1876: “If three Turks from Constantinople landed in Bombay 
with a message from the Sultan Commanding the Faithful in this country to declare a jehad 
against the British Government, our most loyal Mohamedans would obey the order.”12 Ilyse 
Morgenstein Fuerst surmises that early forms of Muslim racialization and minoritization 
coagulated in these years after the Rebellion. The homogenously embodied traits of religious 
fanaticism and violence were attributed in real-time and in the aftermath of 1857 by British 
officials, scholars, and the general public. Nominal power residing in the hands of the remaining 
 
10 Arjana, Muslims in the Western Imagination, 9. 
11 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim : America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror 
(New York: Doubleday Press, 2004), 6. 
12 John Ferris, “‘The Internationalism of Islam’: The British Perception of a Muslim Menace, 1840-1951,” 
Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 1 (2009): 57-77, 60. 
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Mughal rulers was quickly jettisoned through a concerted exclusion from administrative jobs, 
most of which went instead to particular Hindu classes of Brahmins. The Muslim’s racialization 
followed a parallel and sometimes intersecting trajectory with the racialization of Hindus. 
Morgenstein Fuerst argues that for Hindus, this racialization relied on the caricatures of racial 
weakness and religious sensitivity. The aim of this corresponding racialization, however, was to 
explain why Hindus were necessarily susceptible to the wiles of the truly unruly and disloyal 
subject: the Muslim.13 Their characterization of violence and recalcitrance towards Christian and 
“secular” sensibilities was further reinscribed by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the prominent Indian 
Muslim loyalist and the first to be knighted by Queen Victoria. In his rejoinder to British 
bureaucrat W.W. Hunter’s Indian Musalmans; Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel Against 
the Queen?, Khan cedes the realm of normativity to Hunter despite his vehement disagreement. 
His defensive point-by-point refutations continue to utilize the same stakes, terminology, and 
frameworks laid out by his British adversary without problematizing their function and 
legitimacy. Khan’s engagement “within his [Hunter’s] legal landscapes” ultimately upheld a 
discourse that produced Muslims as racialized.14 
 
Colonial Masculinities 
 Mrinalini Sinha contends that the colonial cliché of sectarian “types,” i.e. an effeminate 
Hindu juxtaposed against the pugnacious Muslim, proliferated across surveys, census reports, 
and scholarly handbooks written for British administrators by a burgeoning class of Orientalists. 
 
13 Ilyse R. Morgenstein Fuerst, Indian Muslim Minorities and the 1857 Rebellion : Religion, Rebels, and 
Jihad (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 5. 
14 Morgenstein Fuerst, Indian Muslim Minorities, 124.  
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The production of these texts was part of an “ensemble of political, economic, and administrative 
imperatives that underpinned the strategies of colonial rule in the late 19th century.”15 In 
concurrence with Morgenstein Fuerst’s assessment of the 1857 Rebellion, Sinha notes British 
appeal to the concept of racial equality without the actual broadening of native participation in 
government administration. Rationalized on gendered terms, the masculinity of Indians was 
depicted as either excessive or deficient – never on par with the “correctly” masculine 
Englishman. Native elite Hindus were agential partners in the formation of this discourse as it 
provided them with a means to pursue power and authority, defining themselves as more modern 
and manly than the traditional aristocracy. Sinha reports that in 1883, the introduction of the 
Ilbert Bill sparked a “White Mutiny” due to its proposed narrow expansion of judicial 
responsibilities to Indian judges.16 This meant, effectively, that Indians could preside over the 
court proceedings of European settlers, both men and women. White mutineers insisted on the 
need to benevolently protect white women colonists from the “unmanly” Indian babu (clerk) 
who had neglected his “own” Indian women. Among Muslims, grand narratives of civilizational 
decline were tied to the neglect that Muslim men gave to their own corporeal regiments. Abdus 
Salam’s treatise on Physical Education in India from 1895 lamented the waning bodily strength 
of Muslims but, according to Joseph Alter, “may be taken as a more general statement on the 
condition of all ‘Westernized’ Indians”: 
In contrast with this brilliant past as regards physical vigour and manliness, the lack of 
physical energy which now more or less characterises the Mahomedans [sic} in India 
stands out in bold relief. Our one-sided Western education, so far . . . has acted with us 
like a bad liver: it is making us assimilate what has to be rejected of the Western import, 
and reject what has to be assimilated. We are rapidly parting with our own national ways 
and manners.... In the case of a few here and there, there might be visible some surface 
 
15 Sinha, Colonial Masculinity, 3. 
16 Sinha, Colonial Masculinity, 33-36. 
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Western polish, but it is no more than skin deep; the result being that whilst the sweet 
guilelessness and gentle suavity of the East is absent, the genuine sturdiness and 
masculine straightforwardness of the West is also wanting.17 
 
The British taxonomies of effeminate Hindus, dutiful Sikhs, and seditious Muslims were not 
static, Sinha repeatedly points out, and they bled into one another from location to location. 
There was, for example, similar concern that the Muslims of Bengal were also growing too 
effeminate – an important distinction from femininity, it was the active process of emasculation 
which was to be decried. The common denominator of irregular native masculinity, extreme in 
some fashion depending on religion or geography or some combination of both, said less about 
the elaborate system of categorization put in place than it did about the colonial consolidation of 
power: classifying the native “types” better enabled their discipline and assimilation. The 
formation of improper sexuality, when imposed on the Indian subject (Muslim or Hindu), 
indicates that racialization did not follow a distinct and solitary course. Overlaps in the 
racialization of Muslim and Hindu Indians exposed a nexus on the issue of masculinity, where 
sexual difference signaled ineligibility for self-governance and communal agency. Ashis Nandy 
sees Gandhi’s – and in due course India’s – success sprout out of a growing disinterest in 
synchronizing with the “manly” Englishman’s masculinity. In their refusal to engage with the 
paradigm of colonial masculinity, a new frame of reference emerged in which “the oppressed do 
not seem weak, degraded and distorted men trying to break the monopoly of the rulers on a fixed 
quantity of machismo.”18 This, Nandy reasons, oversaw the rise of non-cooperation with crown 
rule in the 20th century. 
 
17 Joseph S. Alter, “Celibacy, Sexuality, and the Transformation of Gender into Nationalism in North 
India,” The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 1 (1994): 45-66, 55-56. 
18 Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 177. 
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Oriental Commodities and the Threat of Black Virility 
 Notions of colonial masculinity were not curbed by geographic borders, something scores 
of Muslim peddlers from South Asia would find out upon reaching U.S. shores. These patterns 
were in fact shared, with differing valences, among white populations across the Atlantic. Men 
primarily from vicinities of East and West Bengal, but also Punjab, Kashmir, and the Northwest 
Frontier, made their way to the United States in the early 1900s and became willing participants 
in the romanticized perceptions of the “Oriental” as they sold silks and other “exotic” consumer 
goods to leisure-seeking Americans across the eastern seaboard and gulf coast.19 Their initial 
arrival to the U.S. was already mired in deeply gendered perceptions of their innate masculine 
inadequacies. Supposed physical “weakness” was reason enough for British shipping companies 
to hire multiple Indian men (at a lower rate) than a single European man. Positions in the ship’s 
saloon and among catering crews were commonly called “women’s work” and given to these 
“less capable” workers. Illness among Indians was quickly attributed to a “lack of stamina” and 
served as confirmation of their overall inferiority.20  
Upon arrival, the dark skin – and seeming Black adjacency - of Bengali men made their 
assessment in the eyes of the restrictive immigration regime unpredictable and inconsistent, 
Vivek Bald argues.21 Their integration into Black working class neighborhoods, often also 
marrying Black women, allowed them to initially elude the open hostility practiced towards 
“Asiatic” laborers in the late 1800s (though that would change with the 1917 Immigration Act). 
 
19 Vivek Bald, Bengali Harlem and the Lost Histories of South Asian America (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2012), 6. 
20 Bald, Bengali Harlem, 105. 
21 Bald, Bengali Harlem, 52-53. 
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Within the operative racial binary of the U.S., these men worked to ply white fantasies about a 
blurry Orient that included India and extended into East Asia. Americans were “unmoored from 
the daily exercise of colonial power,” unlike their British contemporaries, and the Orientalist 
notions they circulated were primarily in terms of entertainment; an aesthetic to be displayed and 
consumed.22  
Despite mostly being Muslim, the South Asian peddlers, along with Hindus, Sikhs, and 
other religious minorities of the subcontinent, came to be characterized as “Hindoos” by way of 
an overriding embodied/sartorial likeness. The uniform put on by merchants played up and off of 
the Orientalist imagination of mystics and wisemen: “clean-cut features and intellectual faces” 
accompanied a “queer costume” of “turbans or embroidered fezes” that carried “a pack on the 
back weighing many hundred pounds, consisting of gorgeous East Indian and Oriental stuffs.”23 
When this uniform was donned by African Americans across the segregated U.S. South, Bald 
observes, it had utility in temporarily crossing the color line, to “pass” not as white, but as 
something not entirely legible within the hegemonic Black/white binary in order to access better 
jobs and housing accommodations.  
 The end of Jim Crow and anti-miscegenation laws oversaw a selective dejure re-ordering 
of racial constructions and the dramatic re-entry of religion into U.S. politics. Nonetheless, white 
supremacy and its race hierarchies remained formal and informal features of institutions like 
immigration, urban development, education, and kinship networks. The anxious need to protect 
white women, in particular, is a racialized fear that extends back historically beyond the figure of 
a foreign male other. American mythology has long held the Black body as sexually deviant and 
 
22 Bald, Bengali Harlem, 17-18. 
23 Bald, Bengali Harlem, 39. 
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degenerate. This mythology was lent further authority during the scientifically sanctioned racism 
of the 19th century, where biological variants determined “natural” superiorities and inferiorities.  
 This logic maintained that the Black body inherits its predestination, whereby “preserving 
racial distinctions required policing reproduction.”24 The Black woman, as Dorothy Roberts 
shows, is therefore viewed not just as the progenitor of the genetic impairment but as also 
imparting a lifestyle of sexual deviancy and immorality that follows Black men through 
childhood into their adult lives. Jim Crow-era authors like Philip Bruce bemoaned Black men’s 
regression back into their original immoral state after the abolition of slavery, undisciplined now 
without the watchful and disciplinary eye of white slaveholders.25 Original immorality was 
perceived as a potent sexual promiscuity that placed white women of the day in open danger of 
rape by Black men. Such hyper-virility was not a problem when directed towards Black women, 
as they too were considered ravenous in their desire for sex. The bellicose need to protect the 
progenitors of “correct” sexuality proliferated the American South in the form of lynching of 
both Black men and women.  
 Ida B. Wells remains the decisive source on how this institutionalized practice of terror 
invoked the myth of bestial brutes preying on white female victims in order to retain, curb, 
control, and disenfranchise Black American populations. In Southern Horrors, written at the end 
of the 19th century, she documented how the insinuation of sexual violence against white women 
cajoled easy Northern sympathy for the South’s “necessity” of lynching, demonstrating how 
effectively a call to defend white women’s honor could diminish or even justify widespread and 
 
24 Roberts, Killing the Black Body, 9. 
25 Roberts, Killing the Black Body, 11-12.  
153 
 
sustained acts of murder and rape against Black people.26 White women were thus less people 
worth protecting and more a useful fiction for white supremacy. There remains a plain path of 
continuity between the animating rationalities of indifference towards lynchings, the policing of 
Black activists throughout the 1960s and 70s, and the stunning regularity of police brutality in 
contemporary Black communities.27 
 
Asian Abnormalities 
 The language of abnormal sexuality has also been extended to East Asian men in the 
U.S., though here the tropes of non-sexuality and emasculation have historically dominated its 
application. Yen Le Espiritu writes that the 19th century nativist movement manufactured fears of 
a militarily efficient “yellow peril” of Asian laborers, by and large men, and oversaw the 
enactment of anti-Asian immigration laws in the U.S. As Asian women continued to be excluded 
from passage into the United States, the popular imagery of an “undersexed” and “effeminate” 
Asian man gained currency into the next century. The 20th century economy that emerged with 
these immigration strictures in place situated Asian men in “feminized” jobs like laundry work. 
In Hollywood, Asian masculinity was devoid of creative sexuality: “they could not sexually 
engage white women, and, when juxtaposed with white men, could not engage Asian women.”28 
Legally, Asian Americans continued to be denied access to U.S. citizenship, public schools, and 
even a presence in the courtroom. Japanese men who dressed themselves in zoot suits – “a 
 
26 Wells, Southern Horrors, 46-69. 
27 Christopher Waldrep, “National Policing, Lynching, and Constitutional Change,” The Journal of 
Southern History 74, no. 3 (2008): 589–626. 
28 Yen Le Espiritu, Asian American Women and Men: Labor, Laws, and Love (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1997), 111. 
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distinctive, working-class urban style characterized by flamboyant fashions and irreverent 
comportment” – flouted the American war effort during World War II, where fabric was 
otherwise being rationed, and came to be seen as adversarial to the white middle class and 
actively propagating the “Japanese Problem.” 29 The 1943 Los Angeles Zoot Suit Riots were an 
open aggression against Chicanx, Japanese, Black, and other people of color by white soldiers, 
off-duty police officers, and civilians. As immigration laws eased after 1965, Gary Okihiro 
writes that the “model minority” thesis came to encompass Asian Americans in an assimilatory 
fashion. The notion that “American” attributes like work ethic, education, family-orientation, and 
self-sufficiency could shore together immigrants from the margins into a practical and 
universally-desirable mainstream mitigated the “yellow peril” threat from decades past. That 
model minority, Okihiro muses, has come to symbolize “a feminized position of passivity and 
malleability” to a broader regulatory order.30  
 British and French colonial patterns of classification of people continued to find their 
way into the particulars of American racial syllogisms thanks to what Junaid Rana calls the 
“Indian Ocean Model,” where the Middle East and South Asia retained their designation as 
“trouble spots” even while new Cold War and globalization interests resulted in neo-imperial 
interventions in these regions.31 Mahmood Mamdani links this to the return of Christian 
fundamentalism to public U.S. American life, a mass mobilization of white Protestant Christians 
pursuing a declarative political agenda. The rise of the Moral Majority coincided with the rise of 
 
29 Elisabeth Hsu and Ellen Wu, “‘Smoke and Mirrors’: Conditional Inclusion, Model Minorities, and the 
Pre-1965 Dismantling of Asian Exclusion,” Journal of American Ethnic History 34, no. 4 (June 1, 2015): 
43-65, 55-56. 
30 Okihiro, Margins and Mainstreams, 174. 
31 Rana, Terrifying Muslims, 17. 
155 
 
radical Muslim intellectuals who were equally preoccupied with the taking (back) of power.32 
The “violence” of the Muslim was rebranded as “low-intensity conflict” and eventually into 
“terror” within a broader discourse of “Culture Talk,” where figures like the Muslim are not 
simply incapable of modernity but actively resistant to it. The disinterest in conciliatory 
interpretation, coupled with “a profound ability to be destructive… is taken as proof that they 
have no appreciation for human life, including their own.”33 Mamdani mentions a variety of 
Muslim thinkers – Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati, Mohamed Iqbal, Mohamed Ali Jinnah, Abul A’la 
Maududi – who differed in their political goals but all sought to respond to the questions that 
modernity posed; not as resistant to modernity but “as modern as modernity.”34 All of them 
would go on to gain association with terrorism as its “inspiration” throughout a variety of 
contexts.35 The designation of terrorist placed upon Muslim bodies congeals in the context of the 
U.S.’s Cold War interventions in Afghanistan in the 1980s, a nightly vision on American 




32 Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 42-43. 
33 Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 19. 
34 Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 59. 
35 A small sampling finds Robert Erwin asking “Is this the man that inspired Bin Laden?” in The 
Guardian, while the U.S. and U.K.-designated terrorist group Mujahidin Khalq is said to follow an 
ideology “with ingredients from the Iranian religious sociologist Ali Shariati.” Maududi has a profile on 
the website for the Counter Extremism Project, a neoconservative American NGO. See Robert Erwin, “Is 
This the Man Who Inspired Bin Laden?,” The Guardian, November 1, 2001, sec. World news, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan.terrorism3; “Abul Ala Maududi,” Counter 
Extremism Project, May 12, 2016, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abul-ala-maududi; 




Foreign, Anti-Modern, Haters of Women 
 The Immigration Act of 1965 enshrined a class-driven opening for migrants from Asia 
where quotas had previously been in place. American racial logics absorbed these newcomers – 
primarily highly skilled professionals and students – through the lens of the model minority 
politic. This reinscribed their place within racial hierarchies as workers who maintained the 
U.S.’s upward mobility as the world’s biggest and “greatest” economy while also threatening 
that economy by taking employment opportunities away from “real” Americans. Since the 
formal beginning of the War on Terror, this contradiction is ingratiated further into the U.S. 
imaginary through the passage of laws that discursively and materially code the “foreigner” or 
“immigrant” as a threat to the homeland, most visibly identified through the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security and the NSEERS program described in Chapter 3. In this 
system, Arabs, South Asians, Latinx, and other “Brown” men are swept up by the security 
apparatus through legally pursuant searches, detentions, and deportations. Their dispensability, 
observes Junaid Rana, betrays a racism that “is not simply the sense of systems of control and 
hierarchy but also in the sense of determining who lives and dies as a strategy to maintain and 
legitimize the authority of a colonizing force.”36 The threatening Muslim form has been 
maximized for a life of precarity, as Judith Butler might say, because he ontologically deserves 
it.37 
 Today, the Muslim form continues to invite suspicion, distance, and violence through the 
inscription of a native sexual perversity and anti-moderness in the doings and “innate” nature of 
this body. Even within the progressive consensus of recognition, there continues to be lowly-
 
36 Rana, Terrifying Muslims, 4. 
37 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004), 12. 
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voiced trepidation over making common cause with those who avow or simply associate with a 
religious tradition whose legal codes license the persecution of queer people.38 Louder calls, still, 
splash across the pages of American newspapers in (ultimately successful) attempts to isolate 
Muslims from positions of power within progressive movements. This has been justified due to 
those Muslim leaders’ mobilizations on behalf of Palestinian liberation, which are translated as a 
pretense for underlying anti-Semitism.39 The focus on non-normative sexualities, however, 
disciplines well within and beyond the confines of a progressive consensus.  
 Jasbir Puar surmises that the transnational production of such corporealities results in a 
Muslim masculinity that is “simultaneously pathologically excessive yet repressive, perverse yet 
homophobic, virile yet emasculated, monstrous yet flaccid.”40 These paradoxical dualities exist 
in the same ways that narratives of American exceptionalism hold up both its uniqueness and 
universality at once. An indispensable image of the United States is created to rationalize 
violence committed against the Muslim figure in the name of preservation of the lives of proper 
and made-proper subjects, over those that are not. The exceptional circumstances – an 
endangering Muslim masculinity – quickly but surreptitiously “become[s] the rule, and the 
exceptional is normalized as a regulatory ideal or frame.”41 Suspicion thus remains on the 
 
38 Sarah Harvard, “Stuck in the Media Spotlight, LGBTQ Muslims Often Feel Exploited,” Bitch Media 
(blog), March 27, 2019, https://www.bitchmedia.org/lgbt-muslims-media-spotlight-islamophobia-queer-
feminism-hearken. 
39 Bari Weiss, “When Progressives Embrace Hate,” The New York Times, August 1, 2017, sec. Opinion, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/opinion/womens-march-progressives-hate.html. 
40  Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2007), xxv. 
41 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 9. 
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Muslim body because of its capacity for harm and the destruction of other bodies, despite its 
documented legality or presumed inclusion within the norms of secular multiculturalism.  
 Those other bodies, depending on the circumstance, invariably tend to be women – 
Muslim women or non-Muslim white women. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s deduction of “white 
men saving brown women from brown men” finds easy application in the drummings for the 
War on Terror.42 Laura Bush’s radio address on November 17, 2001 struck a gentler note in 
rallying public support for the invasion of Afghanistan than George W. Bush’s pugnacious 
addresses to Congress: 
The brutal oppression of women is a central goal of the terrorists. Long before the current 
war began, the Taliban and its terrorist allies were making the lives of children and 
women in Afghanistan miserable... Civilized people throughout the world are speaking 
out in horror - not only because our hearts break for the women and children in 
Afghanistan, but also because in Afghanistan, we see the world the terrorists would like 
to impose on the rest of us. All of us have an obligation to speak out… Because of our 
recent military gains in much of Afghanistan, women are no longer imprisoned in their 
homes. They can listen to music and teach their daughters without fear of punishment. 
Yet the terrorists who helped rule that country now plot and plan in many countries. And 
they must be stopped. The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity 
of women.43 
 
Lila Abu-Lughod notices a recurring slippage in this speech between the perpetrators of 
women’s oppression through mandated burkas and the greater enemy of the United States. “The 
Taliban and the terrorists” slur together as a single word; “a kind of hyphenated monster 
identity.”44 Elsewhere in the speech, Bush holds these men’s misogyny as the cause for other 
 
42 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988): 271–313, 297. 
43 Laura Bush, Radio Address by Mrs. Laura W. Bush, Crawford, TX, November 17, 2001, 2013, 
https://www.bushcenter.org/publications/articles/2013/02/radio-address-by-mrs-laura-w-bush-crawford-
tx-november-17-2001.html. 
44 Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural 
Relativism and Its Others,” American Anthropologist 104 (2002): 783-790, 784.  
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social ills in Afghanistan, including malnutrition, poor health outcomes, widespread poverty, and 
illiteracy across the population. People of good conscience the world over are called to join the 
ideological struggle to save these women from the men who have “long” oppressed them, 
inferring a fundamental propensity for coercion and cruelty while the stakes of civilization – 
wrapped up in this toxic masculinity – delicately dangle overhead. These Muslim women, after 
all, intimately know the violence of Muslim men.  
 Bush purports that these unique conditions – where “only the terrorists and the Taliban 
forbid education to women” – necessitated the full force of the American war machinery because 
of the potential for imposition on “the rest of us.”45 Are white women “the rest of us” for whom 
Bush so urgently demands preservation? Juliane Hammer remarks that Muslim women have 
always been at the center of anti-Muslim discourses, necessitated by their intimacy with and 
proximity to Muslim men. Women who produce these discourses, like Laura Bush, rely largely 
on their own gender – configured as a deeply shared positionality – to authenticate their political 
mission.46 The “exceptional circumstances” of Afghanistan, as we have seen, have never been 
exceptional. 
 
A Composite Danger 
 Taken together, we arrive back at the beginning. The monstrous Muslim form has been 
centuries in the making, constituted and reconstituted in a Euroamerican imaginary that seeks to 
conjure itself out of that which it is not. That “not” is a Muslim tableaux; a repository for what 
 
45 Bush, Radio Address by Mrs. Laura W. Bush, Crawford, TX, November 17, 2001. 
46  Juliane Hammer, Peaceful Families: American Muslim Efforts against Domestic Violence (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2019), 38-39. 
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has been discarded as un/anti-modern but still fascinates in its queerness. Violence, danger, and 
civilizational threat are rendered through racialized and improperly masculine corporealities, 
though their categorical edges do not retain the fastidiously documented difference that once 
accompanied them under colonial rule. The South Asian Muslim’s lack of fealty bleeds into the 
South Asian Hindu’s effeminacy, the Oriental’s exoticism, the Hindoo’s queerness, and the 
Asian foreigner’s economic threat. The presence of Brown skin does not require deeper 
specificity before triggering an alarm consonant with that triggered by the proximity to Black 
bodies in the U.S.  
By detailing the history and politics behind these scripts, I do not imply for this to be 
sweepingly comprehensive nor a reductive presumption that “all” Muslims experience these 
corporealities in exactly the same way. What I do mean to communicate is the longue and 
intersecting durée of it all. The menace of the Muslim is not a post-Cold War phenomenon of the 
last 40 years, and the even shorter timeline that takes 9/11 as point A does little to lay bare how 
these paradoxical attributes will ideologically and allegorically endure into the present. As I 
argue in Chapter 3, among the most salient features of the Muslim is his unsuitability for modern 
secularism. The persistence of this condition finds life through bodily re-animation. These 
sundry points of failure – inheritable sedition, excessive masculinity, deficient masculinity, 
predation of white women – revive and reify sedimented anxieties, project them onto the Muslim 
object of concern, and naturalize its misalignment. In turn, the subjects from whom the Muslim 
object are distanced are reproduced as correct, normal, and worthy of the continuance of life 
through their securitization away from the Muslim. 
In conjunction, these discourses systemize a broader, urgent pattern that maintains 
secularism, modernity, multiculturalism as the master terms of social legibility. The Muslim 
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gains recognition only after stripping what has been deemed essential to him. Tracing these 
discursive shifts for a more plain and clear framing for Nanjiani, Ansari, and Minhaj’s diasporic 
subjectivities as well as the ways that these subjectivities find resonance with notions of a 
normative “Islam,” the Middle East, Shi’ism, India, Pakistan, Asia, and U.S. Blackness. These 
notions interface and are abstracted out as through affect and comportment, demonstrating an 
embodied hostility against hegemonic white masculinity but to also mollifying and reassuring it 
of its dominance within U.S. secularity. 
I am aware that these men would likely not articulate the precise historical contours of 
their embodied experiences in the language that I have used thus far. However, their deliberate 
choreographies of comedy onstage, as well as their mundane comportment offstage, plainly 
indicate that the cultural and diasporic weight of colonial and neocolonial scripts is nevertheless 
affectively realized. This is particularly true when that weight is conspicuously not felt, but 
assumedly should be. Ansari has expressed concern that he is “getting off on a technicality” 
because India is not on the list of nations in the U.S. Muslim Ban, “not one of these other 
countries where brown people are from.” He concedes that it is privilege of celebrity that 
accompanies him into the lion’s den of Homeland Security. “I’m like the luckiest Muslim-born 
person. Everyone at Homeland Security knows who I am. They tell me they like my work.”47  
At the same time, he tells the talk show host Seth Meyers, “My brother is not recognized, 
so he has had hilarious instances of racist, Islamophobic stuff happen to him... they make me 
laugh so hard even though they’re very mean things. It’s very funny to me! [laughs].” The rest of 
his brother’s experience is recounted through stifled giggles, an innocuous yarn for the in-studio 
 
47 Jada Yuan, “Aziz Ansari Wanted to Be the Great Uniter and Ended Up an Activist,” New York 
Magazine, May 1, 2017. 
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audience to laugh alongside. “He was in a Dick’s Sporting Goods [store] in Charlotte, and he 
was walking around and some guy goes, ‘hey terrorist, get out of here!’ And he looks around and 
he didn’t see anybody. And he’s like, where is this coming from? And the guy goes, [laughing] 
‘hey terrorist, get out of here!’ and he looks up, and there’s a guy on a rock-climbing wall, who 
yelled it down!” The audience claps as Meyers exclaims, “you have to be so racist to take time 
out of rock climbing!”48  
Hasan Minhaj opens his White House Correspondents’ Dinner speech with a similarly 
morbid quip: “Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the series finale of the White House 
correspondents’ dinner. Oh man. My name is Hasan Minhaj, or, as I will be known in a few 
weeks, Number 830287.”49 Elsewhere, he recalls the prickling sting of other comedian friends 
that were “genuine[ly] leveling” with him as rumors swirled about who would replace Jon 
Stewart at the front desk of The Daily Show. “They were like, ‘They couldn’t give it to you, man. 
Just imagine saying The Daily Show with Hasan Minhaj. How is Doritos gonna put ads up 
against that?’”  
In Nanjiani’s standup, he does not – and arguably cannot – wait long before introducing 
his Pakistani and Muslim heritage in any comedy routine, not even in The Big Sick. The first shot 
of the film pans over a comedy club audience, as Nanjiani gets up on stage. “Hello,” he 
introduces himself. “I grew up in Pakistan.”50 Beta Male, in fact, does not go more than 30 
seconds before he remarks that the shock of living in Brooklyn was particularly egregious, as “I 
grew up in fucking Pakistan.” A solitary cheer piques legitimate incredulity: “Really? ‘Woos’ for 
 
48 Aziz Ansari Shares His Brother’s Top Islamophobic Encounters, Late Night with Seth Meyers (New 
York: YouTube, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vKu3gPsQAXY. 
49 Minhaj, Hasan Minhaj COMPLETE REMARKS at 2017 White House Correspondents’ Dinner. 
50 Nanjiani, Gordon, and Showalter, The Big Sick. 
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Pakistan? That’s new. Pakistan’s in the house! Alright… usually we try to keep a low profe 
[profile].”51  
Even when compensating for the privilege and release that celebrity status offers, the 
broad “truth” emanating from their bodies does not de-race or de-brown them. The Muslimness 
endowed upon Brown skin splays that marked difference interchangeably and homogenously. 
For these men, it means being read as one another and other supposedly “famous” Brown bodies. 
Nanjiani, Minhaj, and Ansari have all commented on the quotidian nature of the “mistaken 
identity” phenomenon. In a 2017 interview with GQ, Kumail Nanjiani told editor Anna Peele 
that “when I started out, I would get confused for Kal Penn. Then it was Aziz Ansari. And last 
week, within one week, I got confused for Kunal Nayyar, Karan Soni, and Hasan Minhaj. Minhaj 
and Nanjiani look nothing alike.” He concludes, nonetheless, with a sunny rumination: “I guess 
that’s what progress is. If it means they’re confusing me for ten people instead of three, I’ll take 
it.”52 The following year, he took to Twitter in a slightly more disdainful disposition (the post has 
since been deleted but was covered in media). “A day may come when I am not mistaken for 
another brown actor. But it is not this day.”53 Others, like Kal Penn, Kunal Nayyar, and Hari 
Kondabolu joined the fray to report how often they had been mistaken for Kumail. “Every time I 
get recognized for you I think ‘man I wish it were true:)’,” said Nayyar. “I have taken credit for 
both of your accolades in the last 2 weeks so I guess I owe you each a photo, half a beer, and an 
 
51 Nanjiani, Beta Male. 
52 Anna Peele, “Kumail Nanjiani Is the Future of Funny,” GQ (blog), May 16, 2017, 
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awkward extended hug,” responded Penn. The interaction culminated with the comedian Sarah 
Silverman jumping in to ask innocuously, “Why do you have three accounts?”  
Aziz Ansari kicked off his latest comedy special, Right Now, with a furtive reference to 
his #MeToo scandal cloaked in a joke about being mistaken for Hasan Minhaj. 
I was walking around the other day, and this guy, uh, came up to me on the street, and he 
was like, ‘Hey, man. Love the Netflix show!’ And I was like, ‘Oh, thanks so much.’ He 
was like, ‘Yeah, yeah, I really liked the episode you did on Supreme!’ I was like, ‘What? 
I didn’t do no episode on Supreme.’ And then I quickly realized he’s talking about Hasan 
Minhaj. Patriot Act. Different show. Different guy. And he felt horrible, right? He 
immediately realized his mistake, and he was trying to buy it back. He was like, ‘Oh, no, 
no, Aziz, right?’ I was like, ‘Yeah, yeah. That’s me.’ ‘Master of None!’ ‘Yeah, yeah. 
That’s me.’ ‘Parks and Rec.’ ‘Yeah, yeah. That’s me.’ ‘Treat yo’ self.’ ‘Yeah, yeah. 
That’s me.’ ‘And, uh, you had that whole thing last year, sexual misconduct?’ ‘No, no, 
no, no, no! That was Hasan!’ 
 
When Nanjiani famously “broke the internet” in December 2019 with his shirtless photo 
showing off his new Marvel movie-ready body, Minhaj tweeted back ruefully that “no one is 
going to mistake me for Kumail anymore.”54  
Despite the embodied knowledges these men carry – invariably claimed through the 
performance of levity – I reject the prescription of “false consciousness” when Ansari, Nanjiani, 
and Minhaj then inevitably seek to demonstrate their modern subjecthood and overall fitness for 
the secular. I will not deny their exercise of agency in those moments, as well as the possibility 
of their overall aims changing, which they do over time. I will similarly not retreat from holding 
them to account and naming the normative and material circumstances that enable and are 
enabled by such conduct. There is more here than simply a “complicit” masculine and racialized 
comportment; these are embodied formations in transition and in process seeking to perform 
away their marginality into what is right, “real,” and authentic to them; a secular aesthetic. Let us 
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appreciate intention, at the very least to understand how naturally it can be swallowed, 
manipulated, and regurgitated back as a foot soldier for the continuity of power.  
 
Rendering the Right Muslim Man 
It is worth reiterating that the paths taken towards becoming the Right Muslim Man vary 
between Nanjiani, Ansari, and Minhaj. Minhaj’s path, for example, is littered with untranslated 
alhamdulillahs and inshallahs while Ansari pronounces “Muslim” with the letter Z. Nanjiani’s 
English-medium-school-tinged Pakistani accent demands from him the work of presenting 
legibility the moment he speaks. The final Right Muslim product varies between them as well, as 
each requires different inflections of different bodily perceptions. Parameters of exclusion and 
possibility stretch and contract among the three as they stage versions of Islam on stage. These 
comedic counter-scripts usually do not pursue overt and rhetorically-vocalized assimilation 
and/or legibility in the American secular schema. The body primarily does that work as the site 
of its desired and agential self-articulation, often in anticipation of how it reads absent that desire 
and agency. Thus, a stylized and assertive impersonation is comparable to what Judith Butler has 
called “a phantasmatic attempt to approximate realness” – which, in this case, materializes as a 
rhetorical and embodied distancing from “that” Muslim object which in turn would logically 
qualify one for proper secular subjecthood; “the site of the phantasmatic promise of a rescue 
from… delegitimation.”55  
Unlike the drag queens that Butler discusses, Minhaj, Nanjiani, and Ansari’s 
performances do not expose the regulatory processes that expose a “real” Muslim over the 
Muslim monster. The distance they seek from him, as well as the desire for “realness” is sincere, 
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not subversive to the constructedness of both subject and object. Stanley Thangaraj has discerned 
a comparable trend among Desi American basketball players, whose racial legibility “is 
accompanied by gendered valences of what type of man they are, which results in greater access 
and maneuverability in and out of various Asian American and Latina/o ethnic categories.”56 For 
these comics, I see a distilled valence between three points that governs their performances. On 
one side is the deep-seated and visceral specter of a sexually perverse and terroristic Muslim 
body that vacillates quickly against and within the effeminate masculinity of the Asiatic Brown 
Hindoo/Hindu. Both are deficient against the third ideal neocolonial masculinity represented by 
white men.  
If these scripts of race, religion, gender, and sexuality are written onto and read off the 
essentialized Muslim bodies of Hasan Minhaj, Kumail Nanjiani, and Aziz Ansari, what counter-
scripts do these men enact to frustrate, destabilize, negate, or even transmogrify them into a 
“right” Muslim body? In what ways do the “original” scripts stay in play? The discursive 
possibilities and enablings brought on by the language of jokes becomes secondary to what the 
overall comedic performance is trying to communicate. That is to say: what the jokes do is not as 
telling, for the analysis that lies ahead at least, as what they are striving for. That secularized 
Right Muslim Man relies on the performative and illusory nature of various masculine and racial 
constructions. Alongside the profession of secular loyalty, this racialized masculinity turns on a 
common axis for all three men: the centrality and desirability of white women. Ansari and 
Minhaj both also tack on an affect of American Blackness to embody what Su’ad Abdul Khabeer 
calls “Muslim Cool,” a common trend among Desi Muslims to convey American belonging and 
 
56 Stanley I. Thangaraj, Desi Hoop Dreams: Pickup Basketball and the Making of Asian American 
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fit while side-stepping aspirational whiteness. This demonstrates an “againstness” to run counter 
to a hegemonic order that reads largely as white.57  
These self-articulations aim to stem the tide of fear that emanates from the deceit of an 
essential/essentialized Muslim masculinity. Its duality – somehow being both excessive and 
insufficient masculinity –is what weaponizes the South Asian Muslim body as so particularly 
dangerous. This two-headed duplicity functions against a correct and proper (neo)colonial 
masculinity. These mechanisms of religion, race, sexuality, masculinity, and humor operate 
together to authenticate a secular aesthetic that projects an affect of distance and difference. 
What ultimately gets cultivated – what “becomes” – is an escape from “that” Muslim body by 
way of flattening his own into someone/thing incapable of inflicting harm demonstrated through 
a desire for union with the most symbolic member of the securitized population – white women. 
These secular aesthetics create the conditions for the Right Muslim Man. 
 
Conclusion 
Moving forward, I find Harshita Kamath’s emphasis on impersonation as an act that is 
“intentional or deliberate” but also unconscious and cavalier useful for thinking through Ansari, 
Minhaj, and Nanjiani’s self-presentation.58 If being Muslim is indelibly embodied, despite an 
 
57 While I return to this subject in Chapter 9, note that the againstness which these men embody is unlike 
the againstness that Sylvia Chan-Malik witnesses among Muslim women of color in her book Being 
Muslim. The embodiment of Muslimness is not the “safe harbor” that Chan-Malik describes; rather 
Minhaj, Ansari, and Nanjiani actively channel such embodiment into an articulation of highly visible and 
performative “#resistance.” See also Sylvia Chan-Malik, Being Muslim: A Cultural History of Women of 
Color in American Islam, Being Muslim (New York: NYU Press, 2018). 34-38. 
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active disavowal of belief and ritual, then how far can alternative impersonations – deliberate or 
not – carry the comic and his comedy towards the self he wishes to achieve? For my purposes, 
the governing analytic of embodiment is driven by the corporeal processes of being and 
becoming as they relate to a set of secular aesthetics. Racial and masculine becomings contribute 
to an overall secular becoming, where the original state of being Muslim can/is not ever fully 
abandoned.  
I am not committed to a Deleuzian sense of “becoming” which leaves behind historical 
preconditions to “create something new.”59 Rather, the utility of this terminology unfurls in the 
procession, its ongoing-ness through abstraction and impersonation. An ongoing performance 
signals less the unfinished work of life and more of a queered failure to arrive at the desired 
destination at all.60 What gets abstracted as a “gag” for laughs in order to demonstrate one’s 
authentic “realness”? How does becoming help us understand the inherent precarity and 
instability of the performance to begin with? The coming chapters consider these questions 
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CHAPTER 6: AZIZ ANSARI AND COUNTERSCRIPTING FUNNY CUTE 
 
Indian people could only say something, like, four years ago, okay? We’ve had a slow 
rise in the culture. You know who the first Indian person I saw on MTV was? Me! It’s 
taken a minute. 
 
- Aziz Ansari, Right Now1 
 
Introduction  
Aziz Ansari recognizes and responds to the colonial and neocolonial scripts that his body 
evokes primarily through the production of comedy. He has the most prolific body of work of the 
three men I study, beginning his career by taking jobs that caricatured his own physicality to the 
delight of colleagues and audiences. The good will garnered through those performances 
eventually led to Ansari helming his own show with full creative license, in which the caricatures 
were displaced from his body onto adjacent Muslim ones. Ansari began earning national 
accolades as early as 2005, when a narrow side column story Rolling Stone magazine deemed his 
weekly show at the United Citizens Brigade Theater in Manhattan as “the place to catch new 
talent.”2 His work since then, from individual comedy specials to Master of None, have all 
scripted a self that is referential of Ansari’s South Asian Muslim body.  
This self has been years in the making, working towards “becoming” a Right Muslim 
Man. He is not an agency-less sycophant to secularism. Ansari is assertive in his effort to clarify 
himself through the desirable appearance of a progressive, neocolonial Muslim masculinity. He 
is also assertive of what he is not; not (so) foreign, not a terrorist, not the tropes otherwise so 
visible in their industry. “Look,” Ansari tells a reporter: 
 
1 Spike Jonze, Aziz Ansari: Right Now (Netflix, 2019). 




If there are kind of like these two visions of America, our show [Master of None] 
definitely takes place in the other America. Most of the time, you’re following me, a 
brown guy, and I’m doing stuff that brown guys don’t do in the other vision of America. 
I’m not just working in a convenience store serving white people sodas. I’m not part of a 
sleeper cell. I’m not giving my white friend dating advice and totally inept with women,  
like, “Ooh, I’ve never seen a bra before!” This show is firmly rooted in the other path the 
country is headed toward.3 
 
Why that “other” America(n) path may be problematic in its own right, especially towards those 
resemble himself, does not concern Ansari. His labor is spent on cultivating a self, not its 
backdrop. In this chapter, I examine the ways that Aziz Ansari performs and frames himself 
through dress, comportment, and affect to respond to the broader discourses of race, masculinity, 
modernity, securitization, and religion that are elicited through his bodily presence.  
 
Funny Cute and Sartorial Deliberations 
This self and its attendant Desi masculinity were the subject of Ali Na’s 
“#AzizAnsariToo?,” where she examines the characters Tom Haverford in Parks and Recreation 
and Dev Shah in Master of None. Na suggests that the performativity of Ansari’s own sexuality 
merge with Tom and Dev in a performance of “funny cute,” where the tropes of effeminate 
“Desi masculinity” blend with “cuteness” to affirm the appearance of incapacity and 
helplessness.4 Funny cute is held in opposition to funny sexy, reifying heterosexual and 
procreative intelligibilities through whiteness. Ansari’s funny cute is produced through the 
enactment of slapstick humor and his own racialization, where the obstacles he constantly trips 
over are the sexually encoded norms of white masculinity. “Cutification” converges on 
 
3 Jada Yuan, “Aziz Ansari Wanted to Be the Great Uniter and Ended Up an Activist,” New York 
Magazine, May 1, 2017. 
4 Ali Na, “#AzizAnsariToo?: Desi Masculinity in America and Performing Funny Cute,” Women’s 
Studies in Communication 42, no. 3 (July 24, 2019): 308-326, 317. 
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objectification to provoke antagonism and even violence towards Ansari for an underlying yet 
attributable sexual deviance. Na sees the active denial of Ansari’s agency over the course of 
these performances and his own performativity.  
I do not read such a cumulative loss of agency across Ansari’s career, however. Na 
fittingly argues that “funny cute” emerges out of the coupling of sexual effeminacy and sexual 
threat that are inscribed onto and embraced by Ansari in his performances and person. I also see 
a deliberate counter-articulation that takes those previous inscriptions into account by quite 
literally fashioning himself as something distant 
from them. Ansari’s conscious attire, for example, 
has consistently caught the eyes of magazines like 
Gentleman’s Quarterly (or GQ), who in 2016 call 
him “one of the Most Stylish Men in the World 
Right Now,” continuing that “it’s not really 
surprising… His closet is teeming with classic (if 
high-end) pieces from Saint Laurent and a whole 
arsenal of pared-down basics from Band of 
Outsiders” (pictured here).5 Unlike other comics, 
Ansari is lauded for “want[ing] to tell you the 
brands he likes and what he’s thinking.”6 All of his 
recorded comedic work since Human Giant (though 
 
5 Jake Woolf, “Aziz Ansari Is the Unsung Hero of Minimal Style,” GQ, April 19, 2016, 
https://www.gq.com/gallery/aziz-ansari-style-pictures-gallery-sneakers. 
6 Max Berlinger, “The Secret to Aziz Ansari’s Stylish Master of None Wardrobe,” GQ, May 17, 2017, 
https://www.gq.com/story/aziz-ansari-master-of-none-style-interview. 
Figure 4: Ansari in a high-low outfit, graphic 
t-shirt and shawl-collar dinner jacket. 
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notably not in his post-#MeToo special Right Now) have seen him fitted in suits or a “high-low” 
style, where one pairs a designer piece with another more mass-produced brand. This concerted 
emphasis on dressing well, he has said, was initially a knock against most comedians that wore t-
shirts and jeans as well as a play towards the “showman” type. “Now, when I don’t do it, it feels 
like I’m - not phoning it in, but it just feels more proper when I’m dressed up.”7  
Ansari’s clothes are a calculative and differentiating presence in how he stages himself in 
comedy routines, his television show, and the everyday presence. In Parks and Recreation, 
Ansari’s character Tom Haverford was always seen in a variety of suits from the boy’s collection 
at Brooks Brothers Boys (“their cuts are slimmer” - a deprecating joke picking on Ansari/Tom’s 
body frame).8 The emphasis on suits, however, came from Ansari himself. During a party Ansari 
himself threw for Band of Outsider’s designer Scott Sternberg during New York Fashion Week, 
he told a reporter “Early in Parks, I met with them about like, what is this guy going to be like? 
And I was like, let’s make him really into suits.”9 That penchant was later written into one of the 
show’s most frequently recalled catchphrases, “treat yo’ self!,” a yearly event in the Parks and 
Rec universe for Tom and his colleague Donna to buy their most extravagant cravings ranging 
from clothes, massages, fine leather goods, cashmere socks, velvet pants, and even “sushi made 
from fish previously owned by celebrities.”10 By the show’s end in 2015, “treat yo’ self!” had 
 
7 Kelefa, “Funny Person.”  
8 David Rogers, “Media Blitz,” Parks and Recreation (NBC, February 17, 2011); Shapeero, “94 
Meetings.” 
9 Alex Frank, “Style Interview: Aziz Ansari,” The FADER, February 8, 2013, 
https://www.thefader.com/2013/02/08/interview-aziz-ansari. 




become synonymous with Tom’s profligacy and the acute business sensibilities developed in 
order to keep up with his purchases.  
Ansari’s interest in the finer things has also been a recurring subject in early comedy sets 
like 2010’s Intimate Moments for a Sensual Evening. Here, he scrutinizes inaccurate bedsheet 
thread counts. 
All I know about sheets is, the higher the thread count, the better the sheet, right? ... So 
I’m looking around, trying to find some nice sheets. I see this brand called Hotel Luxury 
Linens. 600-thread count. That sounds fancy too, right? Got a girl back at your place, 
she’s like, ‘oh, my God. Did we just teleport to a five-star hotel?’ “Nah, baby. These are 
just Hotel Luxury Linens. By the way, the technology for teleportation doesn’t exist yet, 
you must be kind of stupid.” So I grabbed the sheets and I get them home. And I’m 
psyched to put them on my bed, right? And I feel them and they feel a little rough to the 
touch. I get a little suspicious. I do a little googling. I find an investigative report 
in Southern Living magazine, where they investigated thread count claims, an issue that 
definitely needed delving into. And they had a little chart, and it said “brand, advertised 
thread count, actual thread count.” So it’s like, “Brand, Wamsutta, Advertised, 500, 
Actual, 497. Brand, Soft Sheets, Advertised, 600, Actual, 600. Brand, Hotel Luxury 
Linens, Advertised, 600, Actual… 296!” Are you shitting me, man? I almost slept on that 
shit! 296 is sandpaper, as far as I’m concerned. If that was a drug deal, I would have shot 
Hotel Luxury Linens in the face. Where the rest of my threads? You didn’t think I was 
gonna count that shit, motherfucker?!11 
 
The lure of prominently indulging has even created a dissonance between what Ansari himself 
wants to wear and what his character on Master of None, an actor without a consistent paycheck, 
would be able to afford. “I just wore my own clothes. But people have been asking me on 
Twitter where I got such-and-such a jacket from and I can’t tell them it’s Saint Laurent… hey, 
you know what brands look really good on me? The most expensive ones!”12  
This type of conspicuous consumption quite literally robes Ansari in a secular aesthetic; 
the trappings of hard-earned luxury and money express a demonstrable investment in the 
 
11 Ansari and Woliner, Intimate Moments for a Sensual Evening. 




offerings of late stage capitalism and its “favorite child,” the cosmopolitan fashion industry.13 
Mainstreamed clothing choices that signal upward mobility buy Ansari not just a degree of 
“model minority” social access into the secular, but they temper the Muslimicity that otherwise 
radiates off his skin.14  
Overt sartorial displays draw laughter as Tom Haverford. But where Ansari increasingly 
controls the narrative arc and performance of humor like those in his self-composed comedy 
specials and Master of None the clothes drape and impersonate a desirable masculine form – 
dressed to the nines, always well-tailored, seemingly ready for a spread in Esquire and GQ (and 
often getting one). Indeed, his frequent inclusion in GQ – a “flagship of men’s fashion and style 
in America” – would indicate a venerable legibility among the progressive mainstream.15 The 
comedy of Ansari’s jurisdiction ceases to be slapstick and physical; it no longer resides in the 
spectacle of his attire against his racialized body. The audience is directed to appreciate what 
adorns the body instead, orienting their laughter away from the emanating Muslimicity towards 




Ansari’s Right Muslim Man 
 
13 Valerie Steele, “A Museum of Fashion Is More Than a Clothes-Bag,” Fashion Theory: The Journal of 
Dress, Body & Culture 2, no. 4 (December 1998): 327–35. 
14 By Muslimicity, I mean an optical gradient of Muslim difference that gets read off of a person at any 
given moment, which can then be turned “up” or “down” by way of affect, demeanor, and comportment 
in order to non-verbally communicate one’s association with the amalgam we call Islam. 
15 “Condé Nast - GQ,” accessed June 11, 2020, https://www.condenast.com/brands/gq. 
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Vestiges of a similar positional distance appear in Ansari’s standup routines, where he 
appeals to his own modernness in opposition to the men who may otherwise physically resemble 
him. In Buried Alive, Ansari mentions to his audience that he would like to get married, but is 
not sure when. He immediately cuts to a recollection of a family trip to India:  
I spent a lot of time with a cousin of mine that lives there. He’s around my age. And it 
was really fascinating to me the dichotomy of our two lives. My life is totally different 
because I was born and raised in America and he was born and raised in this poor part of 
India where my family is originally from. My family’s originally from a poor part of 
India. They’re not from the part of India ‘study abroad programs’ are based. They’re 
from like the South Carolina of India. It’s pretty rough … there was less sexuality there. 
Women are dressed more conservatively. There’s not like sexy posters and magazine 
covers everywhere. It’s a way different vibe. I came back to New York after that trip and 
I was like, “I wanna fuck everything!”… I don’t think he [my cousin] is dating or 
anything like that. He’ll probably have an arranged marriage. A lot of people in India still 
have arranged marriages. My dad had an arranged marriage. It was to my mom. That’s 
how they arranged it.16 
 
In this set, Ansari has rhetorically distanced himself not just from the picture of the undersexed 
and obviously pent-up Indian Muslim man, he has given him a body to occupy and a place in 
which to exist in relation to Ansari’s own body and his environs. “That” Muslim becomes his 
cousin, or even his father, set up in comparison to himself. His Americanness – being, in his 
words, “born and raised” have regulated his sexuality into something both healthy, legible, and 
relatable to his audience. This is a man that “makes sense,” he is the Right Muslim Man. This 
recognition is scaffolded by the progressive consensus, where Ansari’s own relation to Islam 
functions as a racial affinity and his political messaging stays within the equivocal dictates of 
secular multiculturalism. The content of this joke lingers in the shallows, acknowledging that 
arranged marriage might feel strange to those unaccustomed to the practice and reassures them of 
its ubiquity, though not, notably, why this audience would find it so strange to begin with.  
 
16 Will Lovelace and Dylan Southern, Aziz Ansari: Buried Alive (Netflix, 2013). 
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Ansari takes an analogous rhetorical dip in his roundly applauded “political” SNL 
monologue:  
Hate crimes and stuff are on the rise. You know, as far as people in my own skin tone, 
brown people. I think part of the problem is a lot of these people, they just haven’t 
interacted with any brown people in their normal life. The only people they see are these 
monsters in the news who are just a drop in the ocean. Maybe what needs to happen is 
when they do the news report, they should do a second report about some other brown 
people that are just up to normal stuff — just to calm those people down. So the reports 
are like: “The suspects are considered armed and dangerous. Not armed and dangerous — 
these four other Muslim people that are eating nachos in Chicago. Let’s go to footage of 
them. Uh-oh, looks like Nasir just spilled a little cheese on his khakis! Got a little 
overambitious with that last dip! We’ve all been there!”… A lot of people are 
Islamophobic, which doesn’t 
make sense on paper because 
you know the God in Islam is 
the same God that was 
revealed to Abraham. Judaism, 
Christianity, same God. But 
people are scared. Why? 
Because any time they watch 
movies, and TV shows, and a 
character is Arabic, or they’re 
praying or something like that, 
that scary-ass music from 
Homeland is underneath it 
[intones Arabic], it’s 
terrifying! People are like, 
“Aah! What are they saying?” 
Just “God is good”! Normal 
religion stuff! It’s okay! You 
want to end Islamophobia? 
Honestly, just change that 
music. Like, if the music was 
different, if it was just like 
[miming salat to the tune of 
The Benny Hill Show theme] 
people would be like, “Man, 
Islam’s one whimsical 
religion, isn’t it?”17 
 
The storyboard of Ansari’s joke centers and stems from within a secular and racialized logic: the 
fears of “people” – unmarked in the sketch, but heavily implied to be white and non-Muslim – 
 
17 Ansari, “Aziz Ansari Saturday Night Live Monologue.” 
Figure 5: Ansari on Saturday Night Live on January 22, 2016, 
exclaiming, “Aah! What are they saying?” 
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are tenable towards “brown people,” but only because of media sensationalism and packaging. 
He emphatically acts out the situation – voice rising, Ansari impersonates a Muslim praying, 
eyes squinting as they shift side to side, while intoning Arabic-like sounds that he identifies as 
“that scary-ass music from Homeland” but is more a mangled approximation of the adhan. He 
recoils with a jump as the terrified viewer, before switching back to his placatory self, briefly an 
insider assuring the outsider that illegible Arabic translates to “normal religion stuff.”18 The 
punchline for this setup comes from imagining wacky possibilities to palliate fears of the Muslim 
“monster.”  
In each, the Muslim is defanged from the state of being “dangerous,” “Arabic,” or 
“praying.” The result is mundane, depoliticized, and even clown-like – all incapacitated of their 
ability to disturb a broader social order. These are not somber policy prescriptions, of course, but 
Ansari’s commentary intentionally moralizes that anti-Muslim hostility is a social ill. But his 
audience is decidedly not held accountable for its pervasiveness. The brunt of the solution is 
borne by the amorphous “media,” not the audience that enacts and acts on anti-Muslim hostility 
as its gatekeepers. The figure of the Muslim is unagential or has agency but of no consequence. 
He is collapsed into a joke.  
 
 
The Secular Side of Sex 
The SNL monologue was among Ansari’s most timely and risky political material. 
Ansari’s image as a measured political comedian, however, was forged through his foray into 
topics like gay marriage and feminism in the early 2010s. This was a relatively safe play for 
Ansari and his target demographic of young people, among whom opposition to same-sex 
 
18 Ansari,  “Aziz Ansari Saturday Night Live Monologue.” 
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marriage was well under 40% by 2009 while broader opposition across the U.S. dipped below 
the 50% mark the next year.19 When Ansari declared himself a feminist on The Late Show with 
David Letterman, he frames it as a straightforward, easy-sell clause of the legally-enshrined 
principle of equality, not the hard-sell of intersectional and otherwise-divisive issues like 
reproductive rights or violence against women. “If you look up feminist in the dictionary,” he 
reasoned with Letterman, “it just means someone who believes men and women have equal 
rights. And I feel that everyone here believes men and women have equal rights… The word is 
so weirdly used in our culture. Now, people think feminist means, like, some woman is gonna 
start yelling at them.”20 Ansari’s vision of feminism is not acrimonious and will not moralize in 
the ways that killjoys would otherwise. He syncs that progressive but no-trouble-here type of 
optimism to his performances on stage. In his special, Live from Madison Square Garden, Ansari 
self-identifies by postulating what he is not; in this case, a “creepy dude:” 
Creepy dudes are everywhere, and they’re so much more prevalent than I ever realized. 
And it really sucks, ‘cause women have to worry about creepy dudes all the time. And 
it’s very unfair because men never worry about creepy women. Like, men never are 
concerned about creepy women. That’s not a thing. There’s never been two dudes, 
walking alone, late night in a park, like, “Hey, man, I think we should speed up.” – 
“Why, what’s going on?” – “I’m pretty sure that woman behind the tree is masturbating 
to us!” – “Oh, God… Should we get a cab? Should we just keep running? Ahh!” No two 
dudes have ever faced that dilemma… No guy here has any story like that. Every woman 
 
19 A 59% majority of young people between the ages of 18-29 years agreed that same-same marriage 
should be recognized as valid, with 37% opposed in a Gallup poll taken between May 7-10, 2009. More 
broadly in the same poll, a majority of 57% across demographics remained in opposition. By the next 
year across the population, 48% opposed same-sex marriage while 42% favored it. The Pew poll also 
noted that pluralities of white Protestants and Catholics also favored same-sex marriage. See Jeffrey 
Jones, “Majority of Americans Continue to Oppose Gay Marriage,” Gallup.com, May 27, 2009, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/118378/Majority-Americans-Continue-Oppose-Gay-Marriage.aspx; Tom 
Rosentiel, “Gay Marriage Gains More Acceptance,” Pew Research Center (blog), October 6, 2010, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/2010/10/06/gay-marriage-gains-more-acceptance/.  
20 Late Show with David Letterman: Aziz Ansari Is a Feminist, Talk Show, Late Show with David 
Letterman (CBS, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2-5xvpbDN4M&feature=emb_logo. 
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in here has at least three stories like that. I promise you they do. Creepy dudes are 
everywhere, man.21 
 
The abstraction out of the “creepy dude” demonstrates both positional distance and a feminist 
understanding of this quotidian experience for women. His concern, coupled with affective 
horror and an absurdist impersonation, places Ansari squarely in the camp of “good feminist 
ally” for both highlighting the problem and showing himself to not be a part of it. Much like the 
SNL monologue, Ansari does not push so far as to become disagreeable. The “creepy dudes” are 
always referred to in third person, never first or second. While they exist somewhere in the social 
sphere he occupies, he stops short of asking his audience to probe their own participation in such 
actions. The joke can continue, and Ansari emerges scot-free because no one believes themselves 
to be in danger or among the dangerous.  
In Buried Alive, Ansari describes a similar honest bewilderment that (in the year 2013) 
there was still opposition to gay marriage across the United States. 
All the demographics that are really opposed to gay marriage, they’re all gonna be dead 
soon. Like, whenever they ask young people, young people are like, “What, what are you 
talking about? All music is free right now. What the fuck are you talking about? Oh, two 
dudes are kissing? I’m about to watch every movie ever right now.” They don’t care at 
all. But seriously, how do you not know you’re on the losing team at this point? These 
are the same people that were opposed to like uh, women voting or black dudes playing 
baseball. What was the last thing they were opposed to? Interracial relationships. If 
you’re opposed to interracial relationships, guess what? I’m fucking white girls. There’s 
nothing you can do about it. Any time I have sex with a white girl, I think about those 
people for a few pumps and it’s such a great feeling… Seriously, all of you here, next 
time you have sex with someone of a different race, think about those people for a 
minute– you really should do this. It’s very important. It’s your duty as an American, and 
I promise you, nothing feels better than orgasming while thinking about all the progress 




21 Aziz Ansari, Aziz Ansari: Live in Madison Square Garden (Netflix, 2015). 
22 Lovelace and Southern, Aziz Ansari: Buried Alive. 
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In addition to presenting himself as agreeable and far from what his audience might consider 
discord, Ansari impersonates a masculine form that hinges on the progressive consensus. He is 
referential of his racialized Muslim body because it lends further significance to his broadminded 
politics. He is a minority but not problematic: he is feminist, anti-racist, and anti-homophobic, 
unlike those incongruous demographics that “are all gonna be dead soon.” He is the new all-
American, an ideal secular subject forged in the crucible of the political moment. His disbelief – 
both here towards those opposed to gay marriage and in the Madison Square Garden bit about 
creepy dudes – conveys such distance in both Ansari’s mentality and living 
arrangements/associations that the very existence of that other is baffling. How is x possible 
when I and everyone I know and mingle with are y?  
 
Authenticating Desire 
Part of that Americanness hinges on Ansari’s explicit foregrounding of white women in 
this segment. He is projecting himself in political defiance of white supremacy by explicitly 
detailing his erotic desire of white women, the crowned and protected objects of male desire. The 
history of lynching, hyper Black male sexuality, and anti-Black racism underlies the setup of this 
guaranteed applause-line joke. Ansari’s performance of masculinity recognizes this history by 
not only aligning in solidarity with it, but in siphoning some of that sexuality for his public self. 
His body speaks through triangulation; on one end, Ansari is decidedly not the perverse Muslim 
of sexual extremes. On the other, he is the Right Muslim Man, a political liberal that, like all 
other sexually “correct” men, has and enjoys sex with white women. This three-noded 
conversation speaks and performs masculinity for the gatekeepers of “correct” masculinity, white 
women, and secular subjecthood: white men. 
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 This conversation is a recurrent feature of Ansari’s catalogue and materializes as a 
common thread in both seasons of Master of None. Episode One of the series opens in the dark 
to the sound of two people having sex. The hushed atmosphere breaks as Ansari’s protagonist, 
Dev Shah, yells “fuck, fuck! The condom broke!”23 He and his partner, a white woman named 
Rachel, go back and forth about whether the break warranted purchasing an emergency 
contraceptive. The remainder of the episode chronicles the awkwardness that accompanies Dev 
and Rachel, two relative strangers, as they venture into the city to buy Plan B and avoid the 
possibility of raising a child together. Rachel reappears in episode three and remains Dev’s 
regular love interest (though he does have an affair for a single episode arc with a woman named 
Nina, played by Claire Danes) for the remainder of the season.  
Season 2 follows a similar trajectory, where a tense, will-they-won’t-they between Dev 
and his Italian friend Francesca culminates in her leaving her fiancé for him. The fourth episode 
of season two, titled “First Date,” is a montage of Dev’s dates with several different women he 
met on a dating app. This standalone episode aims to validate the monotony of connecting with 
strangers while also establishing Ansari’s non-particularity when it comes to dating. One of the 
women he sees, Priya, asks Dev if he only dates other Indians. “No,” he insists, “I date people of 
different ethnicities, skin tones.”24 On another date, he remarks to a Black woman that “I did read 
somewhere that the people that do worst on the apps are Asian men and black women.” She and 
Dev roll their eyes and clink their glasses. “Well, it’s great white people finally have an 
advantage somewhere. To white people!” A montage follows of Dev being driven home in a 
taxi, though each cut is with a different woman. In every instance, he leans in for a kiss but is 
 
23 Aziz Ansari and Alan Yang, “Plan B,” Master of None (Netflix, 2015). 
24 Aziz Ansari and Alan Yang, “First Date,” Master of None (Netflix, 2016). 
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met with uneven success. Some of the women consent, and Dev respectfully retreats when the 
others do not.  
These are moments of distinction from the general arc of the series, a B storyline that 
signifies a deeply-held tedium and predictability surrounding dating but also illustrates 
Ansari/Dev’s “good-faith” efforts at meeting a wide pool of women. When the show returns to 
its A story, co-starring Francesca, the love interest, the endurance of white women as the 
ultimate object of desire feels less stark and obvious, having been punctured by such deliberate 
standalone plots and accompanying dialogue. During the two-part episode finale of that season, 
Dev’s pursuit of Francesca takes on a dream-like countenance; scenes of them together are filled 
with joyous scampering, scenic vistas, and Italian music. That evening, the camera captures 
Francesca through a warmly-hued filter. She wears nothing but an oversized white dress shirt 
and dances in Dev’s kitchen as snow falls peacefully outside the window. In that moment, she is 
a heightened fantasy. Her whiteness is a component of that picture, not incidental to it. 




 Ansari’s impersonation of “correct” masculinity in Master of None subdues affiliation 
with the Muslim monster. Through an interchangeability with Indianness and Hinduism, the 
Islam that would otherwise be read on Ansari’s person is modulated and subordinated into a 
more-legible race that experiences racism in Hollywood and popular media, rather than the more 
complex nature of anti-Muslim hostility. In an interview with The Guardian, Ansari is adamant 
that he does not consciously try to appeal to white people. “Absolutely not,” he avers. 
“Definitely don’t care what white people think. I just try to make stuff that I think is good and 
hopefully people like it, regardless of their race or gender or anything... If I was trying to please 
white people I would probably have done a goofy Indian accent early in my career and gotten 
parts.”25  
Notwithstanding that intentionality of responding to whiteness, Ansari nonetheless takes 
on the topic of forced accents in the episode “Indians on TV.” After declining to do a 
stereotypical Indian accent for an audition as a taxi driver, Dev runs into his friend Ravi, who is 
also auditioning, in the waiting room. They get coffee together afterwards and Dev laments that 
he is sure the role will go to someone else because of his refusal.  
Isn’t it frustrating, so much of the stuff we go out for is just stereotypes? Cab driver, 
scientist, IT guy… Look, I get it. There probably is a Pradeep who runs a convenience 
store, and I have nothing against him, but why can’t there be a Pradeep just once who’s, 
like, an architect, or he designs mittens or does one of the jobs Bradley Cooper’s 
characters do in movies?26 
 
Ansari, inadvertently or not, has once more given a name and body to the masculine forms he 
defines himself against, this time a masculinity that he/his character aspire towards while also 
 
25 Jones, “Aziz Ansari: ‘I Try to Write Political Material … Then Get Tired of It.’” 
26 Aziz Ansari and Alan Yang, “Indians on TV,” Master of None (Netflix, 2015). 
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recognizing that racism may preclude that possibility. “Well, I just can’t wait for that. I got to 
work,” says Ravi. In the remainder of the episode sees Dev accidentally copied on an email chain 
from a studio executive, Jerry, who enjoyed both Dev and Ravi’s auditions but argues “but there 
can’t be two.”27  
The rest of the plot sees Dev threaten to leak the email, earning him an in-person apology 
from the executive and additional perks like courtside seats to see the Knicks and an invitation to 
an exclusive party with other industry celebrities. He ultimately concedes to Jerry’s logic that he 
himself may not be a racist, but two Indians just “wouldn’t be relatable to a large mainstream 
audience.” Dev rationalizes this to Ravi and their weightlifting friend Anush back at his 
apartment, declaring: 
There’s more Indians popping up every now and then, but we’re like set decoration. 
We’re not the ones doing the main stuff. We’re not fucking the girls and all that stuff. 
We’re just not there yet. There can be one, but there can’t be two, you know? Black 
people just got to ‘there can be two’ status, you know? Even then, though, there can’t be 
three, because then it’s, like, a Black show.28 
 
In the end, neither Dev nor Ravi end up with the role. Ansari has constructed two parallel 
narratives through this episode and the overall show. Mikhail Bakhtin might call this a form of 
heteroglossia, where “a multiplicity of social voices and a wide variety of their links and 
interrelationships... through different languages and speech types” emerge through dialogue of 
the characters, bodily performance, scene direction, and the overall authorial vision for the 
work.29  
 
27 Ansari and Yang, “Indians on TV.” 
28 Ansari and Yang, “Indians on TV.” 
29 Mikhail Mikhaĭlovich Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, 
University of Texas Press Slavic Series 1 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981). 262-263. 
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First, there is the “story” of the episode, of Dev and Ravi, of the racism bred into 
Hollywood that gets reproduced by self-avowed liberals, and of the fascination for a visual 
performance of the “foreign.” But there is also Ansari’s own voice and the work of Master of 
None as a package that gives these conversations an honest platform, depicting the 
disappointment and humiliation of being asked to do an accent while acknowledging that the 
limited opportunities for Indian actors mean someone else will. As Dev expresses regret that he 
cannot play the role of someone who “designs mittens” or is “fucking the girls,” Ansari chooses 
to write and portray Dev with a depth the industry would otherwise deprive him of. Dev is 
always well dressed, he is an actor and eventual gameshow host, he is a foodie who travels to 
Italy to learn the art of pasta-making – a clear departure from the stereotypes Dev (and Ansari) 
are asked to play. He is also virile and sexually considerate of his many romantic partners, so 
much so that those romantic successes result in the A story for both seasons. Dev’s relationship 
with Rachel and the question of when to “settle down” into a pedestrian marriage commands the 
first season; the second is occupied with whether Dev should pursue a forbidden love with the 
engaged Francesca given how exhausting and fraught dating in the 21st century has become for 
the upwardly-mobile millennial. The right to choice, to “choose” love wherever it is found, 
centralizes the individual and his secular right to self-serve. 
As Dev and Ravi argue over “set decoration” in “Indians on TV,” their friend Anush does 
burpees and lifts kettlebells in the kitchen. The scene plays out a non-verbalized joke: lamenting 
that there cannot be two South Asians in a show when three are simultaneously appearing on-
screen together. Ansari inserts an additional subtext to this scene through the inclusion of Anush. 
The latter’s presence throughout the episode, even as a secondary character, is an embodied 
response to the central premise of racist typecasting in this episode: a tall, handsome, Indian  
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bodybuilder. The camera lingers on Anush as he completes one pushup after another, sometimes 
even as Dev and Ravi bicker off screen. The tall, Hollywood-certified version of masculine 
handsome that Anush embodies (not Ansari’s signature “funny cute” but “funny sexy” as Ali Na 
might say) conveys availability for “the jobs Bradley Cooper’s characters do in movies.”30  
Ansari’s heteroglossia sets out to demonstrate the dissonance that exist between visions 
of masculinity. But instead of critiquing the values ascribed onto them, he positions himself as 
eager and ready to meet and return their volley. There is little interest exhibited in lifting up 
alternatives to the masculinity espoused by white U.S. men, just in pointing out the unfair 
imposition of perversity on Brown bodies. “This show is firmly rooted in the other path the 
country is headed toward” – for him, a swapping of skin that need not challenge the hegemony of 
neocolonial masculinity.31  
 
 
30 Ansari and Yang, “Indians on TV”; Na, “#AzizAnsariToo?,” 318. 
31 Yuan, “Aziz Ansari Wanted to Be the Great Uniter and Ended Up an Activist.” 
Figure 7: Screenshot from “Indians on TV,” Episode 4, Season 1 of Master of None. 
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Failing the Secular 
These articulations are hard fought; they are conceived, designed, enacted, and 
reproduced over time. Yet this carefully crafted becoming also rests on precarious ground. The 
Right Muslim Man is an unstable category in the face of hegemonies like secularism, white 
supremacy, capitalism, and anti-Muslim hostility and it requires constant maintenance on stage 
and off. How convincing is Ansari in his act of becoming, and what happens in the event of 
failure? What is foreclosed when there is a break in maintenance, intentional or unintentional, 
and they do not to meet the exigencies of this order? Does the Right Muslim Man collapse back 
into the trenchant homo islamicus he has so ardently insisted against?  
I believe these breaks are inevitable and, in the case of Ansari, have already come to pass. 
How a comic like Ansari responds to secular failure enlightens a corner of this religious studies 
project as we consider what humor can ultimately tell us about Islam as it lives in the world 
today. The immanence of failure, I would say, derives from its contingency on a set of already 
unstable projects: that of racial taxonomies, glib binaries, and the temporal assumptions 
embedded into notions of progress, modernity, and lifecycles. If legibility demands being and 
becoming within these secular boundaries (especially when one never “really arrives” at the 
desired destination of subjectivity) then there is little give in terms of alternative possibilities. 
Failing the secular may very well mean falling back onto the static and entrenched notions of 
Islam’s illegible danger, toxic masculinity, and sexual perversity. 
Aziz Ansari had, until 2017, vigorously pursued a proper neocolonial masculine 
subjectivity in his on and off-stage personas. It was for this reason that the fallout of his #MeToo 
moment particularly riled corners of the American media literati and progressive-consensus 
advocates. His #MeToo moment came within a year of the Master of None launch. On January 
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13, 2018, the now defunct website babe.net published an account by a woman anonymized as 
Grace, who detailed Ansari’s aggressive sexual advances and disregard for her discomfort over 
the course of an evening she spent with him in September 2017.32 She detailed to reporter Katie 
Way how Ansari quickly wrapped up their dinner and invited her back to his apartment, through 
there was still food on the plates and wine undrunk. Minutes within entering the apartment, 
Ansari escalated their interactions sexually, though she repeatedly asked that they “relax for a 
sec” and “chill.” Grace would try to distance herself from Ansari used verbal and non-verbal 
cues, writes Way, “but he wouldn’t let her move away.” He continued to put his fingers in her 
mouth, pantomime sex with her, and gesture for her to touch his penis.  
She left his apartment in tears and ultimately understood the evening’s interactions to be 
sexual assault. “It took a really long time for me to validate this as sexual assault,” Grace said, “I 
was debating if this was an awkward sexual experience or sexual assault.” The column would go 
on to spur a national debate ranging from whether this kind of “ordinary bad date” could be 
lumped into a movement meant to take down serial rapists like Harvey Weinstein to the 
insistence that the “ordinary” nature of this date needed to be re-examined for its power 
dynamics and rules of consent. For his part, Ansari released an apology through his agent that all 
engagements with Grace had seemed consensual, he had taken “her words to heart.” He also, the 
statement said, continued to support the #MeToo reckoning as “necessary and long overdue.”33  
Social and news media responses were prolific. Some pointed out that this allegation of 
misconduct felt like a way to take down a successful man of color for far less than the likes of 
 
32 Katie Way, “I Went on a Date with Aziz Ansari. It Turned into the Worst Night of My Life,” January 
13, 2018, https://babe.net/2018/01/13/aziz-ansari-28355. 
33 Way, “I Went on a Date with Aziz Ansari.” 
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Harvey Weinstein, Louis C.K., and other white men. “As I reflected on the controversy further, I 
began to feel angry. My thoughts turned to blaming the woman, the journalist, and the website 
for publishing the piece in the first place,” wrote Omer Aziz in The New Republic. “I wanted to 
denounce the whole thing as a racialized hit job, an instance of a woman trying to bring down a 
good brown man. Wasn’t there a double-standard here?”34  
Bari Weiss of the New York Times penned an aggravated op-ed replete with disbelief that 
Grace, and her fellow young feminists, did not/do not simply walk away. She added that Ansari 
did not have the power Grace attributed to him. “He had no actual power over the woman — 
professionally or otherwise,” she says. “And lumping him in with the same movement that 
brought down men who ran movie studios and forced themselves on actresses, or the factory-
floor supervisors who demanded sex from female workers, trivializes what #MeToo first stood 
for.”35 The Atlantic’s Caitlin Flanagan was even more stark in her assessment:  
Twenty-four hours ago—this is the speed at which we are now operating—Aziz Ansari 
was a man whom many people admired and whose work, although very well paid, also 
performed a social good. He was the first exposure many young Americans had to a 
Muslim man who was aspirational, funny, immersed in the same culture that they are. 
Now he has been—in a professional sense—assassinated, on the basis of one woman’s 
anonymous account… I thought it would take a little longer for the hit squad of 
privileged young white women to open fire on brown-skinned men. I had assumed that 
on the basis of intersectionality and all that, they’d stay laser focused on college-educated 
white men for another few months. But we’re at warp speed now, and the revolution—in 
many ways so good and so important—is starting to sweep up all sorts of people into its 
conflagration: the monstrous, the cruel, and the simply unlucky. Apparently there is a 
whole country full of young women who don’t know how to call a cab, and who have 
spent a lot of time picking out pretty outfits for dates they hoped would be nights to 
remember. They’re angry and temporarily powerful, and last night they destroyed a man 
who didn’t deserve it.36 
 
 
34 Omer Aziz, “Aziz Ansari and Me,” The New Republic, January 19, 2018, 
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35 Bari Weiss, “Aziz Ansari Is Guilty. Of Not Being a Mind Reader,” New York Times, January 2018, 
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In the logics set out by these two editorialists, both of whom openly write from their 
positionality as white women, holding Ansari’s feet to the fire for being “awkward, gross and 
entitled” signaled that these “modern” feminists are “weak” for allowing such male aggression to 
go unchecked.37 Ansari is both belligerent and inept in his sexual pursuit, a special sort of danger 
because he inhabits both positions. He is not a true predator, but even if he was, you could have 
easily stopped him. Ansari’s masculinity is a paradox that leaves him unaccountable, while his 
victim is made doubly misguided for the misconduct done unto her and for speaking publicly 
about it.  
Still others simply could not wrap their heads around Ansari possessing any sexual might 
over women at all. In late 2018, The New York Times’s Sopan Deb caught up with two women 
who went to see Ansari hash out material that would eventually turn into his special Right Now. 
When asked whether it mattered to them that he had been caught up in such a scandal, one 
woman said Mr. Ansari “wasn’t big enough to be a physical threat.”38 The other did not correct 
her, but felt that Ansari should have stopped with his advances when Grace indicated her unease. 
This small back and forth among his fans suggests that Ansari’s progressive masculine narrative, 
years in the making, had always been maximized on its precarity. His fall lands on a floor made 
sedimented by discourses of sexual perversion – both excessive and deficient – that were 
communicated by his racialized and gendered body. That neocolonial Muslim masculinity is 
“wrong” in its sexuality (at once guilty of but also physically incapable of assault), despite the 
 
37 Weiss uses the phrase “awkward, gross, and entitled” while Flanagan’s full sentence reads “We were 
strong in a way that so many modern girls are weak.” See Weiss, “Aziz Ansari Is Guilty. Of Not Being a 
Mind Reader.”; Flanagan, “The Humiliation of Aziz Ansari.” 
38 Deb, Sopan, “Aziz Ansari, Sidelined by Accusation, Plays to a Big Crowd Back Home,” New York 




persona Ansari has built up to indicate his ideal subjecthood. His pursuit of legibility by other 
means thus remains fraught, and very much subject to the hegemonic vision that his perverse 
Muslim body evokes.  
 
Ansari’s Misattribution 
Neocolonial constructions of masculinity failed Ansari. But he, in response and 
retaliation, did not forsake and fail them. Ansari went quiet for nearly a year, returning to public 
life with a set titled Working Out New Material in October of 2018. Audiences were required to 
place their phones in sacs that remained sealed for the duration of his performance in order to 
avoid leaks. Nonetheless, the New Yorker and others reported that Ansari’s new set was an angry 
harangue against “extreme wokeness” and “the ever-changing standards of political 
correctness.”39 According to those early reports, Ansari never offered an apology during those 
performances. He did not acknowledge Grace or the internet fallout from the babe.net article, 
though the oblique and exasperated references to “progressive” activism could not be read as 
anything but reactionary.  
Working Out New Material would go on to become his Netflix special Right Now, which 
premiered in July 2019. He noticeably tones down the diatribes from New Material; even 
Ansari’s signature cheeriness is replaced by a soft, almost whisper-like measure for much of the 
show. Gone is his usual stubble, replaced by a clean shave that reveals sunken cheeks. He wears 
an uncharacteristic ensemble of sneakers, jeans, and a Metallica t-shirt.  
 






Figure 4: Screenshot of Aziz Ansari comedy special Right Now, taken on June 25, 2020. 
 
 
Spike Jonez’s filming of the set results in a texturized and sometimes ghostly video feed. He 
stands intimately close to Ansari throughout the performance and the shots that result are course 
and granular in their presentation. The closeness is made possible only because Ansari has 
forgone another distinguishing feature of his comedy. In Right Now, he stays seated on a stool, a 
far cry from his bouncing-off-the-walls persona of previous specials. The routine opens with a 
conditional apology to Grace, whom he refers to as “that person,” admitting: 
I’ve felt so many things in the last year, so… There’s times I felt scared. There’s times I 
felt humiliated. There’s times I felt embarrassed. And ultimately, I just felt terrible that 
this person felt this way. And after a year or so, I just hope it was a step forward. It moved 
things forward for me and made me think about a lot. I hope I’ve become a better person. 
And I always think about a conversation I had with one of my friends where he was like, 
“You know what, man? That whole thing made me think about every date I’ve ever been 
on.” And I thought, wow. Well, that’s pretty incredible. It’s made not just me, but other 
people be more thoughtful, and that’s a good thing. And that’s how I feel about it. And I 
know this isn’t the most hilarious way to begin a comedy show. But it’s important to me 
that you know how I feel about that whole thing before we share this night together.40 
 
 
40 Jonze, Aziz Ansari: Right Now. 
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Ansari presents himself as visibly and even aurally chastened, but also as having played a 
positive role for the #MeToo movement through his mistake. There is success even in error, 
having made other men “more thoughtful.” The self-reprimand does not last for too long, 
however, as Ansari turns his focus on rapid progressives who seek to out-know and overperform 
their politics for others. After telling a fake story about someone drawing out a swastika on a 
pizza with pepperoni, the crowd laughs when Ansari reveals the ruse. He stops them 
immediately, hollering, “You’re the fucking problem, okay? What are you doing? This is where 
we’re at now? You think your opinion’s so valuable you need to chime in on shit that doesn’t 
even exist?” Ansari’s distinctive reticence to “call out” his audience has all but vanished here, 
and he readily lashes out at those that play what he calls “progressive Candy Crush.”41 He also 
directs contempt towards those that criticize him for dating a white woman. 
Some people don’t like it! We kind of get it on two fronts nowadays, you know? One 
front, we get kind of old-school, classic stuff, you know? Like, “Y’all don’t match!” And 
you also get kind of new school stuff, like “Aziz, you’re in entertainment, you shouldn’t 
be dating outside your ethnicity, especially a white person, because that propagates ideas 
of white beauty being put on a pedestal!” Which is just a fancy way of saying, “Y’all 
don’t match!” Because, look, man, I understand. I get the argument, okay? But I’ve dated 
Indian people. I’ve dated people of many ethnicities. But this is the person I have a deep 
connection with. That’s very hard to find. And I’m sorry we’re not the same skin tone. 
But I’m also kind of tired of people telling me what race person I’m allowed to date.42 
 
What stands out as most egregious to Ansari is the infringement on his right to choose. 
Flouting this right of choice, also a key and shared tenant between secular subjects, leads a 
collapsing of particularities between the critiques. Denouncing the propagation “of white beauty” 
is likened to racism, equated as two poles of a country wrought by extremism within which 
Ansari simply wishes to live as he chooses. The secular aesthetic on display then is the 
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relationship itself, a “deep connection” to which he assented. Ansari also notes that because his 
girlfriend is Danish, “she doesn’t even understand some of the racism we deal with sometimes.” 
For example, he says, after she found paparazzi photos of the two of them and wondered why the 
comments referred to her as Becky. He explains that this is “internet slang” for white women, 
“like the Beyoncé song.” She appears tickled: “Oh! Like a slur?”43 The joke – that this Danish 
woman does not understand American race or racism – exhibits an apoliticism that, when 
coupled with her whiteness, positions Ansari, in turn, as the authority and instructor on matters 
of American race in the relationship as enacted on stage. 
In his re-animation, Ansari has not chosen the path of illegibility and the myriad of 
options within it. Rather, he has opted out of the progressive consensus sanction and continues to 
pursue secular subjecthood by other means. His frustrations mirror those of Bari Weiss and 
Caitlin Flanagan – why have the markers of injustice shifted in the direction of the ones that 
work hard to be “good?” Ansari is not flouting the regime of humor itself; he is flouting the 
particular corner that gave him rise. He is an established comedian now, though, whose platform 
no longer needs to model race-conscious feminism. Instead, he has literally refashioned himself 
to project the masculinity of a socially distanced maverick in the vein of “the classic greats.” 
Now, his masculine self is more interested in offering comedic takes as an onlooker witnessing 
the absurdity of the petty, not the powerful. 
Failing the secular, however, does not presume its omnipotence. In fact, if one can 
theorize this failure as revelation – in line with Jack Halberstam’s “art of queer failure” – then 
the act of unbecoming unlocks the possibility for a far more capacious self-animation.44 When no 
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longer occupied with the strictures of legibility, the act of failure and refusal can lay bare the 
secular, the nation, and its attendant regimes of humor for their exclusionary boundaries through 
cross-ethnoreligious solidarities. Recall that the strictures of legibility carry their own dangers: to 
be visible and recognized does not prevent secular gaze and scrutiny. Indeed, legibility simply 
turns that gaze into a surveillance of maintenance, increasingly scrupulous of secular alignment 
and more exacting in punishment should one fail that alignment. The dangers of legibility link 
up, in many ways, with the violences that are already faced by Muslims and Muslim 
approximates. A firm footing in the realm of illegibility, however, enables cross-ethnoreligious 
solidarities and the promise of resistance, not simply the conceit of its performance. Ansari has 




 Aziz Ansari’s counterscript aims to become the Right Muslim Man and ideal secular 
subject through comedic affect, comportment, and dispositioning distancing from an un- and 
anti-modern Muslim subject. His Right Muslim Man is a proper capitalist consumer who 
indulges and aspires towards material luxury, mostly uninterested in politics though still against 
any active discrimination like racism, homophobia, and misogyny. He is surprised to learn that 
these are still common perspectives in the United States, but maintains optimism that they can be 
overcome through national solidarity. Ansari also styles himself as sexually active and places 
white women at the center of that sexual desire as a matter of choice and attraction. This is in 
contrast to “that” Muslim who is drawn as subdued, mundane, and sexually illiterate. Ansari’s 
own persona has shifted in the months since being accused of sexual misconduct, in which the 
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object of his derision has shifted away from a stock illiberality towards the progressive 
consensus logic that enabled his rise. The masculinity he embodies is once more focused on 
sexuality as a matter of choice but has dispositionally distanced himself even from secular 














CHAPTER 7: THE COUNTERSCRIPT OF HASAN MINHAJ’S “NEW BROWN 
AMERICA”  
 
Don’t you realize what happened in that moment? We got our first A-list celebrity [Ben 
Affleck] to back the Muslim community. We got Batman, baby! He may not be the hero 
we want, but he is the hero the Muslim world needs. 
 




Hasan Minhaj’s Right Muslim Man has more specific references to contemporary politics 
than Aziz Ansari, primarily due to the nature of his audiences and the experiences he draws 
from. Unlike Ansari, Minhaj was not raised in isolation from South Asian and Muslim 
communities, and unlike both Ansari and Nanjiani, he claims Islam as a believer and not simply 
something he was racialized into. This point of origination requires a more refined engagement 
with the figure of the “terrifying” Muslim. Wat values and affective realisms set “this” Muslim 
apart from “that” when accounting for the transnational context of Muslims in and between the 
United States and India? 
In this chapter, I examine how Minhaj crafts his Right Muslim Man by defining these 
divisions most commonly along ethno-religious solidarity lines. Minhaj’s secular sensibilities are 
shown as clarifying his understanding of U.S. racism along racialized lines. This move 
simultaneously flattens and demeans the particulars of ethno-religious difference outside of a 
U.S. context, reifying his American exceptionalism outlook. This move abides by the confines of 
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the progressive consensus, presenting opposition to the overt racisms of hegemonic whiteness 
through the reinforcement of its secular ideals. He also puts forth a normative narrative of the 
American dream, pictures as unachieved but achievable through a shift in white perspective. 
Endemic to this dream is also the overt pursuit of economic mobility on the basis of the secular 
ideal of equality. Like Ansari, he too configures white women to the center of his sexual desire 
and sets up a cognitive, temporal, and geographic distance between his Right Muslim Man and 
those that are illegibly wrong in their Muslimness. In brief moments, Minhaj choose to inhabit 
illegibility through the use of untranslated jokes, something that grows in frequency as his 
secular platform expands.  
 
Aspirational Whiteness 
 Hasan Minhaj’s Homecoming King comes out of two years of preparation with the Moth, 
a New York non-profit that works with individuals to craft storytelling skills that “dance between 
documentary and theater.”2 The culminating set is an autobiography punctuated by standup 
comedy punctuated by Minhaj’s life until that point, drawing from childhood memories of 
growing up in Davis, California to eventually joining The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. In it, 
Minhaj is accompanied on stage by only a stool. Large screens that take up the length of the 
stage stand behind him. He wears fitted dark jeans, clean white sneakers, and a button up blue 
shirt. His beard has been carefully trimmed and lined up, and his hair is coiffed to the back, 
faded along the sides.  
At the heart of this story is a woman named Bethany Reed, whom Minhaj meets in his 
high school calculus class, the “one bright spot” of his senior year. He and Bethany pursue a 
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relatively chaste romantic relationship, instant messaging each other online and studying at each 
other’s kitchen tables after school. Minhaj recounts his reticence to invite her to his family home, 
given that hers was a “white picket fence, McMansion, Ford Expedition, Eddie Bauer edition” 
type of place that materially exhibited that “they made it!”3 Minhaj relishes the description with 
both an affective awe and envy as his audience claps with appreciation. Bethany’s father, Minhaj 
notes, is a retired judge. Her mother exudes an open affection that Minhaj does not recognize as 
she offers home-baked brownies, asks him to stay for dinner, and inquires what interests outside 
of school he pursues. His response to this final question is drawn out for laughs as he stands 
onstage agape. “What do I like? Um…” he gulps as a look of wide confusion spreads across his 
face. “Nobody… Nobody has ever asked me that before.”4 The audience laughs as Minhaj 
straightens his back and takes a deep breath. “I guess I like acoustic guitar.” Mrs. Reed 
encourages him to “follow your dreams,” which he repeats in a stunned, internalizing mantra. 
“Maybe I will! Maybe I will… follow my dreams!” Bethany then asks to study at his home, 
which makes him recoil. 
What, invite you over to my house? You walk in, like “Ugh, what language are you guys 
speaking? What’s on the TV? What’s that smell?” I’m not going to open myself up to 
that kind of ridicule. But I was like, no, she’s different. I hit her up, and I run down stairs 
and say, “Mom, Dad, a school friend is coming over. Everyone here, please try to be 
normal.” My dad is like, “What? We are normal! [mimes eating a samosa] He’s killing 
me, you know what I mean? “Hasan, we’re normal. Humare khandan [our family] you 
should be proud!” Who is proud? No one is proud. You’re [Minhaj’s father] walking 
around like an Indian rooster. I’m not proud and no one is proud. We get there, we’re 
sitting on my living room table, we’re doing integrals. My mom and dad are arguing in 
Hindi. My mom is frying pakoras, literally the fobbiest thing ever. Kabhi Khushi Kabhie 
Gham is playing on Zee TV. Classic! But it’s too much. It’s all coming at this girl too 
fast. You’ve got to ease your way in. She’s from Nebraska. You know what I mean? Soul 
cycle, yoga, and then Zee TV. Don’t just go into it. So I’m exposed, looking at her like, 
“Please don’t say anything. Please don’t say anything.” And she looks up from her book 
and says, “You know what? This is really nice. We should do this more often. This is 
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really nice.” And I look at her, and I’m like, “Oh, my God. I love you, my white 
princess!” 
 
This scene lays out both the rhetorical and material distance between what Minhaj 
envisions as fundamental to him and his family and Bethany and hers. Her aspirationally 
“normal” environment is coded in classed terms (her father’s occupation, their home, their car, 
their choice of dessert) as well as a cultural calm and kindness that Minhaj plays as having never 
experienced. An earlier joke about his parents’ “conditional love” (dependent on if he “get[s] all 
As”) substantiates this gap.5 His family is depicted as chaotic through sensory overload. The 
smell and feel of pakora oil, the blare of the TV, his “Indian rooster” father, and the sound of 
belligerent Hindi all incense the atmosphere that he is afraid of bringing Bethany into. While 
Minhaj makes clear that he finds these aspects embarrassing (“he’s killing me… I’m not proud, 
no one is proud”) and relatively distant from the “normal” that he is projecting, he does not deny 
the stickiness of the Muslim refractions that inevitably adhere to him. The fear is that, despite his 
efforts at containment, Minhaj will be mocked for “what’s on the TV” or “that smell” – a 
rejection of “that” Muslim that would also sweep up “this” one and prohibit him from the 
possibility of romance.  
Bethany’s unexpected assent and acceptance of this disorder, followed by a stolen kiss in 
the driveway, leave Minhaj head over heels. “Are we getting married?” he thinks out loud. “I 
have to change my pants. We are definitely getting married. When is the shaadi?” She asks him 
to attend the prom with her, and he agrees. But as Minhaj arrives at her home, he is turned away 
at the door, told by Mrs. Reed that they would “be taking photos, so we don’t think you’d be a 
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good fit” for the family back in Nebraska to see.6 Heartbroken, he rides his bike back home. At 
school the next day, he does not tell anyone the real reason he did not appear at the school dance.  
The sad part is, I felt bad for being there. Who was I to ruin their picture-perfect 
celebration? You’ve seen movies. How many times do you see that on screen? And it’s 
not like they were yokels yelling “sand ni**er!” I could let that pass. I’d eaten off their 
plates, kissed their daughter. I didn’t know that people could be bigoted even as they 
were smiling at you. It’s hard when you see people saying they love you but they’re 
afraid at the same time. And I didn’t know what that meant.7 
 
The duality of Minhaj’s Muslim masculinity poses a unique danger to this white family. He is 
subdued and harmless enough to spend informal, private, and intimate time with their daughter 
Bethany, but becomes a hypermasculine peril to the family’s image of themselves and Bethany 
during such a formal, iconic, and very public moment in her life. Along the spectrum of 
normative temporalities, or in the U.S., the prom is typically read as an early rite that mirrors the 
next “big day” in a young U.S. American person’s presumed life cycle. Thus a distinct eroticism 
lays beneath the surface of the suit, gown, and corsage ensemble. With a white American 
woman’s body at the center of this amalgam, the possibility of visibly pairing it with a dark 
Muslim body – now, a blatantly unfit virile threat to their daughter – is unthinkable. Even Minhaj 
“understands” his deficiency in this moment. He does not argue, and does not even take the offer 
of a ride back home in the Ford Expedition. “Who was I to ruin their picture-perfect 
celebration?” the 17-year-old ruminates; an implicit recognition of his body as matter out of its 
prescribed place.  
 The mundane injustice of the prom rejection is coupled with the hate-crime injustice 
Minhaj and his family experience after 9/11, when anonymous assailants throw rocks through his 
family’s house and car windows. The two incidents are written by Minhaj as two sides of the 
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same racism coin, one smiling and one sadistic. Minhaj remarks offhandedly that “time has 
passed, and I don’t really think about that day [prom]. I mean, I did write a show about it…”8 
The audience laughs uproariously at the incongruity of the two statements given how long he has 
lingered on Bethany over the last hour. In this staged self-articulation of his life, Minhaj has set a 
white woman as the location of denied desire, symbolic of what he later calls “the co-sign” but 
also of a very real and persistent sexual attraction. That attraction drives the remainder of the 
show in two ways. A white woman like Bethany does not require validation – she, and the 
description of her family, are implicitly understood as obvious objects of desire. Through this 
legible end “goal” of sorts, Minhaj can rely on his audience sharing the affective sting that comes 
from the denial of this goal. Unable to “become” the subject he desired by way of his own erotic 
desire, the racism Minhaj experiences is both relatable and unfair but does not dissipate the 
attraction.  
He may claim that “I don’t really think about that day,” but the interest in Bethany has 
endures throughout the show. His interest in her makes possible reconciliation and forgiveness 
for racism in a way that would not be possible for those that smashed in his windows. Such a 
reconciliation does indeed occur, a few years after Minhaj has begun performing standup 
professionally. Minhaj describes the scene in Homecoming King as a meeting over coffee in New 
York. As she speaks, he realizes: 
‘You don’t give a shit about this person.’ I care about what she represents. For all of us. 
Growing up, we just want that co-sign. To tell them you’re good enough. Come sit here. 
You’re good enough. You’re valid. But that’s not the American dream. It’s not asking for 
a co-sign. It’s what every generation did before you. You claim that shit on your own 
terms… You’re not Hasan Minhaj [Americanized pronunciation]. You’re Hasan Minhaj.  
 
8 Minhaj and Storer, Homecoming King. 
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This is new brown America. The dream is for you to take, so take that shit! Stop blaming 
other people.9 
 
The intense detail and time given to Bethany in Homecoming King would indicate her 
importance to Minhaj lies not just in what she “represents.” Throughout the segments that deal 
with Bethany, Minhaj loiters on how impressive she is, referring to her as “a fucking G” who 
“knew the rules.” After she invites him to prom, Minhaj’s glee is so apparent he imagines being 
caught by his father but dying happily. “You know you’re going to die, so put it on the 
tombstone. ‘Hasan Minhaj, 4.3 GPA, kissed a white girl.’ What an amazing way to go!”  
After discovering Bethany is now dating an Indian man named Rajesh 
Rengatramanajananam (“this dude is Indian as fuck!”), he runs across the stage, jumping up and 
down for emphasis, before embarking on an extended bit imagining how Bethany and Rajesh 
have sex with one another (“Oh, my God, Rajesh Rengatramanajananam, give it to me right now. 
Rajesh Rengatramanajananam, I want you so bad. Put your Rajesh in my 
Rengatramanajananam.”) The persistence of this eroticism remains palpable to his audience, but 
naming it as such would not serve the storyline that Minhaj has built Homecoming King around. 
The erotic interest – and any masculine softness that might be conjured alongside it – is 
swallowed by what he sees as a broader point, which he enacts through a fierce and full-throated 
re-definition of the American dream.  
Until this point, Minhaj had been sitting on a stool, speaking in low and measured tones. 
“Take that shit!” he bellows to audience applause as he stands up to full height. The American 
dream is and has always been accomplished, he explains, by taking. His rhetoric and posture 
recall a European frontiersman, taming the wild and subduing it into submission. Minhaj draws 
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on this hegemonic masculine grammar, but when channeled through his Muslim body, it surfaces 
as a standing apart and opposition to white supremacy. It is a neocolonial masculinity that 
attends to racial difference but not the deep intersectionalities of difference upon which he 
scaffolds himself.  
Claiming a “new brown America” with and through a racialized body gives him space in 
the special to luxuriate in the untranslated, where white people are not the target audience and 
their total comprehension is not necessary for a joke to land. Minhaj refers to “us” repeatedly in 
Homecoming King, something that eventually comes to be characteristic of his personality 
beyond the stage. In one instance, he remembers how poorly his Daily Show audition appeared 
to go, and how intensely personal and monumental that failure felt. This feeling, he argues, is 
one all of “us” have known: “I’m choking. We’ve all been there. Everyone’s all, ‘How did it 
go?’ You’re like, ‘Prayer hands! Positive thoughts! I.A.!’ No, it’s not happening. You are 
choking. MCAT, DAT, you’re going to the Caribbean, it’s a wrap.” Minhaj quickly cuts back to 
the interview process, but the audience continues to boisterously laugh. “I.A.,” the text shorthand 
for “inshallah” and the widespread practice among South Asians of attending medical school in 
the Caribbean when one’s entrance exam test scores are not high enough for admission into U.S. 
medical or dental school programs are deeply niche and almost secret experiences.  
Minhaj brings such insiderisms into the open and turns many a joke on their axes. 
Another extended bit deals with being slapped in public by parents. “That’s what makes us tough 
and resilient. It’s why we become cardiologists and win spelling bees… It elevates your game. 
You ever seen an Indian kid win a spelling bee? …That kid won’t choke on camera. He’s been 
slapped on camera!”10 The “us” that Minhaj calls out to is also never consistent, however. At 
 
10 Minhaj and Storer, Homecoming King. 
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various times throughout Homecoming King, “us” includes those who are Indian, South Asian, 
Asian, immigrant, or even all people of color. The running thread through it all is non-whiteness. 
Yet the specter of whiteness’s normativity looms over these “insider” jokes. Minhaj, for the most 
part, does not seek to rationalize the dissonance between them. Even Bethany is not named as 
white until the 60-minute mark of a 73-minute show, her whiteness is so implicitly known that it 
does not require explicit specificity.  
 
Caricaturing Religious Difference 
Minhaj’s narrative focus on Bethany comes at the expense of his Indian wife, Beena, 
whose story is relegated to a B-plotline in the overall story of his life as told through 
Homecoming King. Beena is introduced first as a Hindu, which would presumably give Minhaj 
an avenue to proffer a nuanced take on religious difference and discrimination in South Asia. 
This is an insider dynamic he decides to translate for his audience through the language of farce, 
casting the differences between Muslims and Hindus as entirely superficial. He throws up a chart 
on the screen behind him, explaining: 
So some of you guys don’t know. Hindus and Muslims are like the Montagues and 
Capulets of India. We’ve been warring for centuries. You’re like, “What’s the difference? 
You look the same.” So how do I explain this? Hindus and Muslims. Hindus don’t eat 
beef. “No beef!” Right? And Muslims, we don’t eat pork. “Is that pepperoni pizza? No. 
No pepperoni!” And then Hindus, they like statues. They’re like, “Oh! This is a statue of 
an elephant. I’m going to put this in my car.” Muslims are like, “No statues! Calligraphy! 
We’re about the alphabet. We put that in our car. We’re different.” And then Hindus, 
they like cartoons. They’re like, “Oh, this is a cartoon Ganesh. I’ll just put this on the 
wall.” And Muslims… we don’t really, uh… [audience laughter] like cartoons. We’ve 
got to get better about our cartoon policy. Because of this we’ve been killing each other 
for centuries! And I know the older generation doesn’t like those jokes. “Pakistan was 
created for this reason [exclaimed in a Pakistani accent]!” I know.11 
 
 
11 Minhaj and Storer, Homecoming King. 
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By mocking the notion that 
there is any axiomatic 
difference in ritual or 
affinity between Muslims 
and Hindus, Minhaj sets 
himself apart from and 
above the vacillations 
between the South Asian 
Hindu and Muslim 
fundamentalisms. His teasing tenor throughout the joke shapes the Muslim figure as particularly 
recalcitrant. Minhaj even impersonates him briefly with stiff shoulders and an indignant Desi 
accent. It is the Muslims who so problematically insists on difference, who must “get better 
about our cartoon policy.”  
The 2005 Danish cartoon controversy makes an oblique appearance here – out of 
geographic place, no less – and lays responsibility for the implied problem squarely on the 
shoulders of Muslims themselves. That this is packaged as a joke itself, meant to elicit laugher 
from Minhaj’s audience relies on the audience reading Minhaj’s positionality as enlightened 
above “that” Muslim. His Muslim subjectivity is of the Right Muslim Man, who remains 
unbothered by and flippant about what are cosmetic ritual variances between South Asian 
Muslims and Hindus and is thus more “Brown” than “Muslim” in his self-articulation. He does 
not carry the political baggage that “those” Muslims do, and has actually realized their 
fundamental sameness with Hindus, in line with the greater principle of multiculturalism.  
Figure 8: Screenshot of Hasan Minhaj’s Homecoming King. 
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This is made further evident through Minhaj’s (and Netflix closed captioning text’s) 
repeated referral to his mother tongue as Hindi and not Urdu. Despite being mutually intelligible 
for the most part, the politics behind the choice to name the language spoken in his home is 
peculiar. According to the prominent map he displays on the screen behind him, his parents hail 
from Aligarh, a city most famous for inaugurating the Urdu language movement in the 19th 
century. Even when describing the show in interviews elsewhere, he refers to the triumph of 
having entire sentences recited in Urdu.12 So why the conspicuous absence of its name in the 
show itself? I read this as another instance of muting any overt affiliation with Muslim politics 
outside the context of the United States. Muslim/Hindu entanglements in contemporary South 
Asia cannot be reduced to racism in the same way the progressive consensus sanctions in the 
U.S., especially given how racialization has played out through the rise of Hindu nationalism 
among those that share close phenotypic similarities. Minhaj also reiterates twice that these 
(implied to be superfluous) reasons are why “we’ve been killing each other for centuries.”  
The lines are delivered incredulously, thus toeing, however inadvertently, the ahistorical 
colonial line laid out in the aftermath of 1857. Minhaj understands religious differences to be 
overdramatic and suggests that the contemporary political problems between Hindus and 
Muslims in India are entirely their own blinded and exaggerated doing. That those problems are 
perceived as naturalized conspicuously leaves out an actor Minhaj is usually ready to put on 
 
12 Terra Dankowski, “Hasan Minhaj Plays an Away Game,” American Libraries Magazine, March 26, 
2018, https://americanlibrariesmagazine.org/blogs/the-scoop/pla-hasan-minhaj-plays-away-game/; 
Amelia Mason, “Hasan Minhaj, Of ‘Daily Show’ Fame, Tackles Islamophobia And Cost Of The 
American Dream,” WBUR The Artery, November 10, 2016, 
https://www.wbur.org/artery/2016/11/10/hasan-minhaj; Hershal Pandya, “Hasan Minhaj’s ‘Homecoming 





blast. Colonial powers that actively sedimented these notions are rendered invisible, leaving this 
to be seen as a fight among wrong Brown men. Indeed, the act of lifting himself above such a 
fray disturbingly mirrors the discourse that imperial administrators told themselves: “those” men 
are incapable of solving their internal squabbles without “our” intervention. This is indicative of 
Minhaj’s superficial appeal to transnationalism; of recognizing longform connections to the 
peoples and place of India to only read them through secular logics. 
 Minhaj argues that despite these “differences,” he convinces his father to agree to the 
marriage, but his “racist” and tribalistic anxiety nearly stops the marriage from taking place. 
Minhaj’s sister, Aisha, ultimately convinces him. 
“Dad, I love her, she loves me. Isn’t there something bigger that unites all of us outside of 
race, color, creed, class? This is America. We can choose what we want to adhere from 
the motherland. Isn’t life like biryani, where you push the weird shit to the side? Why do 
we got to adhere to this weird shit from back over there?”… He says yes. We rally the 
troops, Me, Mom, Dad, Aisha, we get in the Camry, we’re driving to my fiancée’s house. 
And we’re about to pull up and we get to the door, and my dad is about to ring the 
doorbell, when he says the sentence that is the killer of every brown kid’s dream. He 
goes, “I don’t think we should do this. Log kya kahenge? What will people think?” I 
don’t know if you know, but every time a brown father says log kya kahenge, a star 
actually falls from the sky… I bet you, when Mahatma Gandhi told his parents he was 
going to liberate India, even they were like, “Log kya kahenge! Stop marching. The 
British are going to talk shit about us. Why are you bald and skinny? You’re never going 
to get married!” And I’m standing there on that doorstep, like, “Wait, you want me to 
change my life because of log kya kahenge? Come on, Dad. How many times do we 
complain about racism in our community? All the time. Now the ball is in our court, 
we’re going to be bigoted? Dad, I promise you, God doesn’t like bigotry. God’s not like, 
‘You’re racist. Good job.’ No! Number two, you want me to change my life to appease 
some aunty and uncle I’m never going to see? You want me to change my life for Naila 
Aunty? Fuck Naila Aunty! Are you fucking kidding me? My life?” But I can’t say that. 
Because I’ve played all my cards. So I can’t say anything. Now I’m losing hope. I’m, 
like, “Maybe this is bigger than me. Why can’t I put my head down and do what I’m 
supposed to do? This ain’t Jodha Akbar.” Have you ever been trapped by the time you 
live in? It’s been going on for centuries. So I’m walking back to the Camry, then I hear a 
voice behind me. “Oh, my God. You guys do this all the time.” And it is Aisha, and she is 
pissed. And she’s like, “Dad, I did not fly out from Philly for this. Beena is so legit. She 
has a Ph.D. Hasan bhai is a comedian! No one is going to marry him. Get him married 
before she changes her mind.” She stepped up. She laid down one of her cards for me… 




Once more, Minhaj chalks up the historical complexity of contemporary issues between Indian 
Hindus and Muslims to a hypocritical “racism” on the part of Muslims while insisting on a 
departure from “this weird shit from back over there.” Through this description Minhaj’s identity 
is decidedly not transnational in that moment – he attributes their difference to a generational gap 
between him and his father that is also temporal (“back”), geographic (“over there”) and cultural 
(“weird shit”), all of which come together around the denial of choice. 
 Like Ansari, Minhaj seeks to become the enlightened secular subject he sees himself as, 
unencumbered by what comes from “back over there” and whatever residual appearances it 
makes in the form of “Naila Aunty” and “log kya kahenge” over here. The influence of 
transnationalism by way of familial commitment actively staves off his becoming. The power of 
“log kya kahenge” sticks to his person and orients him away from the choice he wishes to make. 
Only Aisha’s intervention, rationalized in economic and class mobility terms, changes the tide, 
making room for him to become the subject he pursues. 
 
Affective Idealism 
 The dispositional distance Minhaj places between himself and the Brown men he wishes 
to define himself against appears in several other instances during Homecoming King. On the 
topic of Indian uncles, he declares: 
I still can’t understand some of you. There are uncles here. None of you guys are smiling. 
I don’t get it. You’re going to die. Laugh. Why aren’t you laughing? You’re always 
stressed and always tired. You could wake up any immigrant father from a 12-hour nap, 
and they’d say [angrily yawning] “Why do I have to pay taxes?”13 
 
 
13 Minhaj and Storer, Homecoming King. 
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He notes that his father shares this underlying ire, as well. “I remember being in the grocery 
store. And we’d be walking through the aisles, and my dad would pick up yogurt. [annoyed 
voice] ‘Argh, yogurt.’ Or milk. Just like, ‘Argh, dood.’ And I’d look at him and be like, ‘Oh, 
man. Dad hates yogurt. He hates milk!’ But I get that look, now. Life is tough and sometimes 
you don’t know what you’re doing.”14 
Despite now “get[ting] that look,” Minhaj chooses levity and playfulness as his primary 
demeanor of choice. Once more, this is depicted on stage as an embodied generational and 
cultural difference, where Minhaj has chosen agreeability and happiness over what he describes 
as a constant low-level resentment, though his father is also shown to have a softness about him 
that Minhaj also veers away from. In two separate instances, Minhaj’s father Najme is 
personified through his recitation of Urdu poetry; calm, dignified, and as having foresight 
beyond his son’s hotheadedness. “Ye cheez to hoti hain, aur ye cheez honge [these things 
happen, and these things will continue to happen],” he tells Minhaj as he cleans up the shattered 
window glass in their driveway after 9/11. “That’s the price we pay for being here.”15  After his 
father’s quintuple bypass, Minhaj confesses what happened with Bethany in high school. His 
father is disappointed that he has not forgiven her. “Himmat honi chahiye. Apki himmat dar se 
ziyada honi chahiye. Hasan, you have to be brave. Your courage to do what’s right has to be 
greater than your fear of getting hurt. So, Hasan, be brave.”  
Both times, Minhaj is moved by his father’s words but ultimately chooses the alternate 
path in from of him. “I honestly don’t know who is more right,” he tells the audience. “Maybe 
he’s right. Put your head down. Be a doctor, get a house in the burbs, let them call you whatever 
 
14 Minhaj and Storer, Homecoming King. 
15 Minhaj and Storer, Homecoming King. 
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you want. But isn’t it our job to push the needle forward little by little? Isn’t that how all this 
stuff happens?” The subject Minhaj wishes to become is, at its heart, confrontational and unruly. 
His unruliness is made manageable by way of the solidary of the progressive consensus and the 
critical mass accumulated by intoning Muslimness as categorically Brown (read: raced) first. 
This performance, intentionally and unintentionally, models notions and performances of 
American Blackness that project “cool” — a point that I will return to shortly. The fulcrum on 
which Homecoming King rests is the promise of America. That promise, he contends, has 
appeared unattainable because racism otherwise impedes its reach. In the “new Brown America,” 
however, “the dream is for you to take.” That this dream may be exclusionary by design – 
despite efforts to “take that shit” – is not the operative, applause-earning message.  
 Minhaj is also invested in a conventional “American Dream” narrative that reads his 
transnational being as a desired and unidirectional evolution towards the Right Muslim Man. 
Like Ansari, he performs this being by setting himself up on stage against “that” Muslim man. 
This joke finds its way into Homecoming King only through its setup: 
I’m so grateful for that decision [his parents moving to the U.S.]. Najme marries 
Question Mark, they come to the States, I come out. Popping out of your mom is like real 
estate. It’s all about location. I popped out here. Anybody brown, we popped out here, we 
made it. We’re the rappers that made it.16 
 
The original extended version was a part of a regularly circulating standup set performed at, 
among other placed, the Montreal Just for Laughs comedy festival in 2015.  
Don’t you feel, when you go back [to India], don’t you feel like the rapper that made it? 
Like when I show up, I’m like, “yo this is how you guys are living? What?! Yo, when 
Hasan’s here, everybody eats, son, everybody eats! Yeah, Capri Suns on me, fam! 
Gushers on me, fam! Fruit Rollups on me! You’re welcome!” And they’re losing their 
minds over stale Oreos. They’re like, [in a slight Indian accent] “Oh my god, Hasan, it’s 
like one cookie but now it’s two!” I’m like, “I’m not even going to give you a Thin Mint, 
you will shit your pants. If I give you a Samoa you can’t handle this, son. This purple box 
changes everything. Strap in, you will lose your mind.” I call my cousin Sahil, he lives in 
 
16 Minhaj and Storer, Homecoming King.  
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Aligarh, I call him up, “Yo, Sahil, the prodigal son returns. You name it, I’ll bring it to 
you, what do you want?” He’s like, [in slight Indian accent] “Hasan, just bring me 
Hershey’s.” And I’m like, “That’s it? That’s all you want? You could have asked for an 
iPad Retina and all you want is Hershey’s? Hershey’s is a bottom barrel chocolate, Sahil. 
I mean, they just added almonds and stopped.” Are you kidding me, Hershey’s? We have 
a Black President and Twix now; give a shit, Hershey’s! I do! ... I don’t give a shit if you 
work for the Mars Corporation, we’ve been to the moon, goddammit, step your chocolate 
game up. Long story short, I gave my cousin Sahil a Snickers bar, and he’s in an insane 
asylum right now. [In Indian accent] “What is this Hasan?” “It’s nougat.” “What the fuck 
is nougat?!” Those were his last words.17 
 
Both versions of the “rapper that made it” rely on staging those who did not. For Minhaj, 
this is vaguely attributed in Homecoming King but fully personified, complete with an Indian 
accent, through the character of his cousin Sahil in his earlier extended bit. Sahil’s gamely 
persona is exaggeratingly portrayed as infantile and retrograde, satisfied easily with baseline 
treats and unable to fathom the “progress” made in contemporary American chocolateering. The 
notion of progress as demonstrated by the quality of candy is even likened to watershed moments 
like the election of Barack Obama and the moon landing. Sahil exists in a time and in a mindset 
before Minhaj’s present – a child versus a man. That child is fortunate enough to taste modernity 
only fleetingly thanks to the generosity of his American cousin. The image of desperate refugee 
children comes easily to mind, and Minhaj does wink at the hyperbolic leaps he takes with the 
description. At the same time, the reuse of the joke speaks to its utility. Becoming American and 
having access to its riches is a person’s final form. Minhaj’s Right Muslim Man has “made it” to 
the achievable American Dream, become the correct secular subject who is now in a position to 
tender a simulacrum of his “wealth” to those who unvaryingly crave it. The offering is itself a 
reminder of dissonance; this is a wealth in which they cannot partake. Those “back” and “over” 
there – accessible only through a time travel portal – would be so lucky. 
 
17 Hasan Minhaj - White People At Indian Weddings, Just for Laughs Comedy Festival (Montreal, 
Canada, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nNx5tnqD9e0. 
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Stylizing Solidarity and Dissent 
After Homecoming King dropped on Netflix in 2017, it went on to win several media and 
entertainment industry awards. The accolades also cleared a path forward on the same streaming 
platform for Minhaj to host his own news/entertainment show, Patriot Act with Hasan Minhaj, 
which began the fall of 2018. Minhaj has referred to the format of the show as a “woke TED 
talk,” and like Homecoming King, Patriot Act relies almost entirely on Minhaj’s bodily 
performance to carry the humor and content of the program, though he is once more 
accompanied by large screens behind him and under his feet.18 These light up with images and 
citations for the commentary he provides. Minhaj’s clothes are deliberately more “stylish” in 
ways that recall Ansari’s GQ looks; his pants are cropped, his sweaters are fitted, and he never 
repeats sneakers. The politics he brings to the stage are also a noted departure from those 
espoused in Homecoming King. The American Dream he presents in these episodes is far hazier 
and structurally unattainable than before. 
Minhaj continues to call out to a broadly-defined “us” and “we” – sometimes South 
Asians, sometimes Muslims, sometimes Asian Americans. But Patriot Act holds these respective 
communities more deliberately accountable in how they address anti-Blackness, patriarchy, and 
capitalism in the broader United States. The first episode of the show, which aired on October 
28, 2018, takes a deep dive into the state of affirmative action in college admissions. Minhaj 
bounds up on the stage boisterously, exclaiming “we out here!”19 Over the course of 23 minutes, 
he explains both the historical circumstances that ushered in affirmative action policies, as well 
 
18 Richard A. Preuss, Saudi Arabia, Streaming video, vol. 1, Episode 2, Patriot Act with Hasan Minhaj 
(Netflix, 2018). 
19 Richard A. Preuss, Affirmative Action, vol. 1, Patriot Act with Hasan Minhaj (Art & Industry, Comedy 
Bang! Bang! Productions, Margolis Superstore, 2018). 
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as the preponderance of Asian Americans in lobbying for their removal. “Now, Asians, and I am 
lumping all of us together in this, okay?” he says as he turns away from the camera and towards 
his audience. “I find it hilarious that this is the hill we’re willing to die on. Our entire lives, we 
get shat on. ‘Oh you guys have small dicks. You’re bad drivers. You’re the color of poop. You 
smell like curry and kimchi’ We say nothing! The moment we can’t get into Harvard, we’re like 
‘I’ll see you in court, motherfucker!’”20 I read this joke as an extension and a response to 
previous commentary offered in Homecoming King. Minhaj’s father counsels him to “Put your 
head down. Be a doctor, get a house in the burbs, let them call them whatever you want,” which 
Minhaj prefaces with not knowing “who is more right.”21  
In Patriot Act, Minhaj definitively points out that Asian Americans will continue to meet 
institutional and racist barriers on the other side of that supposed escape and achievement.22 He 
lays bare the hypocrisy of Asian American efforts, some co-opted by organizations like the 
Republican-led Students for Fair Admissions, to deny other minoritized groups benefit from such 
policy, especially given how Asian American groups (like Chinese for Affirmative Action) have 
historically lobbied on behalf of the measure to make education more accessible to everyone. 
Minhaj then broadens the scope to criticize institutions like Harvard University for their 
complicity in such racialized conflicts. Their maintenance of “white affirmative action” 
programs like legacy admissions, continue to disproportionately benefit the white, wealthy, and 
well-connected. “We got played,” he insists.  
And for those in the Asian community who keep insisting, “We just want equality! We’re 
American citizens, Treat us like Americans!” then fine. But if you are willing to act like 
racism isn’t a thing, team up with lawyers and then take it to the courts when you don’t 
 
20 Preuss, Affirmative Action. 
21 Minhaj and Storer, Homecoming King. 
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get your way, you’re right. You truly are an American. You just happen to be the worst 
kind.23 
 
Everyone is asked to be accountable in this episode, and Minhaj holds even his own feet to the 
fire. Not only does he admit his SAT score on air, but he confides believing the anti-Black 
advice he received to not check the Asian box on his college application, presuming that “I 
wasn’t going to get into Stanford because some black kid was going to take my spot.” It was 
only much later, he admits, that he realized that “I didn’t get into Stanford because I was dumb!” 
Minhaj’s second episode, titled “Saudi Arabia” went on to gain the most international 
attention when it was banned by the Kingdom’s government for violation of their anti-cyber 
crime law: “Production, preparation, transmission, or storage of material impinging on public 
order, religious values, public morals, and privacy, through the information network or 
computers.”24 Netflix acquiesced to this pressure and removed the episode from its Saudi market. 
Minhaj’s remarks and the self he presents throughout this episode demonstrate how the nuanced 
and honest tenor he advances through this program is still subject to and disciplined by the 
powers of a secular U.S. system as it interacts with the ostensibly theocratic nature of the Saudi 
Kingdom. In the episode, Minhaj details the rise of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin 
Salman (MBS) and his role in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, the suppression 
of activists and potential rivals, his brutal bombing campaign in Yemen, and the open-armed 
welcome he has enjoyed by American politicians, tech magnates, and entertainment industry 
powers including Tim Cook, Jeff Bezos, Donald Trump, and Oprah.25  
 
23 Preuss, “Affirmative Action.” 
24 “Saudi Arabia Anti Cyber Crime Law,” § Article 6 (2007), 
https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/document/anti-cyber-crime-law_html/2014_LA_004_E_Anti-
Cyber_Crime_Law.pdf. 
25 Preuss, “Saudi Arabia.” 
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Minhaj is attentive to the ways that corporate institutions are eager to get into business 
with MBS and the Saudi Arabian government, despite their avowal of progressive politics and 
social values. He also addresses the difficulty of being a Muslim that must, in some way, retain 
some connection to Saudi because of the physical location of Mecca and Medina. “Our 
relationship with Saudi Arabia has always been a complete mindfuck for me,” he says. “As 
Muslims, we have to pray towards Mecca. We make pilgrimage to Mecca. We access God 
through Saudi Arabia, a country that I feel does not represent our values. ‘But, Hasan, there are a 
lot of things people are conflicted about. Look at Amazon, Amazon’s messed up.’ But I don’t 
pray towards Seattle, okay?”26 Elsewhere in the episode, he sternly expresses the dissonance as 
something a U.S. audience inclined towards some nationalistic fervor should also value. 
“Remember America hates terrorists; Saudi Arabia gave them passports. Saudi Arabia was 
basically the boy band manager of 9/11. They didn’t write the songs but they helped get the 
group together.”27 This line received the most media attention after Netflix pulled the episode 
offline, first publicized on January 1, 2019.28 The removal created a maelstrom across media 
circuits, raising questions of what position mammoth tech companies like Netflix should be 
taking as they expand into international markets that seek to limit the availability of content. A 
reiteration of a clash of civilizations discourse brewed in less bombastic terms. 
 
26 Preuss, “Saudi Arabia.” 
27 Preuss, “Saudi Arabia.” 
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For Minhaj, the Right Muslim Man is conflicted by the embedded relationship the U.S. 
maintains with Saudi Arabia, and is obligated to speak out on that conflict, the war in Yemen, 
and the blatant avarice of the nation’s industrial and political leaders when it comes to an 
opportunity to increase shareholder values. Yet Minhaj’s Right Muslim Man, when read by the 
American media and public is one who neatly folds into the frame of “dissident humor” against 
the Bad Muslim strongman. MBS’s callous political maneuverings, especially in his jailing of 
women’s rights activists and free speech advocates, closely resembles the Asads, Mubaraks, and 
Talibans of the so-called “Muslim world.” They also translate easily into Laura Bush’s language 
of the “hyphenated monster” who places his own mother under house arrest. NPR’s coverage of 
the incident referred to the “potential repercussions of his criticism” and the fears he holds for his 
and his family’s safety.29 CNN, likewise, highlights how Minhaj has come to “personal and 
spiritual terms with what the repercussions are.”30 “Think ‘First Amendment.’ Then invert it,” 
the New York Times quipped.31  
The fallout of the episode resulted in a “double bind” for Minhaj, where he was trapped 
between appearing as an agent for broader anti-Muslim discourses while calling attention to a 
series of grave injustices committed by a prominent Muslim leader.32 Nonetheless, Minhaj 
 
29 Ian Stewart, “Netflix Drops Hasan Minhaj Episode In Saudi Arabia At Government’s Request,” 
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Criticized Official Account of Khashoggi Killing,” CNN, January 2, 2019, 
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32 The double bind, as described by Rochelle Terman, is the state of being wedged between imperialism 
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continued to walk the fine line between holding his employer responsible and beating back those 
who saw him as a dissenting hero. In a follow-up update to the Saudi scandal, Minhaj reflects on 
the peculiarity of the bipartisan support he amassed. 
Let’s break down how I became an internet bad boy. Of all the Netflix originals, the only 
show that Saudi Arabia thinks violates “Muslim” values is the one hosted by a Muslim! 
For the first time in my life, I was a bipartisan icon. Liberals and conservatives, they both 
embraced me like I was money from Big Pharma... even Breitbart defended me! 
Breitbart!33 
 
Minhaj keeps the mood light – he jokingly calls himself a bad boy and tugs at the collar of his 
leather jacket before teasing both ends of the American political spectrum for their Citizens 
United-sanctioned corruption and elevating him and his show as a sign of American “free 
speech” principles. A January 2nd tweet about the incident ends with a reiteration that the crisis in 
Yemen is what deserves attention first.34  
 
Playful Impersonations 
Minhaj has, indeed, pushed the needle from the Right Muslim self he positioned in 
Homecoming King and the Right Muslim self in Patriot Act. He has grown bolder in his critique 
against the progressive consensus that enabled his rise, not simply performing gratitude for the 
opportunity. The centralizing good that the Right Muslim protects, however, still is not Islam 
itself. In Minhaj’s brasher impersonation, it is still the central tenant of solidarity – attested as 
 
throughout the world without necessarily undergirding militarized and neo-orientalist narratives of 
Muslim oppression. See Rochelle Terman, “Islamophobia, Feminism and the Politics of Critique,” 
Theory, Culture, & Society 33, no. 2 (July 9, 2015): 77–102. 
33 Richard A. Preuss, Censorship in China, vol. 2, episode 1, Patriot Act with Hasan Minhaj (Art & 
Industry, Margolis Superstore, Minhaj, 2019). 
34 Hasan Minhaj, “Hasan Minhaj on Twitter: ‘Clearly, the Best Way to Stop People from Watching...,’” 
Twitter, January 2, 2019, https://twitter.com/hasanminhaj/status/1080540270092005379. 
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“our” shared principles – that acquire Minhaj’s fervent and funny defense. The cover of 
marginality remains operative. An episode from the fourth volume, filmed on August 12, 2019 
and titled “The Two Sides of Canada,” featured Minhaj taking on the issue of Quebec’s Bill 21. 
This is the province’s secularism law which bans public employees from wearing “religious 
symbols” on their person. “Bill 21 is legalized discrimination,” declared Minhaj on his show. 
“And Monsieur Values [Quebec’s Premier François Legault] here is acting like it’s only about 
enforcing secularism. That’s bullshit. It’s about denying people their right to free expression. 
Also, Quebec, you can’t talk about secularism when your flag kind of has a cross in it.”35  
Minhaj establishes this point of solidarity before cutting to a video clip from his interview 
with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, whom he jokingly cajoles into a word-trap 
shahada. 
Minhaj: What’s going on with this secularism bill? What does this mean? 
Trudeau: I disagree with it… I have been very clear that in a free society, you cannot 
legitimize discrimination against someone based on their religion. 
Minhaj: So you would say you’re accepting all faiths and religions? 
Trudeau: I think what we accept as a country needs to be… defending minorities, 
defending people’s rights. 
Minhaj: Accepting Christianity. 
Trudeau: Accepting Christianity... 
Minhaj: Judaism. 
Trudeau: ... accepting Judaism, accepting Islam, accepting all different... why? 
Minhaj: You accept Islam as the one true faith, the Prophet Muhammad, peace upon him, 
last and final messenger? Don’t laugh at that part! You can’t laugh at that part. 
Trudeau: [Laughing] I am proudly Catholic, but I have a tremendous respect for all 
religions. 
Minhaj: I’ll play the long game. We have until the Day of Judgment. 
Trudeau: I am Catholic. 
Minhaj: [Turns to camera, whispering] Guys, I tried. 
Minhaj, on stage: He’ll come around. Oh, I know it. [Adhan plays in the background]36 
 
 
35 Richard A. Preuss, “The Two Sides of Canada,” Patriot Act with Hasan Minhaj (Netflix, September 1, 
2019). 
36 Preuss, “The Two Sides of Canada.” 
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Minhaj is able to step directly into the impersonation of a Muslim monster and play within it – a 
tricky and covertly proselytizing figure – because he has so concretely established himself as 
otherwise, both to the in-person studio audience and his general “brand” over the course of four 
volumes of Patriot Act and the properly secular performance in Homecoming King. The joke is 
possible only because Minhaj has been freed from necessarily playing both sides at once; “this” 
Muslim has been safely authenticated as decidedly not “that” one. 
 
Conclusion 
 Hasan Minhaj’s efforts at Right Muslim Manhood are constructed through the active and 
mawkish appeal to the viability and achievement of the American Dream narrative. This 
narrative contains a capital-centric, and thus deeply classist, aspiration that concurrently upholds 
racial syllogisms, like the assumption that a nebulous and broad-spectrumed tribalism is what 
ultimately feeds racialized and anti-Muslim violence in the U.S. His centering of a white woman 
in his autobiography is itself a performance of racialized desire which communicates the 
maintenance of those racial hierarchies pertinent to his own class and social upward-trending 
mobility. This sub-function of white supremacy re-appears in Minhaj’s objective to differentiate 
himself from the unsuitable Muslim subject. Throughout his comedy, he insists that difference, 
as understood under the emblem of multiculturalism and the progressive consensus, relies 
primarily on race and racialization.  
Those that dispute this charge are depicted as unmodern and the product of a particular 
geography and environment “over there.” Minhaj’s Right Muslim is shown to stand in opposition 
to “that” Muslim as an evolved counterpoint because of his rootedness in a U.S. American 
geography. The production and reproduction of this performance has landed Minhaj on 
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seemingly sturdy ground as a correct secular subject. This has resulted in a broader platform and 
visibility for his brand of comedy, but has also fashioned Minhaj into an image of dissident 
Muslim humor within the operative regime of humor. Minhaj does not allow the current to take 
him entirely, however, and has exhibited moments of comedic subversion, possible because of 









CHAPTER 8: COUNTER SCRIPTING KUMAIL NANJIANI’S BETA MALE 
 
Well, I’m from Pakistan. We’re still fighting some battles you guys have already won. 
 
- Kumail Nanjiani, The Big Sick1 
 
Introduction 
While Minhaj openly identifies as Muslim in his comedy, Kumail Nanjiani’s career is 
scaffolded on his journey away from Islam. This chapter traces that journey of evasion and 
eventual escape, as well as the tepid ways in which Nanjiani has returned to hold some affinity 
with Islam and Muslims in the United States. Nanjiani’s career as a comic began after his 
graduation from Grinnell College in 2001, when he traveled to Chicago and worked in IT by day 
and performed in comedy clubs by night. A big break from a one-person comedy show about his 
journey away from Islam jumpstarted his Hollywood career. The content and affect that Nanjiani 
comports in allusion to Islam are hyper-cautious of the ways that they may stick to his own 
person. He is the lone Pakistani of the three comedians in this dissertation, and his points of 
temporal and pop culture reference are markedly different than those that Minhaj and Ansari 
work against in their routines.  
I chart how Nanjiani’s Right Muslim Man fashions this cultural orientation as a dearth 
worth joking about after seeking to avoid discussing his Muslimness for much of his early career. 
This avoidance is tempered by the fact that Nanjiani speaks American English accented by his 
upbringing in Pakistan, which makes his construction of the Right Muslim Man far more of a 
 
1 Nanjiani, Gordon, and Showalter, The Big Sick. 
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personal project in his everyday life outside his vocation as a comedian. Like Minhaj and Ansari, 
Nanjiani pursues this personification by racializing his Muslimicity, demonstrating his sexuality 
and desire as universally legible, and distancing himself from practices or beliefs deemed 
explicitly “religious.” I am attentive particularly to the ways that Nanjiani utilizes the dynamism 
of movement and its absence. Where movement towards the secular is depicted as change, self-
improvement, and social evolution, the Muslim point of origination is seen as stagnant, 
simplistic, and stuck.  
 
Becoming Secular, Becoming Pronounceable 
Nanjiani’s one-person show, Unpronounceable, is a mix of comedy and drama and 
received glowing reviews that ultimately enabled him to leave his day job for full-time comedy. 
Nanjiani worked with the director Paul Provenza for two months to put together a show that was 
“personal and truthful.”2 Unpronounceable debuted in Chicago but was performed on several 
comedy circuits between the years 2007 and 2009. The show itself, however, is nowhere to be 
found on the internet or for purchase. Interviews since Unprounceable’s initial run have inferred 
that “the jokes and opinions voiced within the show were considered blasphemous back home, 
and it put his parents in danger.”3 Emails back and forth between myself and his managers have 
thus far yielded only apologies for the delay and no luck in securing a copy for viewing.  
There are a few grainy promotional videos that exist online, in which Nanjiani appears in 
a simple t-shirt and tousled hair almost over his eyes alongside interviews with audience 
 
2 Glenn Jeffers, “New Territory for Comedian Born in Pakistan: Himself,” McClatchy Tribune Business 
News, July 6, 2007, http://search.proquest.com/docview/462079344. 




members outside the venue after the show. “We really enjoyed it!” two women enthuse to the 
person wielding the camera. “What was his name? Kamel? Kamel.”4 (Unpronounceable, indeed.) 
Some published reviews also include quotations and clips from the performance. Its turn in 
Albuquerque was billed by the theater director as a “collision” in which Nanjiani slammed into 
“the American Judeo-Christian life” and divulges “really really foreign customs from Pakistan, 
and how that conflicts with his life here. This is a revealing side of Islam that is foreign to us. 
And it’s very funny.”5 Other reviews resonate with this appraisal. Timeout New York called it an 
example of “an angel get[ting] his wings - a young Pakistani man moves West, loses religion and 
finds comedy” while the A.V. Club Chicago called it a “transformation” for Nanjiani “from a 
fundamentalist Shiite Muslim to an atheist.”6  
These critics are not seeing simply what they want to see. For his part, Nanjiani does little 
to complicate this straightforward narrative as consumed by his audience. In the evolution of his 
life story, the impersonations that Nanjiani takes on do not require new characters to portray the 
“that” Muslim and “this” one – both are already himself, though critically at different temporal 
nodes of his life. This cleanly places each on one side of the stratifying node (his journey to the 
U.S) and the other. Unlike Ansari and Minhaj, there is little subtext to the text of his humor. This 
may account for the near universal praise he accrued for Unpronounceable – a story of 
 
4 Kumail Nanjiani’s “Unpronounceable” at Lakeshore Theater (LakeshoreTheater Youtube Channel), 
accessed May 16, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OtuSLI_JKuQ&t=5s. 
5 Dan Mayfield, “Finding Laughs in Culture Shock ; Pakistan Native Reflects on Move to U.S. in 
‘Unpronounceable,’” Albuquerque Journal, January 2008. 
6 Andrew Marantz, “An Angel Gets His Wings,” Time Out New York, March 27, 2008, 
www.timeout.com/newyork/comedy/an-angel-gets-his-wings; David Wolinsky, “Kumail Nanjiani: 
Chicago Stand-up Explores His Fundamentalist Upbringing in One-Man Show,” A.V. Club Chicago, 





secularization that ends the way it “should.” When recounting his childhood in Karachi, Nanjiani 
explains that even small joys like music were denied to him by the Qur’an and had to be pursued 
in secret. Even then, however, Nanjiani turns this micro-tragedy into a silly, though still dark, 
hypothetical that works to soften the bite of the original Muslim edict. 
We were also told that if you listened to music, we would have molten lead poured into 
your ears in hell. My cousin had introduced me to “Smooth Criminal” by Michael 
Jackson when I was about nine years old, and I loved that song. I was secretly listening to 
it when my parents were away. But I remember hearing about that punishment, and I put 
my head between my feet and I cried, terrified. And then I remember thinking, “why 
lead? Why specifically lead?” I would have thought that hell has enough lava, right? That 
would hurt. But specifically lead. Maybe Satan got a really good deal on lead, like during 
the heyday of alchemy, and he totally overbought. And now he’s like, “Well, we gotta 
move all this lead. If you listen to music, we’ll pour it in your ears. If you dance, we’ll 
encase you in lead.”7 
 
Other sources indicate that Nanjiani describes additional stories about the Prophet Muhammad 
that present as fantastical and unrealistic in Unpronounceable. He also depicts with brutal detail 
the practice of self-flagellation among Shi’i Muslims (“it’s kind of like a Pride parade”) and his 
obsession with Hollywood movies, which his parents allowed in their home as a sort of virus 
inoculation: “just enough knowledge of Western culture to ultimately resist it.”8  
Even after coming to the U.S., Nanjiani says he felt like it was “an alien planet” because 
he had not so much as shaken hands with a woman before the age of 18. In Iowa, he resented his 
freshman year dorm roommate for having sex on the bunk above him well into the night. “I 
would be laying there at three in the morning, tired, new to this country, feeling dirty, and 
thinking that my roommate was going to hell. I’d get him up at five in the morning because I had 
 
7 Paulson, “Kumail Nanjiani on ‘Unpronounceable.’” 
8 Paulson, “Kumail Nanjiani on ‘Unpronounceable.’”; Marantz, “An Angel Gets His Wings”; Sean 




set the alarm so I could pray. That seemed fair.”9 There is almost a wildlife-documentary feel to 
this pre-enlightenment self that Nanjiani conjures for his audience. “That” Muslim has been was 
written to appear as strange, foreign, and incomprehensible, and every feature of the improperly 
sexual Muslim monster is made manifest. Nanjiani describes violence, festering disloyalty, 
sexual deprivation and disillusionment. This makes the transition to the next stage – secular 
enlightenment – the most plausible next step. 
 This takes place in a philosophy course at Grinnell College, where Nanjiani had been 
“learning all these things about debate and critical thinking” but he “hadn’t really been applying 
these things [he] was learning to Islam.”10 In the process of writing a paper that contrasted what 
he called the views of “Islam and the west,” he came across the 34th verse of the fourth chapter 
of the Qur’an, often referred to as the daraba verse. 
And I thought, that can’t be right, must be a bad translation. So I looked up other 
translations all each one said the exact same thing. If your wife doesn’t listen to you, you 
are allowed to beat her lightly. And I knew that was wrong. I knew, I knew, I knew that 
was wrong. I knew God’s final word to his people would not give husbands permission to 
beat their wives, no matter how lightly. It just wasn’t something I could fit in that little 
room in my brain anymore. I left the computer lab and I walked around. It was two in the 
morning. And I know it’s cliché that my life’s existential crisis came at two in the 
morning. But that’s just when they happen! I didn’t pick the time. If I had picked the 
time, I would have chosen, like, an hour after lunchtime, when you’re all energized and 
ready to tackle an epiphany. I remember thinking, the Qur’an is an infallible text. 
Unchanged and applicable for all time. Well this sentence was never applicable. If I 
couldn’t trust this sentence in the Qur’an, could I trust any sentence in the Qur’an? I went 
to bed that night and I felt like I was falling fast. I felt like I was in free fall. Could I trust 
any sentence in the Qur’an?11 
 
Nanjiani invites the audience to wallow in his crisis of faith though not for long. The devastation 
has no productive direction but away, and he quickly converts this wreckage into a moment of 
 
9 Claire Zulkey, “The Showoff,” Chicago Magazine, June 13, 2007, 
http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/July-2007/The-Showoff/. 
10 Paulson, “Kumail Nanjiani on ‘Unpronounceable.’” 
11 Paulson, “Kumail Nanjiani on ‘Unpronounceable.’” 
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secular transition and transformation. The shift is performed in sterile fashion; cue words like 
“debate” and “critical thinking” are commandeered into a straightforward and uncomplicated 
arrow towards the final goalpost of ideal secular subjecthood. The Islam he describes in this 
segment is similarly uncomplicated; the translations of the Qur’an he examines are all the same. 
By applying the logic of deductive reasoning in his epiphany – this all took place because of a 
freshman philosophy class, after all – Nanjiani arrives at the conclusion that the universal Qur’an 
was not to be trusted, and nothing can be salvaged from it.  
This is the salvationary recognition and certitude that gatekeepers of the secular crave – 
when spoken by a discontentedly Muslim figure, this crisis of faith functions as a form of native 
testimonial. It relies on Orientalist notions of a singular Muslim tethered to a literal text, 
temporally and developmentally immobile. The crossover is thus legitimized, as is the depth and 
pervasiveness of the secular’s reach among colonized populations, churning out its slow and 
steady work long after the formality of empire has ceased. It is a story that secularly-invested 
U.S. audiences are eager to hear, welcoming the Muslim identified by their racialization but 
severed from Islam. This is as an example of their own tolerance and multiculturalism. By the 
barometer of success for standup comedians, the Unpronounceable bought him the next step up: 
a sitcom pilot. A New York Times feature on Nanjiani from 2009 mentions explicitly that “it was 
largely on the strength of ‘Unpronounceable’… that he was able to sell his idea for a sitcom to 




12 Konigsberg, “For Kumail Nanjiani, a Good Time to Be Funny.” 
228 
 
 While this sitcom idea ultimately went on to become The Big Sick instead, 
Unpronounceable allowed Nanjiani to become a full-time comic. He starred in his own Comedy 
Central special, Beta Male, in 2013. Beta Male borrows material heavily from Unpronounceable 
but does not tell a single continuous story the way its predecessor does. The set is recorded in 
front of a live audience in Austin, Texas, and Nanjiani wears a loose blue hoodie over a similarly 
colored flannel shirt. As he walks out on stage, a soundbite from the South Asian/Afro-Cuban 
hip-hop group Das Racist accompanies his stride to the center of the stage.13 The overall clip of 
the special is uneven – Nanjiani shuffles across the floor, sometimes mumbling and sometimes 
assertive. The look fits the perceived mold of a “beta male;” typically imagined as subordinate, 
effeminate, and generally lacking in the attributes of an ideal American man. And yet, Nanjiani 
is deliberate in crafting himself not as an impression of that ideal American man, but as one that 
would be legible within the matrix of sexual intelligibility in which that man reigns. One of the 
jokes that appears in both Unpronounceable and Beta Male is about watching porn for the first 
time on a VHS tape given to him by his cousin.  
I was raised as a very religious Muslim. We were told that - and this is true – we were 
told when we were little kids that staring at a woman with a lustful gaze was the same sin 
as stabbing the Prophet’s nephew [laughter]... in the back [laughter]... while he’s praying 
[laughter]. Look at a girl, stab the prophet’s nephew in the back while he’s praying, 
equal. So I was terrified of women, you know. But then, when I was around 10, I 
remember… do you guys remember that Cindy Crawford Diet Pepsi commercial? She’s 
wearing the tight white tank top and those hip-hugging jeans and she’s in the convertible, 
her hair in the breeze. She gets out, she walks over to the vending machine, puts in the 
quarter, picks her drink, then she pops the tab and puts the cylinder to her lips… I 
remember thinking, “I am stabbing the fuck out of the prophet’s nephew right now.” 
[raucous laughter] … At that age though, I didn’t know what sex was. I would not even 
know what I would do if I was in a room with Cindy. Squeeze her mole? That sounds 
awesome today actually!14 
 
 
13 Nanjiani, Beta Male. 
14 Nanjiani, Beta Male. 
229 
 
Nanjiani foregrounds sex and sexuality in his recollections of childhood in Pakistan as a 
precursor for what makes him a “beta male” in the U.S. today. His current condition, where he is 
still uncomfortable around women, can be attributed to the dense scolding he received as a child 
where lust or even a “look” was equated with stabbing the first Shi’i imam, Ali. This goes 
unnamed in Beta Male, unlike in Unpronounceable. In Beta Male, to name his previous Muslim 
self is specific enough to signify his difference and danger. The joke about seeing Crawford for a 
mere 30 seconds implies an obvious unsustainability to a Muslim state of being. This is a 
continuity from Unpronounceable, where to be Muslim is to be in a state of complete normative 
submission or one ceases to be Muslim at all. The textually-compliant Muslim of Nanjiani’s 
yesteryear is sexually repressed and morally cracking because of it. Desire for Crawford is 
violence for Ali. He continues the bit with the following: 
All that innocence disappears when my cousin gives me a video tape. And I’m like, oh 
that’s what I would do to her. Yeah… it’s a porn, I don’t know if you guys got that. And 
it was too early for me to see porn. Like my body wasn’t ready. I put it in, I watched it for 
30 seconds, I pulled it out, I had a fever for three days. I promised God I would never 
watch it again. But then a couple weeks later I got curious, I was like, well I didn’t really 
give it a chance, did I? What is the motivation of these characters? And then I put it back 
in, and then you couldn’t fucking stop me. Which is where I still am today …  so it’s a 
regular porn, beginning, middle, men, women; you know what a porn is. But there’s a 
two-minute preview before for a different porn… I don’t know how to say it, but it’s a 
preview where the people, uh, defecate on each other. [Lone audience member yells, 
‘yes!’] Uh, security? There’s a monster in the room. Other than you, everybody was very 
awkward. And then you yelled, and everybody was even more awkward!  Because I was 
10, it was too early for me to see porn, but it was definitely way too early for me to 
realize that people like her existed. My favorite part is that it’s a regular porn but that’s 
the preview. It’s like, ‘do you like sex? Well, then you might like shitting on people! Do 
you like driving a car? Well maybe you would like to drown in a submarine that’s on 
fire!’15 
 
Nanjiani affirms a normative sexuality through this segment, even though he is retelling a story 
from his childhood. His sexual rapacity aligns coherently with the world he has built around it. 
 
15 Nanjiani, Beta Male. 
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When he mentions growing up in Karachi during his Beta Male set, a single cheer rings from the 
crowd. He turns to the woman and asks deftly, “How’s Karachi doing? Same as ever? Mostly on 
fire?”16 The Karachi that Nanjiani conjures is familiar to other places his audience knows 
because of how stripped down and embroiled it is in visions of neo-orientalist Islam.  
This “IslamLand,” as Lila Abu-Lughod has called it, is a mythical homogenous space of 
inequality and suffering, particularly of Muslim women. It is “the place where things are most 
wrong today,” and authorizes the language of international human rights as a central moral 
imperative for Euroamerica-sanctioned revolution or escape for those that live “there.”17 Nanjiani 
unbendingly places himself in the latter camp, undergoing an internal moral revolution and 
“becoming” commensurate with his new sexually-correct countrymen. That correctness does not 
tolerate sexual deviance on the other end, which Nanjiani makes clear through the emphasis on 
how “awkward” the audience member who cheered for the defecation porn (facetiously called a 
“monster”) made the space for every other sexually-right person in the room. Nanjiani thus 
presents himself as an appropriately sexual Muslim subject – enlightened enough to distance 
himself from sexual repression and violence but not deviant in the sexual proclivities he finally 
chooses to indulge.  
 
Muslim Immobility 
 The Big Sick, released in 2017, tells the story of Nanjiani’s courtship to his now-wife, 
Emily Gordon. The backdrop of the film is his relationship with his parents – stand-ins for Islam 
 
16 Nanjiani, Beta Male. 




and its attendant cultural expectations – which he successfully extricates himself from by the 
film’s end. Emily, played in the film by Zoe Kazan, is a white woman from North Carolina, 
whom Nanjiani meets at one of his standup performances when she lightly heckles him from the 
bar. In the movie, the two date long enough to develop strong feelings for another. They break up 
when it is revealed that Nanjiani has continued to begrudgingly meet other Muslim women 
through arrangements by his parents who are trying to get him married. When Emily 
unexpectedly is placed into a medically-induced coma, Nanjiani stays by her side and develops a 
relationship with her parents, deciding to ultimately follow his heart and come clean to his 
family. The film is meant to mirror their real lives, though cinematic licenses were taken to 
condense reality into and create a more coherent storyline.18 The Big Sick was a hit, earning 
accolades at Sundance and a release deal from Amazon. It went on to a wide release in theaters 
during the summer of 2017.  
 Nanjiani’s character, Kumail, retains similarities to the real-life Nanjiani. Both are 
comedians, and both have experienced pressure by their parents to marry Pakistani Muslim 
women. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the real-life Nanjiani as Nanjiani, and his character 
in The Big Sick as Kumail. As the protagonist, Kumail is also the romantic lead. For all the 
imperfect dispositional layers a lead may possess, his masculine features are also put forth as the 
ideal within the cultivated universe of the film. Nanjiani’s ideal masculinity, as demonstrated 
through Kumail, retains the soft edges of his precursory “beta” self, but with upgrades. Now, he 
is a legibly sexual figure not because of masturbation but through the act of having sex.  
 




In the film, this is demonstrated by Kumail attending to the accepted rites of accelerated 
courtship before having sex with Emily at the end of their first date. While he is shown to have 
commitment issues, a common trope in romantic comedies, this failure is a direct result of his 
Muslim heritage and the expectations of the Muslims in his life. Kumail’s narrative arc, 
therefore, exhibits his journey in breaking free of Islam’s violent chokehold on his own 
individuality. In the first scene set in the Nanjiani family home, his parents and brother lament 
another cousin’s marriage to a white woman. This is followed up by a request (implied to be the 
latest iteration of a long-standing demand) that Kumail take the LSAT. When he insists that he is 
still pursuing comedy, his sister-in-law lights up and advises he simply ask for a job at Saturday 
Night Live.  
When his mother, Sharmeen, asks Kumail to go pray before eating dessert, he descends 
into the family’s basement, lays down a janamaz and sets a timer for five minutes. A rapid-fire 
montage shows him swinging around a cricket bat, examining what items lay on a random shelf, 
and watches a YouTube video of someone jumping into a frozen pool. The timer goes off in the 
middle, and he heads back upstairs. His mother, meanwhile, has laid out an additional place 
setting next to Kumail’s and the doorbell rings. “Oh. I wonder who that could be?” she says 
coolly, avoiding eye contact with Kumail. He sighs. “I’m guessing it’s a young, single Pakistani 
woman who just happened to be driving by our house, which is in a cul-de-sac and I’m also 
guessing that the phrase ‘dropped in’ will be said in the next ten seconds.” Sharmeen reemerges 
seconds later with a young Pakistani woman wearing shalwar kamiz at her side, trumpeting, 
“Everyone. This is Zubeida. She just dropped in.”19  
 
19 Nanjiani, Gordon, and Showalter, The Big Sick. 
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The ensuing scene with Zubeida plays out largely in slapstick fashion. Zubeida fumbles 
as she takes her seat, she makes poorly timed references to the X-Files in an effort to win 
Kumail’s favor and is generally acted out as desperate and over-eager. After she leaves, 
Sharmeen reminds Kumail that “Kumi, there’s not going to be a magic spark, okay? You have to 
work at it. You have to stay open.” A headshot Zubeida gave Kumail gets thrown carelessly into 
a cigar box, and the camera zooms in to show multiple other headshots – potential rishtas, or 
spouses – underneath gathering dust. He shuts the box closed unceremoniously. Emily finds the 
box after they have been dating for four months, and confronts him about it. They have the 
following exchange:  
Kumail:  You know what we call “arranged marriage” in my culture, Emily? Marriage! 
Okay? We just call it marriage. There’s another type of marriage that’s called “love 
marriage” and that’s bad. My cousin Rehan married an Irish woman and he was kicked 
out of the family! And nobody is allowed to talk to him. 
Emily: Why didn’t you tell me any of this? 
Kumail: Because I didn’t think you’d fucking understand and I was fucking right! 
Emily: You don’t think I could fathom your life in any fucking way? 
Kumail:  I’m fighting a fourteen hundred year old culture! You were ugly in high school! 
There’s a big fucking difference! [a beat] I’m sorry. I can’t lose my family.20 
 
In one of the movie’s final scenes, Kumail attempts to reconcile with Emily as she recovers from 
her coma. He hands her a jar of gray powder, declaring “These are the ashes of all the Pakistani 
women, er, well, not the women, the pictures of the Pakistani women. I thought this was a good 
idea, but it feels a little stupid.”21 
 This final image is almost campishly on the nose: a literal box of Pakistani women burnt 
to a crisp to appease the white woman Kumail actually desires. Yet far from sitting 
uncomfortably, this is a laugh line supplied at the expense of Kumail’s attempt at dramatic 
 
20 Nanjiani, Gordon, and Showalter, The Big Sick. 
21 Nanjiani, Gordon, and Showalter, The Big Sick. 
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romance. The women in the box were never meant to be considered serious prospects; they are 
gauche, foreign, and invariably awaiting Kumail’s attention. Even the figure of Khadija, the only 
woman to appear in a second scene, says simply three lines that are not meant to be humorous: 
“My mom says I’m becoming the bruised apple at the bottom of the apple bucket… people are 
always telling me what I deserve. It’s bullshit.”22 She is a classic Muslim woman in need of 
rescue from IslamLand, but Kumail has his sights set elsewhere. The fixation on choice, and the 
pursuit of the white Emily, reigns supreme over the salvation of Muslim women from their ever-
eroding conditions as brides-to-be. In distinct comparison, Emily is vivacious, witty, confident, 
and independent both before and after her coma.  
The same can be said for Kumail’s family. His parents, Sharmeen and Azmat (the latter 
played by Anupam Kher, a prominent Indian actor and a vocal supporter of India’s Bharatiya 
Janata Party), are singularly focused on their son’s proper religiosity and his marriage.23 This 
focus is enforced by fear of isolation and exclusion which Kumail’s brother Naveed similarly 
enforces. 
 
Naveed: …You should listen to mom and grow a beard. 
Kumail: It gets really itchy, I’ve tried. It’s all patchy. 
Naveed: Try being a man and condition like I do. 
Kumail: What’s the whole thing with Muslims growing beards anyway? It’s such an 
arbitrary thing. Like who decided that? Oh, we have to have beards. 
 
22 Nanjiani, Gordon, and Showalter, The Big Sick. 
23 In addition to his fervent support for the Prime Minister Modi and his BJP Party, Anupam Kher lauded 
the ruling government’s move in 2019 to scrap Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and called for a 
“Kashmir solution” and the “potential for correction.” See Ankur Pathak, “We Asked Anupam Kher 
About His Love For Modi. It Got Intense,” HuffPost India, November 9, 2019, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.in/entry/anupam-kher-interview-bjp-narendra-
modi_in_5dc3d437e4b0d8eb3c8fe496; Anupam Kher, “Genocide to 1990 Mei Hua Tha @bainjal Ji. 
Kashmiri Pandito Ka...,” Twitter, August 4, 2019, 
https://twitter.com/anupampkher/status/1158193714642194432; Anupam Kher, “Kashmir Solution Has 
Begun.,” Twitter, August 4, 2019, https://twitter.com/anupampkher/status/1158095559061909504. 
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Naveed: Yeah. There are a billion of us and you are the only one with the truth. Is that 
right? The sun is just shining down on you right now. It’s just parting like “ahh.” 
Kumail: You know, I have to tell you something, Bhai. 
Naveed: Here we go. Yeah? 
Kumail:  I’ve been dating this girl. 
Naveed: Acha. 
Kumail: She’s white. 
Naveed: I thought you were going to say you were involved in a hit and run or you got 
caught forging some checks. But a WHITE GIRL? Such a cliché.  
A white family stares in their direction. 
Kumail: It’s okay! We hate terrorists! 
… 
Kumail: If I find someone who’s as good for me as Fatima is for you, Mom would 
understand, right? I mean, she wouldn’t love me less? 
Naveed: She would definitely love you less. Slowly, you’d sort of -- what’s the word 
when guys stop returning girls’ calls? 
Kumail:  Ghosting? 
Naveed: Yes. [dead serious] You have to end it now or Mom will fucking ghost you.24 
 
Kumail’s clean-shaven face is yet another quiet but effective example of the masculinity 
he seeks to present which also separates him from the Muslim men in his family. Though 
his brother teases him about it, Kumail’s ponderance about this en-masse practice among 
Muslim men following prophetic sunnah is explained as “arbitrary,” loyal to an ancient 
whim and not something otherwise rational. Naveed does not point out this insinuation; 
he only retorts that a billion people can’t be wrong. The beard commentary is mere 
seconds and concludes quickly in order to return to the main plotline. On the issue how 
the rest of the family will respond to Kumail’s news of Emily, Naveed’s warning bears 
out. 
Sharmeen: Kumi, if you don’t want to be a lawyer, fine. If you want to do the stand-up 
comedy and embarrass us as a family, fine. There is only one thing that we have ever 
asked from you: that you be a good Muslim and that you marry a Pakistani girl. That is it, 
one thing! 
Kumail: Can I ask you something that has never made sense to me? Why did you bring 
me here if you wanted me to not have an American life? We come here but we pretend 
like we’re still back there? That’s so stupid! 
Azmat:  Don’t you talk to your mother like that! 
 
24 Nanjiani, Gordon, and Showalter, The Big Sick. 
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Kumail: You don’t care what I think. You just want me to follow the rules. But the rules 
don’t make sense to me. I don’t pray. I don’t. I haven’t prayed in years. I just go down 
there and I play video games. 
Azmat: You don’t believe in Allah? 
Kumail: I don’t know what I believe, Dad! I don’t know. And I can’t marry someone you 
find for me. 
Sharmeen: And why not? 
Kumail:  Because I’m in love with someone. I am. Her name is Emily and she’s gonna be 
a therapist. And right now she’s very sick but I couldn’t tell you that. It makes me so sad 
that I couldn’t tell you any of that. I really appreciate everything you’ve done for me. I 
truly, truly do. And I know Islam has been really good for you, it has made you good 
people, but I don’t know what I believe. I just need to figure it out on my own. 
Sharmeen: You’re not my son. 
Sharmeen turns her back on Kumail and heads towards the door. 
Azmat: Kumi, you’re being selfish. You’re not thinking about us. You’re not thinking 
about Khadija. In fact you’re not even thinking about that girl that you are in love with. 
You think American Dream is just about doing whatever you want and not thinking about 
other people? You’re wrong! You are wrong! 
Sharmeen and Azmat leave. 25 
 
These exchanges are depicted as being between Muslim “insiders,” where the audience is given 
silent access to hear their “internal” conversation. In them, Sharmeen, Azmat, Naveed, and the 
Pakistani women do not flex, let alone grow. As individuals, they underscore the stuckness of a 
pre/anti-modern Muslim subject in two ways: both in terms of the types of communal praxis and 
perspective they partake in (prayer, arranged marriage, excommunication) and in the incapacity 
for “tolerance”/maintaining cordial relations with those that choose to no longer engage in such 
praxis. Their stuckness precludes the ability to “become” anything than what they already are 
and always have been. The lack of agency is racialized onto both Kumail and his family; the 
jolting experience of Emily’s coma is what enables his (and only his) escape from it. 
Kumail, by film’s end, has individuated himself out of this static state and is involved 
instead in a secular process of becoming: he is “figuring it out on his own” and for himself, but 
still appreciative of what Islam may offer others. His mother, on the other hand, shows no such 
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faculty. She is stone-faced and unmoved: “You’re not my son.” The last word is given to Azmat, 
which accentuates the gulf in their thinking. This contrasts with Kumail’s secular practice of 
self-determination and the pursuit of individual choice – in love, in religion – and ultimately 
demonstrates his proper place in the secular schema and the illegible place of the Muslim who 
does not. He has moved and changed; a dynamic that is not offered to his parents. Following this 
logic, there is no need spend screen time on stationary subjects. This is why the characters that 
are written to flourish in The Big Sick are the Right Muslim and the non-Muslims: Kumail, 
Emily, and Emily’s parents, Terry and Beth.  
 
Secular Expansion 
When the audience first meets them, Terry and Beth are in the hospital, frantic and scared 
by the condition their daughter is in. When Kumail arrives, Beth will not even speak to him, 
though Terry attempts polite conversation. In the hospital canteen, he invites Kumail to sit beside 
them while they each lunch and await an update from Emily’s doctor.  
Kumail nods. Sits down. They eat. It’s awkward. 
Kumail: How’s your sandwich? 
Beth: Best fuckin’ sandwich I’ve ever had. 
Terry: Mine’s good. Tuna’s always a gamble. You know, we’re not by the water. Well, 
we are by the water, but it’s a lake. There’s no tuna in the lake. Whatever. I threw the 
dice. I got the 7’s, I guess. Whatever the good dice number is. 
More silence. 
Terry: So, uh, 9/11? 
Blank looks from Kumail and Beth. 
Terry: No, I mean, I’ve always wanted to have a conversation about it with...people. 
Kumail:  You’ve never talked to people about 9/11? 
Terry:  No, uh, what’s your stance? 
Kumail: What’s my stance on 9/11? Oh, ummmm... Anti. It was a tragedy. [a beat] I 
mean we lost 19 of our best guys. 
Beth: Huh? 
Kumail: That was a joke, obviously. 9/11 was a terrible tragedy, and it’s not funny to 
joke about it.26 
 




Here, Nanjiani has inserted a daring joke that steps outside the bounds of the regime of humor. 
There is even an underlying jab at the regime itself - what is and isn’t worthy of laughter – 
though the joke self-disciplines through Kumail’s appearance of reproach. It is arguably the 
biggest laugh line of the movie; one that impressed reviewers so much they mentioned it in the 
title of their commentary.27  
According to Nanjiani, the joke works because “my character is quick and makes 
inappropriate jokes, and he makes the most inappropriate joke possible about the most 
inappropriate event to make a joke about: 9/11.” His explanation, however, only gets at half of 
the character-building that enables such humor. Like Minhaj and Ansari, a 9/11 joke told by a 
Muslim messenger is only possible because of how firmly and convincingly Nanjiani has 
evinced himself as unmistakably not “that” Muslim and a believer of the secular instead. The 
joke – as it is spoken – is always known to be a fiction. The humor comes from seeing the joke’s 
recipient balk, unarmed with the knowledge the audience already has. As the film progresses, 
Beth and Terry continue to warm up to Kumail as he takes them back to Emily’s apartment to 
wait for more news and then out to a local bar where they watch him perform his standup 
routine. While on stage, Kumail is heckled by an aggressive racist.  
Kumail: I want to name my kid Void so he won’t be able to cash any of his paychecks. 
Beth and Terry watch from the audience, laughing. 
Kumail: I’m sorry, sir, this says Void on it. But that’s my name. Curse you, father! 
(gesturing upwards) I work on the second floor of the bank in this fantasy scenario. 
 
27 Sam Adam for Slate Magazine calls it “ what may be the best 9/11 joke ever made” in Sam Adams, 
“Watch the Trailer for Kumail Nanjiani’s Sundance Hit The Big Sick,” Slate Magazine, May 2, 2017, 
https://slate.com/culture/2017/05/watch-the-trailer-for-kumail-nanjiani-s-the-big-sick-video.html; see also 
Marlow Stern, “Kumail Nanjiani on the Art of Crafting a Masterful 9/11 Joke and That Time He Was 
Accosted by Trump Supporters,” The Daily Beast, June 21, 2017, sec. entertainment, 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/kumail-nanjiani-on-the-art-of-crafting-a-masterful-911-joke-and-being-
accosted-by-trump-supporters; Caroline Siede, “The Big Sick Lovingly Updated the Rom-Com Formula 




Heckler: Go back to ISIS! 
A hush over the crowd. Kumail not sure how to respond. 
Kumail: Toast is a really strange food. 
Beth: [to heckler] What did you just say? 
Heckler: I said, he should go back to ISIS. 
Kumail: Toast is the only food that- 
Beth: Well that’s a really confusing position. Do you want ISIS to have more people? 
Heckler: No, I was saying that to him because... 
Beth: Guess what everybody? We’ve got an ISIS recruiter here. 
The crowd laughs. 
Kumail: Glad we got to the bottom of that. Toast is like a- 
Beth: What is it about him that made you say that? 
Kumail: I think we know what the answer is. 
Heckler: Lady, I wasn’t talking to you. 
Beth: What is it about him? 
Kumail: We don’t have to go down this path. We know what’s at the end of it. 
Heckler: ‘Cuz of how he looks. 
Kumail: There it is. 
Beth: That is like saying that all frat boys wearing country club hats and Hawaiian shirts 
have shriveled up, tiny little dicks! 
The crowd reacts. 
Kumail:  Actually, Beth, this is a bad way for you to find out, but he’s right. I actually am 
a terrorist. I just do stand-up comedy on the side to keep a low profile. 
Heckler: Fuck you. 
Kumail: First of all, very clever. Did you write that at home? Toast is - 
Beth: Fuck you! 
Heckler: Fuck you. 
Beth: No, fuck you!28 
 
This is a breakout moment for the character of Beth, who until this scene has retained a 
cold pretense towards Kumail. As the writers of the film, Nanjiani and Gordon noticed a 
difference in the audience reaction this scene received before and after the 2016 presidential 
election. “In test screenings, which we were doing before the election, (Beth’s outburst) just got 
huge laughs,” says Gordon. Nanjiani expresses apprehension about its reception in 2017 but is 
pleased that audience responses are not just amused. “It’s also righteous anger. People clap as if 
(it’s) almost triumphant.”29 Beth’s pugnacious defense of the movie’s Right Muslim Man 
 
28 Nanjiani, Gordon, and Showalter, The Big Sick. 
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protagonist adds a desirable secular component to her politics, while Kumail, too, is shown to 
experience anti-Muslim hostility despite trying to avoid naming its racialized dimension against 
him. His passiveness and her feminist bellicosity each take their place within the syllogisms of 
the progressive consensus.  
This works well for the movie’s overall plotline, as the heckling incident acts as a 
bridging event to bring the three characters closer together. They collectively drink over the 
course of the night. Beth tells the story of how her military family did not initially accept Terry, a 
teacher from New York who “couldn’t even change a tire.”30 Terry confides that he cheated on 
Beth a non-determined amount of time ago, and while she has forgiven him, his guilt still dogs 
him. Both parents are given a full backstory, and their character motives draw from seemingly 
universal affects – abiding love for their child, fear for her health, solidarity for the oppressed, 




A final note on cinematic license. After Kumail’s parents leave his apartment angrily, we 
see them again during a scene in which Kumail interrupts their family dinner to tell them he is 
moving to New York to pursue his comedy career. None of them speak in response. Finally, as 
he packs his car full of furniture moments before departing, his parents pull up. Azmat steps out, 
tells Kumail “You are still kicked out of the family, but because we did not get a proper chance 
to say bye to you... Your mother is so angry with you. She is not going to get out of the car. 
She’s not even going to look at you… here [handing him plastic container]. Biryani. For your 
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trip. Your favorite. She made it herself specially for you with extra potatoes.”31 As Kumail turns 
to look at her, she turns away. It is the last we see of her. At the same time, the Tupperware 
represents a crack, a tempered hint towards future reconciliation. But the film does not explore 
that possibility.  
In real life, Nanjiani’s parents were far less obstinate in Nanjiani’s own retelling of this 
time in his life. In multiple interviews, Nanjiani admits that while his family had expected to 
arrange a marriage for him, his confession about Emily was met with great concern. “She was 
super-sick, and they saw how much I loved her, and they obviously aren’t monsters so they were 
like, ‘OK, what can we do? Can we come visit her?’” he says in Cosmopolitan Magazine.32 After 
her recovery, “they knew there was nothing they could do to stop it, so they were like, ‘Well, you 
have to get married right now.’ So that’s what happened.”33 On Conan O’Brien’s talk show in 
2016, Nanjiani relates a funny story about the day of his wedding, which took place within three 
months of Emily’s hospitalization. “So we’re Muslim and she’s not Muslim,” he explains, “but 
my family was very understanding and very welcoming, so we had this Muslim ceremony at my 
parents’ house.”34 He even quips that Emily did not mind that the nikkah was presided over by an 
imam (whom O’Brien repeatedly refers to as a “cleric”) because “we did both, you know, we did 
the Muslim one and the wrong one!”35 And in a 45 minute sit-down with Terry Gross of NPR’s 
 
31 Nanjiani, Gordon, and Showalter, The Big Sick. 
32 Jane Marie, “The Secret Life of Marrieds: Why We Kept Our Marriage Secret for Years,” 
Cosmopolitan, May 20, 2014, https://www.cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/relationship-advice/secret-life-of-
marrieds-kumail-emily. 
33 Marie, “The Secret Lives of Marrieds.” 
34 Kumail Nanjiani: The Muslim Cleric Who Married Me Was Into Beyoncé, CONAN (TBS, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5oQCkcot9K4. 
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Fresh Air, Nanjiani elaborates even further on how unexpected it was to witness his parents’ 
adaptation to his marriage.  
Nanjiani: It’s very tricky because I understand my parents - I understand why they 
wanted me to marry someone within the culture - right? - because they’re here and they 
want to hold onto their identity and they want to hold onto their culture. And one of the 
most important ways to do it is to sort of pass it on to your kids. And then having your 
kid choose someone outside the culture, I understand. You know, it’s a very – it’s a 
struggle. It’s difficult to hold onto your identity in a land where your identity is not 
valued. 
Gross: So is everything OK now in the family? 
Nanjiani: Yeah, yeah. You know, I realized I had not given my parents enough credit. I 
just, you know, it’s easy to think of your parents as being the people that they will always 
be and that they’re sort of done, you know, that they’re always going to be these people. 
But I had not given them… I had not thought that they would have the capacity to evolve 
and change in the way that they really have… I just did not give them enough credit.36 
 
 
His mother, Shabana, even gave Emily the jewelry set she had been saving for her son’s future 
wife since his childhood.37 This “credit” is peculiarly missing from The Big Sick. In fact, the 
small nods of recognition towards what Nanjiani has described here are unambiguously 
overridden by the space, time, and complications allotted to Beth and Terry over Sharmeen and 
Azmat. That his parents even welcome Emily with a Pakistani wedding itself gets tucked away in 
the end credits.  
 
 
36 Terry Gross, “How A Medically Induced Coma Led To Love, Marriage And ‘The Big Sick,’” Fresh 
Air (NPR, July 12, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/07/12/536822055/how-a-medically-induced-coma-
led-to-love-marriage-and-the-big-sick. 
37 Marantz, “Kumail Nanjiani’s Culture-Clash Comedy,” May 1, 2017. 
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The Big Sick, despite attempts at Muslim depictions that critique and give little currency to 
presumptions of violence, nonetheless re-entrenches other Orientalist notions about Islam, like 
inherent illiberalism and cultural intractability. Escape from this IslamLand is presented as a 
secular act of becoming – forging one’s own path unencumbered by the weight of Muslimicity.  
 
A Very Muslim Monologue 
 After the summer success of The Big Sick, Nanjiani was invited to host Saturday Night 
Live on October 14, 2017, only the second Desi (after Aziz Ansari) to host in the show’s 45-year 
history.38 He performed his opening monologue as a standup set, borrowing jokes from Beta 
 
38 Stephany Bai, “Aziz Ansari to Become First ‘SNL’ Host of South Asian Descent,” NBC News, January 
10, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/aziz-ansari-become-first-snl-host-south-asian-
descent-n705351. 
Figure 9: Screenshot of end credits in The Big Sick. 
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Male but incorporating new material to stay on theme for the promotion of his film and the then 
current political milieu. In a manner similar to Ansari, Nanjiani’s monologue is compactly 
centered on being/appearing Muslim.  
I had a movie earlier this summer called The Big Sick. People who don’t know, The Big 
Sick is the true story of the first year of the relationship between my eventual wife and I. 
And my wife Emily is a white American person, and my parents wanted me to marry a 
Muslim Pakistani person, so things didn’t quite go their way… I’m getting ahead of 
myself. I was the second person from my family to leave Pakistan and come to the west. I 
had an uncle decades before me who was going to Scotland. And the Nanjianis were very 
excited. And they were like “Hey, remember the deal, be good.” And he was like, “Yeah, 
[wink] got it.” And then he got to Scotland, fell in love with a white woman, married her, 
and then Nanjianis were like, “Never again! Let’s regroup, let’s tighten this up.” And 
then for decades nobody left. The next person who left was me, forty years later. I came 
to America, fell in love with a white woman, married her, and then made a movie about 
it, just to rub it in their face! Nanjianis: 0, White Women: 2. When I called my mom to 
tell her, she wasn’t even upset. She was like, “You know what? This time, shame on 
us.”39 
 
This joke sets up whiteness against Islam (“white American” vs. “Muslim Pakistani”) and 
lightheartedly ties the static outlook of his Muslim family to their static geography in Pakistan. 
The joke works because the premise is one that all can coalesce easily around: of course the 
Muslim family would not accept marriage outside their own. Leaving Pakistan for the “west” is 
an onboard to marrying white women and all that such a marriage represents. His solidarity has 
shifted for the purposes of this joke, aligned with the unnamed white women of his premise and 
her secular scaffold.  
The monologue continues with a joke taken from Beta Male and updated for the first year 
of the Trump presidency. 
Islamophobia is really on the rise right now. It never really went away but it’s really 
having a moment right now. Islamophobia is kind of like Will and Grace, you know 
where it was huge a while ago and we thought it was gone and done, and now it’s back 
and bigger than ever: Thursdays on NBC! They made me say that... I saw a guy be like, 
“Of course all Muslims are sexist. The Qur’an says women can’t drive.” [eyes widen] 
Yeah, pretty sure the Qur’an never said that. Because if the Qur’an had said “women 
can’t drive cars” 1400 years ago, I would be at the mosque right now. And so would all 
 
39 Nanjiani, Kumail Nanjiani Standup Monologue - Saturday Night Live. 
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of you. ‘Cuz that would mean the Qur’an predicted cars. If 1400 years ago the Qur’an 
was like, “Someday there will be a metallic box that will carry you wherever you want. 
And it will have four wheels. And you’d have to put gasoline in it. And it will have a 
little speedometer to tell you how fast you’re going. And it will have a bluetooth 
connection. And women shouldn’t drive it,” I would be like, “I know two things for sure: 
Islam is the only true religion, and women shouldn’t drive.” [Laughter] I am so glad you 
laughed at that, ‘cuz otherwise it sounds like I’m just giving a very divisive speech. 
“Islam is the only true religion. Women shouldn’t drive.” That will definitely be the 
quote on the internet tomorrow.40 
 
Once more, Nanjiani swerves in and out of the tenants of the humor regime, but he makes sure to 
physically and affectively react adversely, in real time, to the words he is saying. Nanjiani’s 
eyebrows rise and furrow in disbelief at the racist logic laid out by his conversation partner.  
His response, (“if the Qur’an had said…”) stresses each phrase with an air of dispassionate 
frivolity in order to communicate both the folly and misogyny inlaid within this fictive 
clairvoyant Qur’an.  
 
40 Nanjiani, Kumail Nanjiani Standup Monologue - Saturday Night Live. 




The “divisive speech” disclaimer he tacks onto the end is present in Beta Male as well. In 
both sets, among audiences that have known him for five minutes or for 50, Nanjiani does not 
trust a regime-crossing joke like this to stand alone on the strength of his unspoken bodily 
reactions. He must re-certify his secular aesthetic explicitly, distance “that” Muslim from “this,” 
and follows up with another joke that denotes his clear aversion to racism and its effect on non-
Muslims, as well. Solidarity against white supremacy once more places Nanjiani under a shared 
cover of marginality as distinctly not the danger, but its victim: 
Sikh people get attacked all the time for being Muslim. Spoiler alert: they’re not. But 
they’re Brown and they wear turbans so people attack them for being Muslim. Which 
must put them in such an awkward position, ‘cuz they’re like, “I’m not Muslim! Not that 
you should attack Muslims. But if you’re looking to attack Muslims, which you 
shouldn’t, I’m not one, there is a Muslim right over there, don’t attack him, unless 
somebody’s definitely getting attacked, in which case, get it right, which is wrong!”41 
 
Conclusion 
Nanjiani’s Right Muslim Man is avowedly secular, and (re)produces that self through a 
processual drama of ascending into the secular. This originates from a point of static and 
“essential” Muslim being that ultimately erodes and results in a secular Muslim self that is averse 
to “Islam” as it relates to issues of belief and ritual practice. This production does not dissipate 
his cultural and racial affiliation with Islam. It imbues him with marginality due to the 
dominance of anti-Muslim hostility in the U.S. and opens up an avenue for Nanjiani to 
demonstrate a non-confrontational dimension of difference, where his now-secular Muslimicity 
blunts his capacity to inflict harm in his interpersonal relationships and across the social 
spectrum. Nanjiani’s secularizing/secularized Muslim man is dynamic in his ability to adapt and 
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meet social challenges, and he aligns the rewards of this dynamism as unconflicted sexual union 
with a white woman and acceptance by/into a greater secular society.  
The essential Muslim being – personified by his parents, family, and “Pakistan” – is 
depicted as woefully static and immobile in their interpersonal growth and belief structure. It is 
notable that Nanjiani is deliberate in displacing the attribution of innate violence away from the 
essential Muslim figures in his comedy – instead of being an object to fear they are instead 
transformed into an object of humor by way of their simplicity and unsophisticated adherence to 
ritualized imagination. The authenticity of this assemblage derives from Nanjiani’s native 
testimony as a former Muslim of “that” persuasion, one who is now the Right Muslim Man 
because Islam is only a matter of racialization. In this logic, Nanjiani can be victim to anti-
Muslim hostility but cannot make demands of the secular system to accommodate Islam in any 
other fashion. Taken together, Nanjiani articulates a vision of Islam away from the 
characterization of 21st century terrorism, though he remains cognizant of that notional 
embeddedness. In response, he sterilized Islam and Muslims into figures unmodern but 
ultimately harmless outside of interpersonal divergences. They are unlike the Muslim able to step 
outside Islam as a “religion,” one like himself, who has countless space and opportunity opened 














CHAPTER 9: PATRIARCHAL DIVIDENDS, CO-OPTING BLACKNESS, AND THE 
CONCEIT OF REPRESENTATIVE #RESISTANCE  
 
The orange lining to the Trump administration is it’s united minority groups to be like, 
“Oh, we’re all Black, we’re all Muslim, we’re all Latino.” 
- Hasan Minhaj on Ebro in the Morning1 
 
Introduction 
 As I come to the close of this project, it is abidingly clear that Aziz Ansari, Hasan 
Minhaj, and Kumail Nanjiani have emerged as a simulacrum for the progressive consensus and 
secular subjecthood despite the racialized and epistemic violence they otherwise face as Muslims 
moving through a racist social schema that names itself as secular. Muslim women comedians, 
for example, have similarly staged selves that attend to secular sensibilities with nowhere near 
the same level of success. So why only these men? It feels appropriate to attend to this question 
directly by shining a final light on ontologies of patriarchy and Blackness in the progressive 
consensus context, especially as they laid the ground for what I call the conceit of representative 
resistance. Due in part to what Raewyn Connell names “the patriarchal dividend,” Ansari, 
Minhaj, and Nanjiani have come to represent themselves not just as ideal Muslim subjects but as 
representative of the only feasible Muslim subject under such secular taxonomies.  
For Ansari and Minhaj particularly, this is accomplished through their simultaneous 
appropriation of and disavowal of American Blackness and Black aesthetics. When #resistance is 
 
1 “Hasan Minhaj Breaks Down What Went Down At The White House Correspondence Dinner,” Ebro in 




simply window dressing, what is accomplished in its name? It is my hope that by consciously 
naming the presence and application of patriarchy and anti-Blackness, we may better understand 
the stakes of why humor matters and how it is critical for explaining the functions and feats of 
religion, race, gender, secularism, and Islam in quotidian humor, in the world of comedy, and in 
U.S. public life.  
 
Paying Out the Patriarchal Dividend 
When Raewyn Connell refers to the “patriarchal dividend,” she is speaking about 
material benefits that men gain through the gendered growth of capitalist economies as they 
result from the division and products of social labor between those identified as men and 
women.2 The benefits are accrued through the valuation of labor according to the social 
construction of gender and masculinity in particular. Labor that men are seemingly “naturally” 
inclined towards and excel at – i.e. work that is public-facing – has historically been prized 
above and monetarily rewarded over the labor of women, even when the work is the same.  
Standup comedy and the regime of humor is no different. The guild has long been a 
domain of the old boys’ network, epitomized by a literal table at the back of the Comedy Cellar 
in New York occupied, by and large, by cisgender men. A New Yorker article describes the 
extreme hostility that a remodel of the restaurant upstairs was met with when the comedians’ 
table was slightly moved. Chris Rock thunders the names of those who had previously sanctified 
this space. “This is not the table where Robin Williams sat, this is not where Ray Romano sat, 
 
2 R. W. Connell, “New Directions in Gender Theory, Masculinity Research, and Gender Politics,” Ethnos 
61, no. 3–4 (January 1, 1996): 157-176, 172. 
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this is not where Jon Stewart sat,” he berated the owner.3 Only three women are mentioned in 
this article, and all at once at that. Michael Che, who is frequently criticized for transphobia and 
misogyny in his comedy sets, speaks about the sanctuary the table provides.4 Nick DiPaolo, 
whose website features him giving the finger to a composite group of “activist” women, is 
described as a “regular” at the table, and Louis C.K., about whom sexual misconduct rumors had 
long swirled before his #MeToo moment, is mentioned for his lovable company.5 The gates of 
the standup industry are policed to protect the patriarchy.  
At the same time, the mere visibility of a Muslim woman incites controversy within 
normative Muslim and secular discourses, often for similar reasons. From vociferous debates 
 
3 Andrew Hankinson, “An Upset at the Comedians’ Table,” The New Yorker, August 21, 2017, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/28/an-upset-at-the-comedians-table. 
4 Hazel Cillis, “Michael Che (Still) Can’t Take Criticism From Women,” Jezebel (blog), March 31, 2018, 
https://jezebel.com/michael-che-still-cant-take-criticism-from-women-1823930425. 
5 Hankinson, “An Upset at the Comedians’ Table”; “Nick Di Paolo,” Nick Di Paolo, accessed June 29, 
2020, https://www.nickdip.com. 
Figure 11: Screenshot of Nick Di Paolo’s website, nickdip.com, taken on June 18, 2020. 
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between male ulema about “appropriate” Muslim women’s dress to the obsession with women’s 
liberation from the hijab, scholars like Leila Ahmed, Juliane Hammer, and Lila Abu-Lughod 
have tracked the ways that anxiety over Muslim women’s bodies and how much of them is 
“seen” draw from patriarchal discourses of consumption and control.6 On the comedy stage, this 
becomes an added precondition to the material Muslim women comics write and make light of. 
Comedian Tissa Hami, for instance, wears a prop chador and hijab that she throws off in the 
middle of the show because “I was feeling kind of slutty.”7 Jaclyn Michael argues this creates a 
tense incongruity for the audience, who must grapple with her as someone who (now) seems 
very much like them. The “modesty costume,” in Michael’s reading, is meant to indicate that 
clothing is not central to an American Muslim woman’s identity.8 Hami continues in this reactive 
vein by later conceding that while women typically may pray behind men in mosque spaces, it is 
not because they are marginalized. “We’re not in the back because we’re oppressed,” she swears. 
“We just like the view! We’re praying for a piece of that!”9 
I am less inclined to agree with Michael that Hami’s jokes are successful in distancing 
herself and other Muslim women from the notion that clothes play an outsized role in their 
 
6 See in particular the following works: Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? 
Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others,” American Anthropologist 104 
(2002): 783-790; Leila. Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam : Historical Roots of a Modern Debate 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 208-248; Leila Ahmed, “The Veil Debate - Again,” in On 
Shifting Ground: Muslim Women in the Global Era, ed. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone (New York: The 
Feminist Press at CUNY, 2014), 154–70; Juliane Hammer, “Center Stage: Gendered Islamophobia and 
Muslim Women,” in Islamophobia in America: The Anatomy of Intolerance, ed. Carl W. Ernst (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013), 107–144. 
7 Jaclyn Michael, “American Muslims Stand up and Speak out: Trajectories of Humor in Muslim 
American Stand-up Comedy,” Contemporary Islam 7, no. 2 (July 2013): 129–53, 143. 
8 Michael, “American Muslims Stand up and Speak out,” 143. 
9 Michael, “American Muslims Stand up and Speak out,” 143.  
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subjectivity. Rather, I see the production of such sartorial flourishes as reinscribing their 
importance and centrality – here, recreating a relational “this” Muslim and “that” like those so 
carefully enacted by Minhaj, Ansari, and Nanjiani. Becoming “this” Muslim (or one that may 
come off as more “right” in her secular subjecthood) does not close her off from the violence that 
is enjoined by being a woman. Her mere presence is an act of “againstness” in ways not shared 
with her male co-religionists.10 It is not a stretch, then, to recognize that the dividend of public 
presence for U.S. Muslims pays out regularly to men, even on the micro-stage of the comedy 
industry.  
Visibility is, as demonstrated here, fraught in the face of racialization and anti-Muslim 
hostility for Muslim men, but it is not the impediment it is for Muslim women, or, for that 
matter, Black Muslims. The presence of these men, however, has been eagerly marshaled by 
industry forces that buttress the progressive consensus. Masculinity is reflexively equated with 
authority. Due to the heightened apprehension that the Brown Muslim amalgam continues to 
summon and empower as valid, those that resemble the terrifying Muslim are thus also the 
recipients of the opportunity to confront them. The question of gender is swallowed and 
sacrificed in this regard, as the notion of “better” representation here is read primarily through 
the minoritization of race. Thus, racialized Brown Muslim men are made the recipients of a 
perverse dividend of authority as an image of #resistence, and re-enact patriarchal male 
normativities through the guise of being representative. Minhaj, Nanjiani, and Ansari have all 
taken on that mantle of representation with varying degrees of enthusiasm. When they do, 
 
10 Chan-Malik uses “againstness” to demonstrate how certain embodiments make one immediately 
outside the presumed dominant modes of being. I return to the concept later in the chapter, as well. See 
Sylvia Chan-Malik, Being Muslim: A Cultural History of Women of Color in American Islam, Being 
Muslim (New York: NYU Press, 2018), 15-18.  
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however, their experiences are extended to the experiences of Muslim women, as well. None of 
these men actually give a platform to such women; they simply speak on their behalf. 
 
To Be Representative 
Increasingly, Minhaj, Nanjiani, and Ansari’s Muslim minoritization – as it appears on 
their person and influences their humor – has been called on not just as examples of Muslim 
humor but as emblematic of it.11 Nanjiani and Ansari have been keen to engage the role of 
offering representation but demure when it comes to being representative. Ansari says this is not 
from a place of shame so much as “religious people deserve a better representative than a guy 
who’s doing a show about fucking and drinking and eating pork all the time.”12 He did, however, 
take the platform offered to him by SNL seriously, recalling “Okay, I’m in this position, I have 
to be somewhat responsible.” When they asked for material to cut out of his monologue, he 
insisted that the Muslim material stay put. “I’m going to keep that Islamophobia thing in because 
no one else can really talk about that.” Nanjiani, too, steps in and out of the position. His Twitter 
activism on issues like the Muslim Ban are tied to comments on his ethnic background: “I can’t 
imagine what it must be like to be someone who looks like me in other parts,” he says. “If there’s 
an ethnicity that is maligned and attacked and demonized ... I’m with you. I stand with 
 
11 “The daring works by Ansari, Nanjiani and Minhaj are taking powerful steps in redefining the image of 
Muslims,” says reporter Caryn James. See Caryn James, “Critic’s Notebook: Un-Demonizing Muslims, 
One Comedy at a Time,” The Hollywood Reporter, July 4, 2017, 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/critics-notebook-demonizing-muslims-one-comedy-at-a-time-
1018564. 
12 Jada Yuan, “Aziz Ansari Wanted to Be the Great Uniter and Ended Up an Activist,” New York 
Magazine, May 1, 2017. 
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you. Because it’s unavoidable that people are seeing me a certain way, I kind of want to own it. I 
feel more Pakistani than I have in the last 10 years.”13  
In an interview with podcasters Dax Shepard and Monica Padman, however, Minhaj is 
far less ambiguous than the other two. 
I’m not asking anyone to carry some baton that they should have to carry, but for me, I’m 
very proud to be Desi… I’m very proud to be this guy who, for the most part, through 
elementary school, middle school, junior high, I had a mustache, sideburns, glasses, and 
was on the sidelines of the conversation and to now be in the mainstream and say, you 
know what it is, I’m Hasan Minhaj, this is new Brown America… and I don’t care if in 
the producer’s session, they go, ‘Hanson Minaja?’, it’s like ’I don’t give a fuck.’ Because 
the Internet is real, and there’s more people who look like me than you. I’m sorry to get a 
little Farrakhan about it, but that’s how I feel! … Monica, what do you think? ... Don’t 
you have a cousin named Varun who kind of looks like me? Poofy hair, lined up beard? 
... This wouldn’t have been possible in 2011, 2012, these kinds of conversations in pop 
culture? Monica, you know, this sort of unbridled honesty where we’re playing offense? 
Not possible.14 
 
Minhaj relishes this representative role, even calling on Monica, the South Asian co-host, to 
affirm that his increased visibility is actually a symbol of progress that she shares in, as well. 
This is not something Minhaj has imagined on his own – it is how he is reported on in broader 
media discourses. The Hollywood Reporter describes the combination of these three men as 
“providing a timely corrective to Trump-era alarmism about Muslims,” effectively “touch[ing] 
universal emotions,” and “mak[ing] their points without preaching.” Ansari’s presumption that 
“no one else can really talk about it” appears implicitly shared by Nanjiani and explicitly by 
Minhaj. For Minhaj in particular, this betrays a conceit of representative resistance, whereby the 
 
13 Nanjiani and the article author’s slippage between ethnicity, nationality, and religion in this article 
demonstrate the main thesis of the progressive consensus: that the varied dimensions of social difference 
all amass into a single operative mode of racialized distinction. See Ryan, “Kumail Nanjiani: ‘I Feel More 
Pakistani than I Have in the Last 10 Years.’” 
14 The reference to Louis Farrakhan in this segment is jarring, and I return to it later in this chapter. Dax 




Muslim minoritization of these comedians has come to stand-in for all types of minoritization 
within the progressive consensus.  
Minhaj, Nanjiani, and Ansari (up until his 2017 #MeToo confrontation) are/were 
representative of Muslim resistance, a position made possible through racialization and the 
patriarchal dividend. But if they are representative of being/becoming Muslim, then how does 
one account for the experiences of Muslim women and Black Muslims in the U.S.? Sylvia Chan-
Malik’s theorization of insurgent being, the “unruly and rebellious expression against social, 
cultural, and political norms of race, gender, and religion,” is useful to explain part of what these 
men advance in their comedy. Yet they seek to tame that insurgency into something more 
secular, while the Black Muslim women and Muslim women of color that Chan-Malik studies 
embrace it as a form of againstness. “It is a set of affective responses that emerge out of the ways 
Islam is consistently lived insurgently by women, responses that arise out of the ways U.S. 
Muslim women engage, navigate, and counter the ways Islam is imagined as an unruly and 
insurgent political presence at various moments in history,” says Chan-Malik.15  
For someone like Maya Blow, a Black Muslim woman who now runs Soul Flower Farms 
with her husband east of San Francisco, Chan-Malik writes that the experience of anti-Muslim 
hostility was channeled primarily through her gendered and racial presentation. Strangers would 
hurl objects and spit on her because of her hijab, while rich white mothers at the park would 
dismiss her as a teen mom. These encounters are part of her person and her “againstness”; they 
are shaped by her “backbone” of Islam which transmutes back out as “being Muslim” to the 
world.16 These are experiences that feed her devotion to fighting carceral injustice, farming, and 
 
15 Chan-Malik, Being Muslim, 16. 
16 Chan-Malik, Being Muslim, 217-220. 
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sustainability practices “because, as Muslims, we are supposed to be living close to the earth.”17 
How can the same points of pursuit that Minhaj, Nanjiani, and Ansari share stand for a life like 
this? That their corners of experience have been elevated and discursively characterized as 
“representative” of Muslims, ostensibly even for Black Muslim women like Maya, reifies yet 
another masculine presumption of being unmarked by gender and racially determined as 
“Muslim.”  
 
Co-opting Blackness for “Muslim Cool” 
 This conceit extends also to the performance and co-optation of American Blackness for 
Ansari and Minhaj in terms of their bodily comportment, sartorial choices, and representative 
capacity. This is a performance with multiple aims, among which is yet another refraction of 
American authenticity – not aspirationally white, having been made minoritized by it, but still 
desirable and legible within its jurisdiction. Su’ad Abdul Khabeer demands recognition of “the 
critical importance of Blackness to all U.S. Muslim self-making, including those who move 
away from Blackness as well as those who… move toward Blackness as a way of being 
Muslim.”18  
This move towards Blackness particularly by South Asians in the U.S. has been 
documented by scholars like Nitasha Tamar Sharma, whose ethnographic research on “hip hop 
desis” reveals a class of young 1.5 generation and second generation South Asians that identify 
with U.S. American Blackness and hip hop as a way to express their own racialized and 
 
17 Chan-Malik, Being Muslim, 218. 
18 Su’ad Abdul Khabeer, Muslim Cool: Race, Religion, and Hip Hop in the United States (New York: 
NYU Press, 2016), 24.  
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diasporic identities and connect themselves to Black histories.19 Typically attributed to the ways 
that these Desis have experienced alienation and feelings of belonging, Sharma writes that her 
interlocuters actively “make” race by changing how they define and engage with the hegemonic 
meanings and categorical specificities of existing structures. Not finding such dynamic 
engagements among their immediate parental generation, Sharma argues that the young people 
she studies in the first decade of the 21st century turn to U.S. American Blackness “as a model of 
an explicitly racialized response to this void.”20  
Out of this emerges a race consciousness based on the shared experience and knowledge 
of history and global power that shaped the very entry of South Asians and Blacks African 
diasporas to the Americas. Communities are constructed out of this sameness and a mutual 
interest and politics. “Analyzing the overlapping processes of racialization enables a perspective 
that highlights the relational formation of minority identities,” Sharma reflects. “These theories 
inform the lyrics of these artists, who use hip hop to advance a global racial perspective that 
contests multiple racisms and offers a model for solidarity.”21 Still other South Asians, such as 
the South Asian youth studied by Sunaina Maira, affiliate with Blackness through sartorial and 
affective choices like “the style, and the attitude, and the walk” of Black men.22 The desire for 
such alignment draws, once more, on the operative notion of Black hypermasculinity and 
 
19 Nitasha Tamar Sharma, Hip Hop Desis: South Asian Americans, Blackness, and a Global Race 
Consciousness (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 4. 
20 Sharma, Hip Hop Desis, 89.  
21 Sharma, Hip Hop Desis, 119.  
22 Sunaina Maira, “B-Boys and Bass Girls: Sex, Style, and Mobility in Indian American Youth Culture,” 
in Desi Rap: Hip Hop and South Asian America (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 48.  
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simultaneous danger/allure. Maira observes that such affect is read as contradicting “stability” – 
financial and psychological – and is discarded in the search for a long-term marital partner.23  
Anti-Blackness thus remains pervasive across normative Desi Muslim discourses and is 
coded in racial and classed terms. “Black masculinity and fears of economic instability become a 
counterpoint to the “traditional” heterosexual family structure,” Maira suggests, “and desires for 
upward mobility that are linked to a nostalgia recalling an imaginary past, yet focused on its 
fulfillment in an imagined future.”24 Vijay Prashad adds that while it is recognized that whiteness 
is not necessarily an achievable category, there is nonetheless a strong desire to deny affiliation 
with Blackness “at least partly out of a desire for class mobility (something, in the main, denied 
to blacks) and a sense of solidarity with blacks was tantamount to ending one’s dreams of being 
successful (that is, of being ‘white’).”25 
 
Exploitation and Alignment 
 Minhaj and Ansari both participate in the manipulation of Blackness for comedic ends 
and their self-articulation. Ansari’s 2010 bit about bedsheets in Intimate Moments culminates in 
such intense anger that it can only be captured through the impersonation of a stereotypical 
gangster: “If that was a drug deal, I would have shot Hotel Luxury Linens in the face. ‘Where the 
rest of my threads? You didn’t think I was gonna count that shit, motherfucker?!’”26 The same 
set makes Black celebrities the butt of several jokes, such as Kanye West and R. Kelly. These 
 
23 Maira, “B-Boys and Bass Girls,” 51.  
24 Maira, “B-Boys and Bass Girls,” 52. 
25 Vijay. Prashad, The Karma of Brown Folk (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 94. 
26 Ansari and Woliner, Intimate Moments for a Sensual Evening. 
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segments are written primarily as observation of absurdity or excess. One joke about Kanye 
West centers on how odd it is that he listens to his own music at home (“that’d be like if I had a 
stand-up album, you came over to my house, and I was listening to it going, ‘hahaha! These 
jokes are dope’”).27  
At the same time, these jokes rely on the social capital of association with prominent 
Black figures, given that his audience is primarily white. He turns this into a quick punchline 
before describing R. Kelly’s extravagance onstage.  
I go to his concert with my friend Jason. We get there. Show’s sold out. People are 
psyched for R. Kelly. Jason looks over at me and goes, ‘Hey, Aziz, me and you are the 
only two white people at this concert.’ I was, like, ‘First of all, Jason, I’m not white. 
Second of all [lowering his voice ominously], you’re the only white guy at this concert. 
We might kill you, Jason!’28 
 
Ansari has continued to cluster his observational comedy around Blackness and Black 
celebrities. He performs another joke in this vein the following year on The Late Show with 
David Letterman, Anderson, and his 2012 routine Dangerously Delicious, about seeing 50 Cent 
at a restaurant.29 It is told as follows:  
I was eating at one of my favorite restaurants in New York not too long ago, and I was 
eating dinner with a friend, and he was like, ‘Aziz, what have you been up to?’ and I said, 
‘SHUT UP. 50 Cent is sitting over there and I need to hear everything he says.’ And 50 
Cent did not disappoint. He ordered a grapefruit soda. The waiter brings him the 
grapefruit soda. And then 50 Cent said the greatest thing anyone could ever say when you 
see a grapefruit soda… He looks at the waiter and says, ‘Why isn’t this purple?’ And it 
took me a few seconds, and then I realized, ‘Oh my god, 50 Cent has no idea what a 
grapefruit is! Excuse me, everybody in the restaurant, you need to SHUT UP right now 
‘cuz a waiter’s about to explain to a grown man what a grapefruit is!” You realize how 
amazing this moment is? There are parents that aren’t there when their children learn 
what a grapefruit is. I am there for that moment in rapper 50 Cent’s life. This guy leaves 
 
27 Ansari, Dangerously Delicious. 
28 Aziz Ansari and Jason Woliner, Intimate Moments for a Sensual Evening. 
29 Aziz Ansari Explaining His Encounter with 50 Cent., Late Show with David Letterman (CBS, 2011), 
https://www.wimp.com/aziz-ansari-explaining-his-encounter-with-50-cent/; Aziz Ansari Says the “50 




the restaurant, he’s going to know about a new fruit! And the exchange was just glorious. 
The waiter, struggling to explain the concept of a grapefruit to a man that just didn’t get 
it… And it just blew my mind, how does 50 Cent not know what a grapefruit is? This guy 
has been rich for so long. He has to run into a grapefruit every now and then. I do okay, 
and I see grapefruits every fucking day! What happens when he sees a grapefruit? Is he 
just like, ‘What’s up with those oranges? They’re all red and shit! And they’e big as fuck! 
Dude they’re looking at me weird! Shoot those ni**as!’30 
 
His 2013 special, Buried Alive, also featured a rib about Black men reacting to magic tricks. 
I feel bad making broad generalizations about men and women like that, but… I’m pretty 
confident. To me it’s one of those things. It’s like saying, black dudes are blown away by 
magic tricks. Stereotypes are fucked up, but that one’s on point. If anyone has footage of 
a black dude seeing a magic trick and not being blown away, show it to me. I’ll never say 
that again. But until I see that footage, that’s my favorite racial stereotype ever. That’s the 
best one! Nothing comes close. What do you got? ‘Jewish people are really cheap.’ No, 
no, no. When a black dude sees a magic trick, his mind explodes. ‘Bu-bu-but Asian 
people open up dry cleaning places a lot.’ No, no, no, no. When a black dude sees a 
magic trick, for a few moments, he thinks it’s real. Like there’s a sorcerer on earth. If you 
don’t know what I’m talking about, this is what happens, all right? They see the magic 
trick and then this– boosh! – They got to walk away a minimum of 30 feet ‘cuz 
everything they know about reality has just been destroyed. They have to reassess 
existence from the ground up. But what always happens? They always turn around. 
[Leaping across stage] ‘That’s amazing! That’s amazing! That’s amazing! That’s 
amazing!’31 
 
When these jokes are taken together and stacked against the rise of Ansari’s overall career – and 
here, I mean the type of self he assumes on stage and on screen from one role to the next, the 
gaps and silences he lays over his own experiences of racial difference and racism before 2016 – 
there is a clear tendency to lean on the conceit of representative resistance through the use of 
Black aesthetics.  
Ansari is willing to tease at the eccentricities and infantilism of prominent Black men 
while still ingratiating himself in their company and profiting, figuratively and quite literally, 
from the experience and intimacy with that Black celebrity. He has actively sought to advance 
himself as an ideal secular subject but vocalizes himself through Southern slang. He has played 
 
30 Ansari, Dangerously Delicious. 
31 Lovelace and Southern, Aziz Ansari: Buried Alive. 
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the flatly frivolous half of the ostentatious “treat yo’ self” duo alongside a Black woman in Parks 
and Recreation. He then transformed himself into a progressive standard-bearer in comedy as a 
beneficiary of the mentorship of Black comics like Chris Rock. All of this has taken place along 
a career trajectory that does not acknowledge the place of Blackness in his self-articulation. Once 
more, I am mindful of Harshita Kamath’s intentional/unintentional impersonation. Why is 
Blackness so often present in Ansari’s punchlines, even if peripheral? We are familiar with 
standup that values the varied experiences of Blackness. So why is that value so muddled in 
Ansari’s comedy?  
 I venture that this ambiguity of value derives directly from Ansari’s conceit of 
representative resistance. It is clear how exactly Ansari has built a career by telling jokes to 
white people; this is a matter of both social demographics and cultural hegemony. Though he is 
adamant that his comedy is not “for” white people, Ansari’s career, comedy, and his cultivated 
Right Muslim self subsist on their consumption.32 The co-optation of Blackness allows him to 
speak in a triangular fashion that maintains anti-Black racism while also authenticating him as 
American in ways that the two-poled effeminate and brutish Muslimicity of his racialized body 
cannot entirely overcome. Reaching for Blackness, and performing it through impersonation, 
situates Ansari “here” and not “there” in an incomplete process as he is never so convincing to 
“be” Black.  
That he never arrives at that destination, however, is what ultimately positions him for 
step two. Ansari keeps secure the supremacy of whiteness through an added performance of 
derision, where Blackness and Black men are ripe for mockery. Here, Ansari’s Brown Muslim 
 
32 “Definitely don’t care what white people think,” says Ansari. “I just try to make stuff that I think is 
good and hopefully people like it, regardless of their race or gender or anything.” See Jones, “Aziz 
Ansari: ‘I Try to Write Political Material … Then Get Tired of It.’” 
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outsiderness and general insistence that his comedy does not play to anyone specifically allows 
him to then tease Black oddity specifically because it is “on point.”33 He invites his white 
audience to laugh “at” those that have scaffolded his very presence as someone worth listening to 
in the first place because it is equal and fair.  
 
Channeling Black Confidence 
Hasan Minhaj is arguably more conscious of the ways that Blackness and hip hop 
influence his own political realities, but it less forthcoming on how heavily he leans on both for 
his own physical affect and authentication on stage. If we take Su’ad Abdul Khabeer’s 
theorization of hip hop as epistemology, then it is clear how Minhaj’s telegenic “look” relies on 
hip hop to posture himself away “from being ‘merely ‘artists’’ to being actively engaged in 
acting upon the world.”34 Minhaj’s facial stylings utilize aesthetics commonly created in Black 
barber shops like lined up beards with temple fades. In both Homecoming King and his 
appearances in Patriot Act, a key feature of Minhaj’s ensemble are his conspicuous sneakers. 
Sneaker culture, associated with the rise of Michael Jordan and his collaboration with Nike for 
Air Jordans in the 1980s and 90s, “reigns as the universal icon for the culture of consumption 
[and] the ingenious manner in which black cultural nuances of cool, hip, and chic have 
influenced the broader American cultural landscape.”35 In an interview about his sneaker choices 
on Patriot Act, Minhaj calls the shoes an homage to his childhood, which he chose deliberately 
 
33 Lovelace and Southern, Aziz Ansari: Buried Alive.  
34 Abdul Khabeer, Muslim Cool: Race, Religion, and Hip Hop in the United States, 29.  
35 Michael Eric Dyson, “Be Like Mike? Michael Jordan and the Pedagogy of Desire,” in The Jazz 
Cadence of American Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 372–80, 378. 
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as a way to stand out against his peers. “We shoot the show where I’m standing, I’m not behind a 
desk. You see the shoe in a light—I work the stage, I’m on top of the LEDs,” he says. ““It’s like 
a little wink. We’re going to do this 25-minute deep dive on student loan debt and it’s this super 
nerdy comedy book report, but I’m also wearing some ‘Union Los Angeles’ Air Jordan Is.”36  
The “loop” that Abdul Khabeer traces between hip hop and knowledge of the self is 
evident in how Minhaj conceptualizes his brand and the image of a “New Brown America” that 
is posited at the end of Homecoming King and carries through in Patriot Act. Such a performance 
of “cool” carries and lends credit to his content and political interventions. Minhaj tells Dax 
Shepard and Monica Padman that this conceptualization of an authentic self comes to him by 
way of another hip hop-influenced Asian American writer, chef, and lawyer Eddie Huang. 
One of my favorite authors is Eddie Huang. Eddie Huang says this great thing and it 
informs my choices in life. He goes, ‘I don’t buy off the sales rack and I don’t wear 
Reeboks.’ What he’s trying to say in his first book, Fresh Off The Boat, ‘I wear Jordans, I 
wear Nike, I wear the brand that I really fucking love. And now that I have a little bit of 
bread, I’m gonna go into the store and I’m gonna buy the jacket that I want’… It’s an 
uncompromised choice. I’m wearing the Air Jordan III White Cement, I’m not gonna get 
the color way over… I want this one, I’ve been eyeing it for a while so I’m getting it. 
And that’s the same thing, that’s the approach to Hasan Minhaj.”37 
 
Minhaj projects this aesthetic for himself in his Montreal Just For Laughs routine about 
the “rappers that made it” and in Homecoming King when his Hasan-character needs to 
demonstrate deep generosity, summon a well of courage, or appear unduly vulnerable. The 
“rappers that made it” bit is replete with boisterous expressions of bounty through the use of 
African American Vernacular English and Hip Hop Nation Language, a break from Minhaj’s 
more customary use of what Samy Alim distinguishes as “White Mainstream English,” though 
 
36 Ian Pierno, “For the ‘Heads: Hasan Minhaj Flexes a Fire Collection of Kicks on ‘Patriot Act,’” SLAM 
Online, October 4, 2019, https://www.slamonline.com/kicks/hasan-minhaj/. 
37 Shepard and Padman, “Hasan Minhaj.” 
264 
 
this is often referred to through the limited stricture of “standard” English.38 Minhaj’s affect 
changes as he slips into “the rapper that made it” – his voice deepens with disbelief (“yo this is 
how you guys are living? What?!”), his arms pump the air, and he beats his chest with his palm 
in syncopation with the list of his offerings: “Capri-suns on me, fam! Gushers on me, fam! Fruit 
rollups on me! You’re welcome!”39 Directly after, his voice rises back to his usual octave, the 
pace of delivery slows back down, as well. The “rapper” persona is an unsustainable peak but 
serves the purpose of exhibiting the height of “making it.”  
Early in Homecoming King, Minhaj expresses grief that his mother was only sporadically 
present during childhood because of immigration delays. “But then she would go back to India. 
That’s when I realized I don’t want a toy. I just want my mom. I want to be a family…” here, the 
crowd awws with sympathy. Minhaj cuts off the sentimentality abruptly – it is a bit mawkish, 
after all – and launches into a satirical impersonation of the rapper Drake, “I know, I was very 
emo, I was like Drake. I missed that girl. [affecting Drake] When is she coming back? I need her 
in my life. I need her. I need that girl. I need that girl in my life. I need her, Dad. She used to call 
me on my phone!”40 He dances around with Drake’s signature slouch and gesticulation as his 
audience whoops and hollers, cheers interlaced with laughter.  
Later, near the end of the show, Minhaj gives himself a pep talk as he walks towards the 
café where he will confront Bethany years after the prom jilt. He mumbles to himself: “Walk in 
there, be cool. Walk in there, be confident. Be like this, dude.” Here, Minhaj once more 
 
38 H. Samy Alim, Roc the Mic Right: The Language of Hip Hop Culture (New York: Routledge, 2006), 
54-55.  
39 Hasan Minhaj - White People At Indian Weddings. 
40 Hasan Minhaj and Christopher Storer, Homecoming King (Netflix, 2017). 
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instrumentalizes a Drake-like swagger, spinning in a circling, furrowing his eyebrows, licking 
his lips before offering a breezy, “sup?” The audience laughs when he notices that Bethany is 
actually sitting outside and witnessed his practice spin. “You know when you see someone from 
your past, all of a sudden, you’re that age again? So all that Kanye juice just goes out of my 
body. I can’t say anything… Dude, are you going to be a darapok again? Say something.”41 The 
inflection of Black confidence and cool here is channeled as a set up against the Urdu-language 
darapok, or coward. The aesthetic and affect of Blackness is marshaled by Minhaj as a 
heightening technique for recognition – of enacting uncompromised legitimacy, demonstrating 
prowess and control, or communicating a depth of sadness and longing, the aesthetic is a 
performance punch-up, familiarity turned hypervisibility.  
  Minhaj relies on this heightening technique again in Homecoming King in an attempt to 
preempt the perceived mundanity of the experiences relayed in the performance before 
questioning its premise. 
For the most part, I actually think about it the way my dad does. Oh, you couldn’t go to 
prom with a white girl? Who gives a fuck? At least your spine isn’t getting shattered in a 
police wagon, though it’s happening to my African-American brothers and sisters to this 
day. So this is a tax you have to pay for being here? I’ll pay it all. ‘I can’t date your 
daughter?’ I don’t give a fuck, Uncle Sam. Take it. But then I realized, wait, hold on. 
Why is it every time the collateral damage has to be death, for us to talk about this? A kid 
has to get shot 16 times in the back for us to be like, ‘Maybe we have a race problem in 
this country. Maybe we’re afraid of each other.’ For every Trayvon Martin or Ahmed the 
clock kid, there are shades of bigotry that happen every day between all of us. Because 
we’re too afraid to let go of this idea of the Other. Someone who’s not in our tribe, you’re 
Other.42  
 
Blackness – and specifically Black death – are summoned as an immediate offset for the 
suburban anti-Muslim hostility and racism Minhaj suffered. But just as quickly as he summons 
 
41 Minhaj and Storer, Homecoming King. 
42 Minhaj and Storer, Homecoming King. 
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the example, he releases it through an insistence that the mundanity of racism, like the racism he 
has experienced, should also be taken seriously. Minhaj attributes both microaggressive racisms 
and hate crime killings/police brutality to a collapsed fear “of the Other” across communities of 
color. This generalization is done to demonstrate solidarity against acts of bigotry, but it blunts 
the crux of his argument. The “Other” – anyone who is “not in our tribe” as he says – can be 
extended to white people, as well. Anti-Black racism is displaced, while all other forms of racism 
are flattened as mere ignorance and disagreement.  
Minhaj does not name white supremacy as the underlying institution beneath racism in 
Homecoming King. Recall that Minhaj does something similar in his interview with Dax Shepard 
and Monica Padman. As he gets worked up recollecting how he continues to experience racism 
despite his current fame, Minhaj firmly asserts that “I don’t give a fuck. Because the internet is 
real and there’s more people who look like me than you.” He hastily backs down, extending an 
apology. “I’m sorry to get a little Farrakhan about it, but that’s how I feel!”43 Minhaj plucks the 
apparition of Louis Farrakhan as an expression of regrettable excess and incongruent to his 
ultimate political vision. This moment illustrates a jarring dissonance between the self Minhaj 
postulates and the self that has arrived in the position he currently enjoys. If Minhaj is accoladed 
for branding himself and what he calls “new Brown America” as only being possible “because of 
Black America” and “the struggle that Black America had to endure,” then why is an icon of 
Black Muslims and Black resistance invoked with specification only to illustrate what Minhaj is 
not?  
Abdul Khabeer might call this an example of the “baddd” Black man who “has enough 
swag and anger to make rousing speeches and songs, yet his leadership is rarely relevant 
 
43 Shepard and Padman, “Hasan Minhaj.” 
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offstage.”44 While Farrakhan and what he represents has certainly diluted in the decades since his 
height in the 1990s, he is still an American pariah due to his ability to stir and motivate. The fear 
he inspires comes from the uncontested Americanness of his message. Nation of Islam and 
Farrakhan, as institutions unto themselves, were brokered by the American condition and 
therefore speak directly to its flaws. Actions taken towards autonomy and independence 
stemmed from the Protestant/secular failures of the nation and its vision to accommodate and 
protect Black people and the lives.45 It was rarely this content of Farrakhan’s, however, that 
would make newspaper headlines in the 1990s. Anti-Jewish statements, mingled within this 
larger messaging, meant any work done by the NOI would be tinged by the mark of anti-
Semitism.46  
Association with Farrakhan, even being in the same room, dogged Barack Obama’s 
initial presidential run in 2008 and oversaw the eventual ouster of Tamika Mallory, Linda 
Sarsour, and Bob Bland from their roles on the board of the Women’s March.47 I am left, in the 
 
44 Abdul Khabeer, Muslim Cool, 106.  
45 Curtis argues that we must account for how the surging interest and engagement with Islam among 
Black Americans added to the decline of Protestant authority from the 1950s on. See Edward E. Curtis, 
Black Muslim Religion in the Nation of Islam, 1960-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2006), 118-130.  
46 During the Nation of Islam’s 2018 Savior’s Day celebration commemorating the birth of Wallace Fard 
Muhammad, Farrakhan made comments referring to the “Satanic Jew” said that Jews had a “grip on the 
media” and that “the powerful Jews are my enemy.” Tamika Mallory’s attendance at the event set off 
wide-ranging accusations of anti-Semitism within the Women’s March Leadership Committee. Sophie 
Tatum, “Nation of Islam Leader Farrakhan Delivers Anti-Semitic Speech,” CNN (blog), February 28, 
2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/28/politics/louis-farrakhan-speech/index.html. 
47 In a post to NewsOne, Tamika Mallory said that though she very much believes in and takes part in the 
struggle against LGBTQIA oppression, she would not disavow the Nation of Islam. “Where my people 
are is where I must also be. I go into difficult spaces,” she writes. Barack Obama, in his denunciation of 
Farrakhan’s endorsement for president in 2008 said, “I did not solicit his support... I can’t say to 
somebody that he can’t say that he thinks I’m a good guy.” See Tamika Mallory, “Tamika Mallory 
Speaks: ‘Wherever My People Are Is Where I Must Be,’” NewsOne (blog), March 7, 2018, 
https://newsone.com/3779389/tamika-mallory-saviours-day/; Daniella Silva, “Three Founding Women’s 
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wake of this, wondering why the Desi Muslim Minhaj invokes Blackness for the purposes of 
performative heightening. Is this easy recognition of Blackness as extreme and hypervisible a 
ratification of its value? Yes and no. Like Ansari, Minhaj’s overt reliance on and occasional 
slipinto Black aesthetics are meant to authenticate his Right Muslim self within a secular 
American social sphere. At the same time, the emphasis on heightening cuts in two directions 
and reveals an enduring tendency to maintain the course of white supremacy and racial 
hierarchies, even when one’s craft seeks to dismantle them. 
 A deeply-set “ethnoreligious hegemony” of South Asian and Arab notions of Islam 
continues to reign across Muslim communities and their interactions with non-Muslims in the 
U.S.48 This, when tied to the conceit of representative resistance, becomes all the more apparent 
in Minhaj and Ansari’s performances and self-articulation on and off stage. When read in 
relation to the construction of themselves as the Right Muslim Man and an ideal secular subject, 
the notions of Blackness that Minhaj and Ansari render do not displace the determined 
suppositions that reside within operative racial hierarchies in the United States. Within such 
renderings, Black bodies and Blackness are made hypervisible, “seen but misrecognized,” but 
are ultimately relegated into reproducing the “facts of Blackness”: its disavowal and 
 
March Leaders Leaving Board after Anti-Semitism Accusations,” NBC News (blog), September 17, 2019, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/three-founding-women-s-march-leaders-leaving-board-after-
anti-n1055351; Editor, “Obama Denounces Farrakhan Endorsement,” Wall Street Journal, February 27, 
2008, sec. Politics, https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/02/26/obama-denounces-farrakhan-
endorsement/. 
48 Abdul Khabeer uses the phrase “ethnoreligious hegemony” to designate the ways that South Asian and 
Arab Americans’ interpretations and practices of Islam have historically dominated perceptions of what 
constitutes “authentic” Islam, particularly after the increased settling of middle and upper-class migrants 
from South and Southwest Asia in the U.S. after 1965. Jamillah Karim also describes a phenomenon of 
leaning model minority tropes among South Asian Muslims when trying to distinguish themselves away 
from Black Muslims in the U.S. See Abdul Khabeer, Muslim Cool, 13-15; Jamillah Ashira Karim, 
American Muslim Women : Negotiating Race, Class, and Gender within the Ummah (New York: NYU 
Press, 2009), 29-33. 
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instrumentalization.49 In the cases of Minhaj and Ansari, conscripting Blackness in their comedy 
works to authenticate the performer as indelibly American because of their easy and frequent 
conversance with the indelible Americana of Blackness. This authentication is overlain with the 
same air of dispositional distancing that the comedians employ with the essentialized homo 
islamicus who cannot function in conjunction with and in modernity.  
 
Transnational Class Impediments 
It is worth noting that Kumail Nanjiani does not attempt such Black significations in his 
comedy routines. This can be attributed to Nanjiani’s presentation and understanding of himself 
as an immigrant – a trope he leans on heavily and acknowledges with frequency in his sets, likely 
because his accent cannot be changed or covered. Coupled with his reticence to tackle any 
racialized politics that do not immediately radiate off his skin, Nanjiani’s standup material has 
taken on a largely observational and absurdist quality in general and then becomes granularly 
specific when having to do with Pakistan or Islam. This dissertation has not attended closely to 
the roles and tribulations that class structure introduces to the dynamics of religion, secularism, 
race, gender, and masculinity. Looking forward, I aim to rectify this gap by arguing in another 
companion piece to this dissertation that Nanjiani, Ansari, and Minhaj all actively seek to 
obfuscate their class credentials – all from highly cosmopolitan and economically privileged 
social positions – in order to slide into a more legible “poor” and working class immigrant 
casting. 
In particular, Nanjiani’s decision to consistently center a “conservative Muslim home in 
Pakistan” as his originating state is read and translated into what I call a “poor Muslim” 
 
49 Abdul Khabeer, Muslim Cool, 79. 
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sensibility – “poor” here meaning both indigent and culturally impoverished. This is a welcome 
aesthetic to a broader, pop American audience as the before-and-after vision presented in 
Najiani’s standup aligns him with broader hegemonic discourses that reduce Muslims and Islam 
as perpetually new and foreign; immigrants with means that were limited over there but have 
found encouragement and sustenance for their American dream over here. Nanjiani’s humorous 
recollections of Pakistan rely on painting an image of a poor land and people with no electricity 
(reminiscent of Lila Abu-Lughod’s Islamland), where monkeys attend birthday parties, and 
movies arrive from America ten years late.  
Class is obscured by Islam, by brownness, and, in Nanjiani’s case, by accent. The careers 
and the personas that all three Desi men have created owe a tremendous debt to their class 
position and the reshuffling of capital in their direction. Far from the popular and comforting 
imagery of an immigrant saving their whole lives to travel to America with a single suitcase, the 
realities of these men are far more transnational and cosmopolitan, facilitated by the privileges of 
familial wealth. This imagined narrative of poverty not only suits the regime of humor that each 
work within, it is mirrored outside the comedy world by wealthier classes of South Asian and 
Arab immigrants that arrived in the U.S. after 1965 in an oblique homage to the “American 
Dream” discourse that positions America as both a place that facilitated economic opportunity 
and a political safe-haven.  
Such discourses, when rehearsed with the frequency of a comedy routine, additionally 
obscure the class realities of working-class Muslims, the raced realities of Black Muslims, and 
the corporeal overlaps of the two in the contemporary U.S. Perhaps most critically, however, 
these discourses and performativities reject and bury the realities that their very presence in the 
U.S. is coded in racist and classist terms in favor of maintaining an imagined ease of class 
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mobility and “anyone can succeed” vision of America. This discourse ultimately implies that the 
problem, then, still resides over there, in Islamland or with Islam itself, which operates as a 
subjugating force that relates so strongly to poverty that it easily slips into a broader vision of 
Islam as ultimately responsible for that poverty itself. It also erases the realities of many Black 
Muslims and other working-class Muslims whose economic ascent has been stymied through the 
very institutions and policies that authorize the cosmopolitan immigrant Muslim’s entry.  
 
Whither Legibility?  
 This leads to two enduring questions that circle the drain of this project Why is legibility 
so desirable in the secular sphere? What does it actually buy? That would appear to be the 
guiding citation for Minhaj, Nanjiani, and Ansari in their conceit for representative resistance. 
Given their varied but determined endeavors to present as the Right Muslim Man, “this” and not 
“that,” these men pursue legibility in the eyes of those who dictate the secular order that gave 
them rise. The reigning racial logics of the contemporary U.S. mean, inevitably, that those 
subjects/subjectifiers are white. While these comedians make gestures towards solidarity as a 
means to demonstrate their againstness to white supremacy, patriarchy, racism, and anti-Muslim 
hostility, their self-articulations of Muslimness, race, and masculinity are honed to pass muster 
against the scrutiny of white viewers. The secular regime of humor that facilitates their rise and 
visibility simultaneously contains them, such that the comedian has room to critique certain 
power structures while still remaining very much subject to them.  
Other Brown and/or Muslim artists have sought to provincialize whiteness and its secular 
domain through their work and by building cross-racial/religious solidarities that readjust the 
reference point away from legibility instead towards liberation. Su’ad Abdul Khabeer 
272 
 
distinguishes such efforts as “racial sincerity,” which she observes among non-Black U.S. 
Muslims who are drawn to Muslim Cool as a style paved by anti-racist activism. These 
solidarities draw on a legacy of similar historical efforts to disrupt the hegemony of South Asian 
and Arab notions of Islam as well model-minority and anti-minority narratives. Vivek Bald and 
Nayan Shah’s chronicles of Desi migrants in the late 19th and early 20th century, likewise, 
document a blending into Black and Latinx communities that gain cover within while also 
unsettling the running racial order. The adoption of South Asian styles of turbans by Black men 
in the Jim Crow South similarly offered a reprieve from the stark violences committed by way of 
the Black-white binary.50  
 
Conclusion 
The cross-racial solidarities that Minhaj and Ansari perform, however, reproduce the 
hypervisibility of Blackness as a heightened state of extremes. These “facts of Blackness,” while 
gesturing towards shared political and social aims, on occasion veer into the category of 
caricature and ultimately devalue the experience from which they are originally drawn. Yet the 
invocation of Blackness is not disavowal in the way “that” Muslim is. The closeness to 
Blackness, despite its caricatured apparition, is co-opted to form a legible, but subversive secular 
subjecthood in service to concepts that do not dislodge white supremacy, white women, and anti-
Muslim hostility at its core. The distance from “that” Muslim – publicly unruly, disloyal and 
sexually perverse – maintains and reifies the secular regime of humor. This enables Ansari, 
 
50  Vivek Bald, Bengali Harlem and the Lost Histories of South Asian America (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2012), 49-50; Nayan Shah, Stranger Intimacy: Contesting Race, Sexuality, and the Law 
in the North American West (University of California Press, 2011), 14. 
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Minhaj, and Nanjiani a path forward in which their embodied foreignness is not the primary 















CONCLUSION: UNDISCIPLINED MUSLIM JOY 
 
The old definitions have not served us, nor the earth that supports us. The old patterns, no 
matter how cleverly rearranged to imitate progress, still condemn us to cosmetically 
altered repetitions of the same old exchanges, the same old guilt, hatred, recrimination, 
lamentation, and suspicion. 
 
- Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider51 
 
As I close out this conversation on American Muslim humor and comedy, I would like to 
reiterate that though what has been analyzed in these pages may very well feel like a description 
of the present, this is, foremost, a historical investigation. I have drawn a circle around a 
particular moment in American public life, illustrating the transitory nature of that moment and 
how animated a reality it was then and for that which has followed. In attending to the dynamism 
of Hasan Minhaj, Aziz Ansari, and Kumail Nanjiani’s comedy, we have here a snapshot of 
transition. This pixelated blur is one in which regimes of humor, constituted by secularity, 
whiteness, and the patriarchal dividend, reign and cut the checks. But #representationmatters, 
quite literally, and by re-injecting religion and secularity as critical categories for considering 
this moment of transition, I have come away with new insights for how we understand the forms 
and functions of Islam, race, gender, and sexuality in the United States during the early decades 
of the 21st century. 
Over the course of this dissertation, I assess the how and why of humor studies, with 
attention to the ways that their underlying mandates map onto historically contingent taxonomies 
of Islam and Muslims that have been made to appear otherwise static and essentialized. At the 
 
51 Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 1984), 190. 
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same time, I argue that the genre of humor – given its alertness to taboo and to social boundary 
maintenance – is ripe for critique of hegemonic discourses and their place in this genre itself.  
The study of Muslim humor has fallen into what I’ve designated as four primary 
categories of distinction within the English-language academy: consolidated into the study of 
“ethnic” humor, an authentic “Islamic archive” of humor, “dissident” humor, and humor in the 
wake of 9/11. All of these frames remain hypervigilant of the trope of the “humorless” Muslim 
subject and speak back to it as a presumed point of origin. This presumption requires 
documentation of its own history, something I offer by charting the historical development of a 
“sense” of humor as a prized personality trait alongside the historically-contingent notions of 
interiority, economy, and the imperialism as they postulate what it means to be secular. This 
vision of secular is not the absence of religion, but a Protestant-informed disciplining of religion. 
The secular permits the presence of religion in interiorized, Protestant-specific forms; Islam, as a 
result, is disciplined outside of its bounds. 
Secular formations have relied on imperial encounters with colonial subjects, many of 
whom were Muslim, to further substantiate themselves against this fortified inverse through the 
makings of race and religion. The conceptualization of race and racialization has reached what I 
have defined as the progressive consensus in the United States around the years 2014-2016, a 
paradigm made mainstream from the work of social justice activism and scholars in the 20th and 
early 21st centuries. It has come to be an overriding mode through which to recognize social 
difference in the critical years of 2015-2019. In its streamlining, this consensus does not 
destabilize concomitant secular notions of multiculturalism, equality, and freedom in the pursuit 
of recognition. The shared cover of marginality racializes Muslims into being “seen” – not 
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necessarily as unproblematic, but not so problematic that they cannot be accommodated under a 
secular schema.  
Minhaj, Ansari, and Nanjiani strive to use this racialized legibility to become the Right 
Muslim Man, a performed self that works towards achievement using bodily comportment, 
dress, joke structure, and the cultivation of neocolonial masculinities. Though the Right Muslim 
Man differs in the desired end result between them, all three men keep specific racial and 
patriarchal hierarchies in place in order to console and pacify secular gatekeepers of their own 
correct secular subjecthood. This subjecthood sits on the conceit of representative resistance, 
whereby the perverse privileges that accompany Brown men as representatively Muslim mean 
their experiences stand in for the experiences of all minoritized peoples, particularly Muslim 
women, but also all manner of Brown (and even Black) men interchangeably. Patriarchy is re-
entrenched through its pernicious unnaming and silence. Minhaj and Ansari both perform and 
perform against significations of Blackness that scaffold their American belonging, albeit in 
ways that – once more racially – demonstrate disciplined social difference. In such a 
configuration, anti-Muslim hostility can be directed not at Muslims but at “Islam” the religion, 
less so the body that presents as American.  
The humor and comedy produced by these men has, in the United States at least, relied 
on secular, white, masculine consumption. I have been dogged, in the course of this writing, by 
this specter and its seemingly inevitable return at every corner. My apprehension has less to do 
with finding myself in agreement with the myths that claim these categories as the sole 
consequence of a pinnacular modernity, and more so with the dangers that accompany reifying 
their permanence when attending so closely to the ways in which they dominate social 
institutions like religion in the first place. Feminist scholars like Patricia Hill Collins, Molefi 
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Asante, and Chandra Mohanty, among so many others, have urged those that study racialized 
identities to be wary of what Myra Washington catalogues as either a resignation or resistance to 
whiteness.52 Within this classification, resistance can only be understood through “anomalous, 
inconsistent, or shifting counters” to the reconstitution of whiteness, while resignation submits 
that whiteness is unsurmountable in its power.53 How, she then asks, can we “move toward 
somewhere not yet imagined and end with kinships and build solidarities premised on 
relationships not centered around race”?54 How do we cede no further ground to the hegemonies 
that seemingly dictate what we read, what we cite, what we like, what we aspire towards, and 
even what we deem funny? Can we only ever be, or can we overcome, what has been made 
inherent to ourselves?  
The analysis of Muslim humor provided in the preceding pages can point us towards such 
a possibility, though it may not exist in such form just yet. It is precisely because of the 
dynamicism of the progressive consensus moment and the sustained calls for #representation and 
#resistance that something besides interchangeable figureheads may exist on the horizon. I see 
this possibility take form in a figure like Ramy Youssef, whose eponymous Hulu comedy series 
was released in spring of 2019 and loosely follows the real-life spiritual trials of a character 
based on Youssef himself. Like Minhaj’s Homecoming King and Patriot Act, Youssef 
incorporates and levies the notion of untranslated jokes “for us,” in the expectation that not all of 
 
52 The following works take up this question broadly: Patricia Hill Collins, “Setting Our Own Agenda,” 
The Black Scholar 23, no. 3/4 (1993): 52–55; Molefi Kete Asante, “A Discourse on Black Studies: 
Liberating the Study of African People in the Western Academy,” Journal of Black Studies 36, no. 5 
(May 1, 2006): 646–62; Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and 
Colonial Discourses,” Boundary 2 12/13 (1984): 333–58. 
53 Myra Washington, “Woke Skin, White Masks: Race and Communication Studies,” Communication 
and Critical/Cultural Studies, June 15, 2020, 1–6, 1. 
54 Washington, “Woke Skin, White Masks,” 2. 
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his humor needs to be legible to the mainstream at once. His show Ramy was a sleeper hit for the 
streaming service, which ordered a second season of the show shortly after the success of the 
first season and he came away with a surprise Golden Globe for Best Actor in January 2020. 
Jennifer Aniston, who opened the envelope inscribed with his name at the ceremony, struggled to 
pronounce it and deferred the Reese Witherspoon beside her. Youssef jumped on stage to accept 
the award and exclaimed, “I’d like to thank my God, Allahu Akbar! And Hulu.”55 
Youssef’s show made its way to Hulu after cultivating a standup comedy career for 
several years, much like Minhaj, Ansari, and Nanjiani. In 2016, he served as the opener for the 
comedian Jerrod Carmichael’s show in Chicago. During that time, he brainstormed with 
Carmichael, a Black performer and creator of the NBC sitcom The Jerrod Carmichael Show, 
about the idea for a television show in which the main Muslim character grappled explicitly with 
questions of religion as a believer and not as a skeptic.56 The resulting program is, in many ways, 
unprecedented in the history of mainstream American television. The show’s title card is entirely 
in Arabic until the last moment that “RAMY” splashes across the screen, overlain a repurposed 
version of a 1970s soccer anthem by the Egyptian band Al Massrieen.57 Unlike Minhaj, Ansari, 
and Nanjiani, Youssef very much positions Islam as the moral substance of the show, not 
something that is dealt with in terms of distant relativism or the choice of renunciation. This 
 
55 Malcolm Venable, “Ramy Youssef Charms the Golden Globes in Humble Speech: ‘I Know You Guys 
Haven’t Seen My Show,’” TVGuide.Com (blog), January 5, 2020, https://www.tvguide.com/news/ramy-
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279 
 
mapping of popular Muslim humor is not bound to the mythos of multicultural secularism the 
way my subjects are. Islam is unequivocally the aspiration for Youssef and he names it freely 
and openly – to comedic effect, at times, but always with sincerity. “I’m just, like, trying to be 
good,” he confides to a shawarma shop owner at the end of the pilot episode, the same man who 
berated him at the mosque earlier in the episode for not properly performing wudu before 
Jummah prayers. “Do you... do you really think that God cares if I wash between my toes?”58 
In a similar vein, Youssef’s HBO comedy special Feelings concludes not with a joke sure 
to please (as most standup specials tend to wrap up with), but with a daring and unnerving 
provocation:  
I was thinking that in this weird way, 9/11 made me more Muslim. Because I was told it 
was my fault. I was told that the most horrible thing that I’ve ever seen to this day was 
because of me, because of who I was, where I came from, the language that I speak, and 
my faith. And I had to find out if that was true. So I looked into it. And I realized that not 
only was it not true, but this was something that I really wanted to be part of my life. I 
started praying, I started fasting, I started doing all these things that I might not have 
done… But because it happened, all this fear happened too. And it elected the dude that 
we have… and it’s not good. Like even the people that voted for him, are like “uhhh” 
[grimace] You see them, it’s like when your friend is drunk at a party and someone’s like, 
“is that your friend?” and you’re like “I mean, you know, like… we just went to middle 
school together.” He’s dismantling the courts, no one knows what he’s going to do next. 
He’s making us weak. But the way I feel about the way I believe, in my faith, that’s how 
all my friends are. And so it’s like Islam is stronger. And America is weaker. All because 
of this one thing. And so the thought I have is: did 9/11 work?59 
 
His audience is silent, followed by gasps and muffled laughter across the vast auditorium. He 
rescues the last several seconds by clearing his throat and intoning deeply, “Now that I have your 
attention… The ice caps are melting.”60 Moments like this in Youssef’s comedy manage to walk 
a line of levity that simultaneously lampoon and prick the heart of American secularity’s 
 
58 Harry Bradbeer, “Between the Toes,” Ramy (Hulu, April 19, 2019). 
59 Christopher Storer, Ramy Youssef: Feelings (Chicago Cultural Center, Chicago: HBO, 2019). 
60 Storer, Ramy Youssef: Feelings. 
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sacrosanct. Being Muslim, for once, is not on the chopping block, but the idea of American 
omnipotence is. His audience, for the most part, cannot recognize it. The contrast between the 
subjects of Youssef’s comedy versus Ansari, Minhaj, and Nanjiani is stark; the willingness to 
take on this type of material is not a willingness exhibited certainly by Ansari or Nanjiani, and to 
a lesser extent Minhaj, though he has also moved in that direction. At the same time, their mark 
is indelible. It is clear that Ansari, Minhaj, and Nanjiani have paved a path for this kind of messy, 
meditative, and politically-ambiguous comedy, walking in this direction so that someone like 
Youssef might break into a sprint, blurry and illegible within the regimes of humor. 
Of course, the miasma of patriarchy, racism, and disciplinary secularism has not been so 
quickly displaced by one interloper. For all of his accolades, Youssef has rightfully sustained 
cutting criticisms of his work that point to the tedious nature of his portrayal of Muslim women’s 
experiences throughout several episodes, as well as the devaluation of Muslim women’s voices 
in his writer’s room.61 Like Minhaj, Ansari, and Nanjiani, Youssef does not depart from the 
cliché of centering his desire for white women, while a considerable portion of screen-time is 
similarly dedicated to the sexual exploits of his mother and sister with white men, as well. 
Activist Zeinab Khalil writes that anti-Black racism pervades the first season without rebuke, 
while the portrayal of Sufis in a late episode fulfills the trope of the good, “non-threatening” 
Muslim.62 The endurance of hegemony remains, but it is less easily assumed in these cases. 
 
61 Margeaux Sippell, “Here’s What’s Going on With the Women Staff Writers on ‘Ramy,’” TheWrap 
(blog), September 18, 2019, https://www.thewrap.com/former-ramy-staff-writer-says-no-women-writers-
were-asked-back-for-season-2-but-no-men-were-either-exclusive/; Shamira Ibrahim, “What ‘Ramy’ Gets 
Wrong About Muslim Women,” The Atlantic, April 23, 2019, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2019/04/hulus-ramy-misses-mark-muslim-
women/587722/. 
62 Zeinab Khalil, “11 Reasons Why ‘Ramy’ Doesn’t Deserve a Second Season,” Wear Your Voice (blog), 
August 12, 2019, https://wearyourvoicemag.com/hulu-ramy-muslim-tropes/. 
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Capricious attempts at representative #resistance and building up a romance of racialized 
solidarity are quickly held to account. This shift in humor is not necessarily decolonial, but with 
persistent and assiduous critique, it could be. Muslim humor can move beyond the desire to 
achieve legibility through secular fealty. The middling, transitory category that Ansari, Minhaj, 
and Nanjiani have thus far occupied through their comedy seeks to preserve forms of Muslim 
subjecthood and sociality. Yet they are undergirded by the conceit of a patriarchal representative 
#resistance and the co-optations of Blackness, very much still subject to the powers and 
discipline of the humor regime.  
“Somewhere, on the edge of consciousness, there is what I call a mythical norm,” Audre 
Lorde writes in Sister Outsider. “Those of us who stand outside that power often identify one 
way in which we are different, and we assume that to be the primary cause of all oppression, 
forgetting other distortions around difference, some of which we ourselves may be practicing.”63 
The humor produced and enabled by the progressive consensus recognizes this mythical norm, 
but not for all its distortions. This is where the difference lies between #resistance and resistance, 
and what a future of secular failure may enable. In this corner of Muslim life, it looks like what 
Ansari, Nanjiani, and Minhaj have given us on occasion in brief, inspiriting bursts: humor that is 
for us, undisciplined, unruly, and untranslated. This humor is bound to us in its illegibility. It 
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